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Re: [P2P-F] [commoning] support appreciated for Plan C, a commons transition plan for greek civil movements
by Michel Bauwens 15 Jul '15

15 Jul '15

thanks George, i have not read the book but my impression is that it is exclusively focused on entities that have extractive practices ? Michel On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 3:32 PM, George Pór <george.por(a)gmail.com> wrote: > I've just inserted in the "Building up alternative democratic power and > self-organization" section: > > create a 'self-management learning center' to support even non-commons > organizations of all sorts to move to self-management inspired by the > experiences described in Reinventing Organizations > <http://p2pfoundation.net/Reinventing_Organizations> > > george > -- > George Pór > Fellow, Future Considerations > Fellow of Royal Society fr the Arts > Visiting Professor, Management Center Innsbruck > Founder and Co-editor of Enlivening Edge: > News from Next-Stage Organizations > > researcher in collective intelligence and wisdom > evolutionary thinker, social architect, and integral mentor > <http://community-intelligence.com/integral-mentoring/> > to leaders and changemakers in business, government, and civil society > > Email: george.por(a)gmail.com > Mobile: +44 7780 181 865 > Skype: georgepor > LinkedIn: uk.linkedin.com/in/georgepor > Twitter: @Technoshaman > Web: http://futureconsiderations.com/who/team/core/george/ > Publications: https://independent.academia.edu/GeorgeP%C3%B3r > > On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 10:08 AM, Michel Bauwens <michel(a)p2pfoundation.net > > wrote: > >> dear friends, >> >> I will try to work on this in the coming days, but would really >> appreciate any support , >> >> see: >> http://p2pfoundation.net/Plan_C_for_Advancing_the_Commons_Transition_in_Gre… >> >> Michel >> >> -- >> Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: >> http://commonstransition.org >> >> P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net >> >> <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: >> http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens >> >> #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Commoning mailing list >> Commons-Institut e.V. Germany >> Commoning(a)lists.commons-institut.org >> https://lists.schokokeks.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/commoning >> >> > -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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Fwd: [NetworkedLabour] What should have been done in Greece.
by Michel Bauwens 15 Jul '15

15 Jul '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Frederic Janssens <fjanss(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:39 PM Subject: Re: [NetworkedLabour] What should have been done in Greece. To: Michel Bauwens <michel(a)p2pfoundation.net> Cc: Christian Fuchs <christian.fuchs(a)uti.at>, " networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org" <networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org> Concerning the attitude of Syriza towards Grexit, here is what Yanis Varoufakis tells in an interview (linked to by sebastian(a)rolux.org on nettime list) : http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/07/exclusive-yanis-varoufaki… : HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit from day one... YV: Yes, absolutely. HL: ...have preparations been made? YV: The answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ???war cabinet' within the ministry, of about five people that were doing this: so we worked out in theory, on paper, everything that had to be done [to prepare for/in the event of a Grexit]. But it's one thing to do that at the level of 4-5 people, it's quite another to prepare the country for it. To prepare the country an executive decision had to be taken, and that decision was never taken. HL: And in the past week, was that a decision you felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]? YV: My view was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn't want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I didn't want this to be like Nietzsche's famous dictum that if you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss will stare back at you. But I also believed that at the moment the Eurogroup shut out banks down, we should energise this process. HL: Right. So there were two options as far as I can see - an immediate Grexit, or printing IOUs and taking bank control of the Bank of Greece [potentially but not necessarily precipitating a Grexit]? YV: Sure, sure. I never believed we should go straight to a new currency. My view was - and I put this to the government - that if they dared shut our banks down, which I considered to be an aggressive move of incredible potency, we should respond aggressively but without crossing the point of no return. We should issue our own IOUs, or even at least announce that we're going to issue our own euro-denominated liquidity; we should haircut the Greek 2012 bonds that the ECB held, or announce we were going to do it; and we should take control of the Bank of Greece. This was the triptych, the three things, which I thought we should respond with if the ECB shut down our banks. ... I was warning the Cabinet this was going to happen [the ECB shut our banks] for a month, in order to drag us into a humiliating agreement. When it happened - and many of my colleagues couldn't believe it happened - my recommendation for responding "energetically", let's say, was voted down. HL: And how close was it to happening? YV: Well let me say that out of six people we were in a minority of two. ... Once it didn't happen I got my orders to close down the banks consensually with the ECB and the Bank of Greece, which I was against, but I did because I'm a team player, I believe in collective responsibility. And then the referendum happened, and the referendum gave us an amazing boost, one that would have justified this type of energetic response [his plan] against the ECB, but then that very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ???No', should not be what energised the energetic approach [his plan]. Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. ... You cease to negotiate. -- Frederic -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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Fwd: [NetworkedLabour] Hart-Landsberg on Greece
by Michel Bauwens 15 Jul '15

15 Jul '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: peter waterman <peterwaterman1936(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 2:14 PM Subject: [NetworkedLabour] Hart-Landsberg on Greece To: WSFDiscuss List <WorldSocialForum-Discuss(a)openspaceforum.net>, Debate is a listserve that attempts to promote information and analyses of interest to the independent left in South and Southern Africa < debate-list(a)fahamu.org>, "CRITICAL-LABOUR-STUDIES(a)jiscmail.ac.uk" < CRITICAL-LABOUR-STUDIES(a)jiscmail.ac.uk>, "< networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org>" <networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org> [image: Socialist Project - home] <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> *The B u l l e t* <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/> Socialist Project • E-Bulletin No. 1142 July 14, 2015 [image: Socialist Project - home] <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> « Previous <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1141.php> Home <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> Today <http://www.socialistproject.ca/today/> 1 <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1142.php#comments> Next <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1143.php> » Lessons From A Defeat In Europe Martin Hart-Landsberg The Troika are celebrating the end of negotiations with Greece, proclaiming that thanks to their tireless efforts the Eurozone remains whole. And why wouldn't they celebrate. They have demonstrated their power to crush, at least for now, the Greek effort to end austerity and its associated devastating social consequences. Tragically, Syriza has not only surrendered, the nature of its defeat is likely to leave the country worse off, at least both economically and very likely politically as well. [Mike Constable <http://www.mikeconstable.com/>] At this point, one of the most important things we can do is try to draw lessons from the Greek experience. • Perhaps one of the most obvious lessons is that visions of a more humane Europe are not real. European leaders were more than willing to pursue the complete collapse of the Greek economy in order to break Syriza and the movement that gave it power for fear of the demonstration effect a successful Syriza might have had on broader European politics. Using the lever of a European Central Bank cut off of funding for Greek banks, the Troika pressed Syriza to the wall. “Extensive Mental Waterboarding” Here is how a Guardian blog post <http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jul/12/greek-debt-crisis-eu-l…> described the nature of the discussions leading up to the final Greek surrender: “Alexis Tsipras was given a very rough ride in his meeting with Tusk, Merkel and Hollande, our Europe editor Ian Traynor reports. “Tsipras was told that Greece will either become an effective ‘ward’ of the eurozone, by agreeing to immediately implement swift reforms this week. “Or, it leaves the euro area and watches its banks collapse. “One official dubbed it ‘extensive mental waterboarding’, in an attempt to make the Greek PM fall into line. “An unpleasant image that highlights just how far we have now fallen from those European standards of solidarity and unity.” • Second, the vicious nature of the European response to the Greek government's initial offer of moderate austerity, symbolized by the stance of its dominant power Germany, reflects more than ignorance or petty mindedness on the part of European leaders. It reflects the increasingly exploitive nature of contemporary capitalism everywhere. Capitalists, pursuing profits in an increasingly competitive and unstable global system, demand ever greater power to intensify the exploitation of workers everywhere and that is how dominant states approach social policy in their respective countries and international institutions. • Third, class interests dominate so-called “economic rationality”. A case in point <https://economicfront.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/victory-greece-over-the-troi…>: in the period before the July 5 referendum we learned that IMF staff believed that Greece would be unable to pay its debts under the best of conditions and that therefore any agreement with Greece had to include debt relief while at the very same time the head of the IMF was aggressively joining with European leaders to reject Greek government pleas for just such relief. • Fourth, since dominant powers will do everything in their power to block meaningful social transformation, those seeking to lead it must prepare people as best they can for the expected class struggle and opposition. In this case Syriza can and should be faulted for not engaging people about the difficulty of achieving both an end to austerity and Eurozone membership under current conditions and doing its best to develop the technical and political capacities necessary for a break from the Euro on its own terms if and when the situation called for it. Greeks elected a progressive government, voting Syriza into power in January 2015, on the basis of the party's commitment to both anti-austerity and continuing Eurozone membership. The leadership of Syriza never wavered from encouraging Greeks to believe that both were possible and most Greeks, for many reasons, were eager to believe that this was true. Although the results of the July 5 referendum showed that the Greek working class has a strong fighting spirit, polling also revealed that most of those who voted No hoped that their vote against the European austerity plan would lead to a better deal from Europe, not a break from the Eurozone. They no doubt felt this way because of government pronouncements. For example, below are the results of polling <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/09/what-were-the…> done the day before the referendum: Tragically, immediately after the vote the Greek government surprised everyone by returning to negotiations with the Troika with an offer to accept an austerity program much like the one that had been originally placed before the people and rejected. The only meaningful addition was that it included the long held Greek proposal for debt relief. This decision was a serious mistake for two reasons – it generated serious confusion on the part of the Greek population and perhaps even more importantly convinced the Troika that the Greek government was not prepared to use its new domestic support to challenge the status quo. This only emboldened the Troika to proclaim that the referendum had changed everything and now that trust had been lost between the Troika and Syriza leaders, the austerity demands had to be intensified. In fact, we have learned that Syriza's leaders did not expect to win the referendum and were prepared to and in fact perhaps hoped to be able to resign and let more conservative forces negotiate and approve a new austerity package. Here is part of an interview <http://ineteconomics.org/ideas-papers/blog/the-greek-revolt-against-bad-eco…> with James K. Galbraith, a strong Syriza supporter: “The recent Ambrose Evans Pritchard piece is very much on the mark (‘Europe is blowing itself apart over Greece – and nobody seems able to stop it <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11724924/Europe-is-blowing-its…>’). The Greek government, and particularly the circle around Alexis, were worn down by this process. They saw that the other side does, in fact, have the power to destroy the Greek economy and the Greek society – which it is doing – in a very brutal, very sadistic way, because the burden falls particularly heavily on pensions. They were in some respects expecting that the yes would prevail, and even to some degree thinking that that was the best way to get out of this. The voters would speak and they would acquiesce. They would leave office and there would be a general election.” No Plan B It all went downhill from there. In short, Syriza leadership had no plan B. The Troika knew that Syriza was unwilling to pursue its own break from the Eurozone, which meant that its leadership would do anything to remain in the Eurozone. The following is from an interview <http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/07/exclusive-yanis-varoufaki…> with Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister, that provides insight into the somewhat self-inflicted weakness in Syriza's bargaining stance: “The referendum of 5 July has also been rapidly forgotten. It was preemptively dismissed by the Eurozone, and many people saw it as a farce – a sideshow that offered a false choice and created false hope, and was only going to ruin Tsipras when he later signed the deal he was campaigning against. As Schäuble supposedly said, elections cannot be allowed to change anything. But Varoufakis believes that it could have changed everything. On the night of the referendum he had a plan, Tsipras just never quite agreed to it. “The Eurozone can dictate terms to Greece because it is no longer fearful of a Grexit. It is convinced that its banks are now protected if Greek banks default. But Varoufakis thought that he still had some leverage: once the ECB forced Greece's banks to close, he could act unilaterally. “He said he spent the past month warning the Greek cabinet that the ECB would close Greece's banks to force a deal. When they did, he was prepared to do three things: issue euro-denominated IOUs; apply a ‘haircut’ to the bonds Greece issued to the ECB in 2012, reducing Greece's debt; and seize control of the Bank of Greece from the ECB. “None of the moves would constitute a Grexit but they would have threatened it. Varoufakis was confident that Greece could not be expelled by the Eurogroup; there is no legal provision for such a move. But only by making Grexit possible could Greece win a better deal. And Varoufakis thought the referendum offered Syriza the mandate they needed to strike with such bold moves – or at least to announce them. “He hinted at this plan on the eve of the referendum, and reports later suggested this was what cost him his job. He offered a clearer explanation. “As the crowds were celebrating on Sunday night in Syntagma Square, Syriza's six-strong inner cabinet held a critical vote. By four votes to two, Varoufakis failed to win support for his plan, and couldn't convince Tsipras. He had wanted to enact his ‘triptych’ of measures earlier in the week, when the ECB first forced Greek banks to shut. Sunday night was his final attempt. When he lost his departure was inevitable. “'That very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the energetic approach [his plan]. Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. ... You cease to negotiate.'” Of course, it is easy to call for a break with the Eurozone but in reality such a break would not be a walk in the park. For example, Varoufakis makes clear that there were no certainties for what would happen if the government decided on a break: “'He [Tsipras] wasn't clear back then what his views were, on the drachma versus the euro, on the causes of the crises, and I had very, well shall I say, ‘set views’ on what was going on. A dialogue begun ... I believe that I helped shape his views of what should be done.' “And yet Tsipras diverged from him at the last. He understands why. Varoufakis could not guarantee that a Grexit would work. After Syriza took power in January, a small team had, ‘in theory, on paper,’ been thinking through how it might. But he said that, ‘I'm not sure we would manage it, because managing the collapse of a monetary union takes a great deal of expertise, and I'm not sure we have it here in Greece without the help of outsiders.’ More years of austerity lie ahead, but he knows Tsipras has an obligation to ‘not let this country become a failed state’.” To be a bit more specific, a break from the Eurozone would require nationalization of the banks – an act that would immediately draw the country into a serious legal test with Europe since the banks are technically under the control of the European Central Bank. It would require the government to quickly issue new script as it prepared a new currency, and aggressively engage in an expanded public works program. At the same time it was unclear whether the new script would be accepted and whether the country would have sufficient foreign exchange to maintain minimum purchases of key import items such as food and medicine. Moreover, many businesses, holding debts denominated in euros, would likely be forced into bankruptcy necessitating government takeover. And, all this would take place in a relatively hostile international environment. No doubt some countries would offer words of solidarity, but it appears unlikely that any would or could offer meaningful financial or technical assistance. Still, with proper preparation the possibilities for success could have been greatly enhanced. Strikingly, Varoufakis mentioned that Syriza had established a small team to think about what a break would mean shortly after their January 2015 election, a team that no doubt was kept small because the government wanted to keep the planning secret. But that was a mistake. Planning should have happened on a large scale and in a visible way. Discussions should have been held with international legal experts as well as with the Brics countries concerning possible use of their new lending and investment facilities. There was no need to keep this planning quiet, quite the opposite – Eurozone leaders should have been made aware that Syriza was seriously studying its alternatives. And the population should have been brought along – that the government would do all in its power to stay in the eurozone as long as this was consistent with an end to austerity. As it was, Tsprias went back into negotiations unarmed, desperate for a bailout. Once the ECB tightened its support for Greece's banking system it should have been clear, if not before then, that a German-led Europe was only interested in total surrender on the part of Greece. And as far as I can tell total surrender is what they got. Greece has agreed to austerity program that is far worse than any previously rejected. Here is the Guardian summary <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greece-bailout-agreement-ke…> of what was agreed: *Greek assets transfer* Up to €50bn (£35bn) worth of Greek assets will be transferred to a new fund, which will contribute to the recapitalisation of the country's banks. The fund will be based in Athens, not Luxembourg as Germany had originally demanded. The location of the fund was a key sticking point in the marathon overnight talks. Transferring the assets out of Greece would have meant “liquidity asphyxiation”, Tsipras said. As the statement puts it: “Valuable Greek assets will be transferred to an independent fund that will monetise the assets through privatisations and other means.” The “valuable assets” are likely to include things such as planes, airports, infrastructure and banks, analysts say. Some of the fund will be used to recapitalise banks and decrease debt, but analysts are sceptical about how much money there will really be to work with. “Given the experience of the last few years’ privatisation programme, these targets appear overtly optimistic, serving as a signalling mechanism of Greek government commitment to privatisation rather than a meaningful source of financing for bank recapitalisation, growth and debt reduction,” said George Saravelos, a strategist at Deutsche Bank. *Pensions* Greece has been told that it needs to pass measures to “improve long-term sustainability of the pension system” by 15 July. The country's pensions system, and its perceived generosity relative to other eurozone states, has been a key sticking point in the past five months of negotiations with creditors. The so-called troika of lenders believes that Athens can save 0.25% to 0.5% of GDP in 2015 and 1% of GDP in 2016 by reforming pensions. Greece had wanted to draw out reform of early retirement rules, starting in October and running until 2025, when everyone would retire at 67. The EU wants the process to start immediately, by imposing huge costs on those who want to retire early to discourage them from doing so. The lenders also say Athens must bring forward the reform programme so it completes in 2022. *VAT and other taxes* Another source of contention in the months of failed negotiations that preceded Monday's tentative deal, VAT is now also on the block for immediate reform. The latest agreement demands measures, again by 15 July, for “the streamlining of the VAT system and the broadening of the tax base to increase revenue”. One of the key objections from Greece's creditors to its VAT system is a 30% discount for the Greek islands. Athens proposed a compromise on 10 July under which the exemptions for the big tourist islands – where the revenue opportunities are greatest – would end first, with the more remote islands following later. The onus on Greece to “increase revenue” is likely to mean more items will be covered by the top VAT rate of 23%, including restaurant bills, something that had until recently been a red line for Tsipras. *Statistics office* Another demand for legislation by 15 July is on “the safeguarding of the full legal independence of ELSTAT”, the Greek statistics office. *Balancing the books* Greece has been told it must legislate by 15 July to introduce “quasi-automatic spending cuts” if it deviates from primary surplus targets. In other words, if it cannot cut enough to balance the books, it should cut some more. In the past, the troika has demanded that Greece commit to a budget surplus of 1% in 2015, rising to 3.5% by 2018. *Bridging finance* Talks will begin immediately on bridging finance to avert the collapse of Greece's banking system and help cover its debt repayments this summer. Greece must repay more than €7bn to the European Central Bank (ECB) in July and August, before any bailout cash can be handed over. *Debt restructuring* Greece has been promised discussions on restructuring its debts. A statement from Sunday night also ruled out any “haircuts”, leaving the €240bn Greece owes to Brussels, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the books. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, said the Eurogroup was ready to consider extending the maturity on Greek loans. She argues that a delay in loan repayments and a lower interest rate act in the same way as a write-off, which is why many analysts point out that the Greek debt mountain is worth the equivalent of 90% of GDP in real terms and not the 180% commonly quoted. Merkel said that for this reason there was no need for a Plan B. *Radical reforms* Tsipras pledged to implement radical reforms to ensure the Greek oligarchy finally makes a fair contribution. The agreement thrashed out overnight would allow Greece to stand on its feet again, he said. Implementation of the reforms would be tough, he said, but “we fought hard abroad, we must now fight at home against vested interests”. He added: “The measures are recessionary, but we hope that putting Grexit to bed means inward investment can begin to flow, negating them.” *Liberalising the economy* The new deal also calls for “more ambitious product market reforms” that will include liberalising the economy with measures ranging from bringing in Sunday trading hours to opening up closed professions. Greece's labour markets must also be liberalised, the other eurozone leaders say. Notably, they are demanding Athens “undertake rigourous reviews and modernisation” of collective bargaining and industrial action. Pharmacy ownership, the designation of bakeries and the marketing of milk are also up for reform, all as recommended in a “toolkit” from the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *IMF support* The statement from the euro summit stipulates that Greece will request continued IMF support from March 2016. This is another loss for Tsipras, who had reportedly resisted further IMF involvement in Greece's rescue. *Energy market* Greece has been told to get on with privatising its energy transmission network operator (ADMIE). *Financial sector* Greece has been told to strengthen its financial sector, including taking “decisive action on non-performing loans” and eliminating political interference. *Shrinking the state* Athens has been told to depoliticise the Greek administration and to continue cutting the costs of public administration. The Guardian highlights one of the hidden landmines in the agreement: “Our economics editor Larry Elliott has been going through the details of this morning's deal <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greece-bailout-agreement-ke…> and concludes it will deepen the country's recession, make its debt position less sustainable and that it ‘virtually guarantees that its problems come bubbling back to the surface before too long’.” He continues <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/13/europe-greece-pushed-into-furt…> : “One line in the seven-page euro summit statement sums up the thinking behind this act of folly, the one that talks about ‘quasi-automatic spending cuts in case of deviations from ambitious primary surplus targets’. “Translated into everyday English, what this means is that leaving to one side the interest payments on its debt, Greece will have to raise more in revenues than the government spends each and every year. If the performance of the economy is not strong enough to meet these targets, the ‘quasi-automatic’ spending cuts will kick in. If Greece is in a hole, the rest of the euro zone will hand it a spade and tell it to keep digging. “This approach to the public finances went out of fashion during the 1930s but is now back. Most modern governments operate what are known as ‘automatic stabilisers’, under which they run bigger deficits (or smaller surpluses) in bad times because it is accepted that raising taxes or cutting spending during a recession reduces demand and so makes the recession worse.” At least according to press reports, Tsprias put up his greatest fight over inclusion of the IMF in monitoring the agreement and privatization. The IMF is definitely in. As for privatization or what the Guardian calls “Asset Transfer,” gains were minimal. One can question in fact whether at least the latter area is one where Tsprias should have tried to draw lines. At least on the face of it, it would seem that it would have made more sense to fight the demand to “liberalize” labour markets. A victory here would have given the state freedom to encourage the development of a strong labour movement, regardless of ownership. Moreover, as noted in the summary, Greece is still not guaranteed new loans or debt relief. Its parliament has to pass all of the above and then the government gets to start negotiations again. As the Guardian reports <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greek-bailout-what-happens-…> : “European leaders lined up to say Grexit has been averted, but this snappy soundbite glides over the fact the eurozone has simply agreed to open negotiations on an €86bn (£62bn) bailout. Although this is a step to shoring-up confidence in the euro, it is only a promise to have more talks with no guarantee of success. “Talks on the bailout plan are forecast to last around four weeks. ‘We know time is critical for Greece, but there are no shortcuts,‘ said Klaus Regling, the official in charge of the the European Stability Mechanism, the eurozone's permanent bailout fund that Greece hopes to tap. “But these formal talks can only begin, if eurozone leaders avoid several political and financial tripwires. The Greek government has until the end of Wednesday to ensure that sweeping reforms to its pension system and VAT rates are written into law. If Greek lawmakers meet this eurozone-imposed deadline, the baton will pass to the creditors. At least five countries, including Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, will have to put the idea of opening negotiations on a bailout to a parliamentary vote. “Politics could be overtaken by financial deadlines. Athens faces demands to repay €7bn of debts in July, including €3.5bn due to the European Central Bank on Monday (20 July). “Eurozone officials are working round the clock to come up with emergency funds that will help Greece bridge the gap before a permanent bailout kicks in. ‘It's not going to be easy,’ said Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the hawkish Dutch politician, who was re-elected chair of the eurozone group of finance ministers on Monday. Several options were being discussed on bridge finance, but no one had found ‘the golden key to solve the problem’, he said, although he hopes to see progress by Wednesday.” The ECB will also continue to maintain a choke hold on the Greek economy perhaps for months, tightening if any deviations take place. “They told clients tonight that the European Central Bank is unlikely to cut Greece much slack until the third bailout is agreed. “We suspect the ECB will stall an ELA decision until Greece begins to legislate the new deal later this week. “Greece would still face a tight ELA cap, however. We expect the ELA cap will remain carefully calibrated and controlled at least until the new ESM loan is fully in place. Access to banks could be fully normalised only in the fall.” It is hard to see this agreement as anything but failure. Clearly the main responsibility for this disaster rests with the leaders of Germany and the European Union. They showed that they had no interest in meaningful, honest negotiations, fearing that they would likely lead to a real challenge to their power. But unfortunately Syriza's leadership did not make the best of the bad hand they were dealt. They needed to talk more truthfully to the population about the political/class nature of and reasons for the difficult challenges they faced and do the maximum possible to strengthen their negotiating position and prepare the population for the failure that they thought likely. Hopefully, the Greek people will find the time and space necessary to digest and learn the lessons from this struggle and successfully regroup. We all must. • Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea; and Adjunct Professor in the Labour Studies Program at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He blogs at economicfront.wordpress.com where this article first appeared. « Previous <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1141.php> Home <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> Today <http://www.socialistproject.ca/today/> Next <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1143.php> » Comments #1 *Anonymous* 2015-07-14 19:15 EDT *Where does "power" reside in a bourgeois democracy?* "Greeks elected a progressive government, voting Syriza into power in January 2015,..." Well no actually as we have clearly seen Syriza was not "voted into power" in January 2015. Power at that time still resided with "Capital" as it always will in a capitalist (bourgeois) democracy. ------------------------------ *Post New Comment: * Display Name: E-mail: Subject: Comment: enter your comment here... What is this text?: [image: Prove you're not a robot] : « Previous <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1141.php> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(((( The B u l l e t ))))~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ • ISSN 1923-7871 • Next » <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1143.php> Share: [image: Delicious] <http://delicious.com/post?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistproject.ca%2Fbullet…> [image: Digg] <http://digg.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistproject.ca%2Fbullet%2F…> [image: Facebook] <http://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistproject.ca%2…> [image: Google bookmark] <http://www.google.com/bookmarks/mark?op=add&bkmk=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialist…> [image: MySpace] <http://www.myspace.com/Modules/PostTo/Pages/?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistpr…> [image: Reddit] <http://reddit.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistproject.ca%2Fbullet%…> [image: StumbleUpon] <http://www.stumbleupon.com/submit?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.socialistproject.ca%…> [image: Twitter] <http://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Currently+reading+Bullet+No.+1142+abou…> [image: UnionBook] <http://www.unionbook.org/profiles/blog/new?post_title=Bullet+No.+1142+Lesso…> [image: RSS] <http://www.socialistproject.ca/rss> ^ Back to Top ^ <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1142.php#top> -- *Recent publications* 1. 2014. From Coldwar Communism to the Global Justice Movement: Itinerary of a Long-Distance Internationalist. http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/from_coldwar_communism _to_the_global_emancipatory_movement/ (Free). 2. 2014. Interface Journal Special (Co-Editor), December 2014. 'Social Movement Internationalisms'. (Free).3. 2014. with Laurence Cox, ‘Movement Internationalism/s’, Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements. (Editorial), Vol. 6 (2), pp. 1–12. 4. 2014. ‘The International Labour Movement in, Against and Beyond, the Globalized and Informatized Cage of Capitalism and Bureaucracy. (Interview). Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements. Vol. 6 (2), pp. 35-58. 5. 2014. 'The Networked Internationalism of Labour's Others', in Jai Sen (ed), Peter Waterman (co-ed), The Movement of Movements: Struggles for Other Worlds (Part I). (10 Euros). 6. 2015. Waterman, Peter. ‘Beyond Labourism, Development and Decent Work’. <https://escarpmentpress.org/globallabour/article/download/2338/2433> Global Labour Journal, 2015, 6(2), pp. 246-50. *More publications, click [////]* _______________________________________________ NetworkedLabour mailing list NetworkedLabour(a)lists.contrast.org http://lists.contrast.org/mailman/listinfo/networkedlabour -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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Fwd: [NetworkedLabour] Panitch: The Denoument
by Michel Bauwens 15 Jul '15

15 Jul '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: peter waterman <peterwaterman1936(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 2:00 PM Subject: [NetworkedLabour] Panitch: The Denoument To: "CRITICAL-LABOUR-STUDIES(a)jiscmail.ac.uk" < CRITICAL-LABOUR-STUDIES(a)jiscmail.ac.uk>, WSFDiscuss List < WorldSocialForum-Discuss(a)openspaceforum.net>, Debate is a listserve that attempts to promote information and analyses of interest to the independent left in South and Southern Africa <debate-list(a)fahamu.org>, "< networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org>" <networkedlabour(a)lists.contrast.org>, p2p-foundation <p2p-foundation(a)lists.ourproject.org> [image: Socialist Project - home] <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> *The B u l l e t* <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/> Socialist Project • E-Bulletin No. 1143 July 15, 2015 [image: Socialist Project - home] <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> The Denouement Leo Panitch For many decades, the view was widespread on the left that there was a distinct European variety of capitalism which could be positively contrasted with the Anglo-American more ‘free market’ variety. The labour movements of northern Europe were usually seen as being the decisive force behind greater state economic involvement, more capitalist cooperation with unions, and more egalitarian social welfare and labour market regimes. The development of the European Union added a further attractive dimension to this, especially for internationalists. It was considered retrograde to want to stay out, let alone get out, of the European ‘project’ at each phase of its development, with many seeing participation in its institutions as the decisive terrain for the left's engagement. The hyper-austerity policies European states have pursued since 2009, contributing to the powerfully lingering effects of the first great global capitalist crisis of the 21st century, already shattered a good deal of the left's illusions about Europe. The denouement of the Syriza strategy in Greece appears to have written *finis* to it. The writing was on the wall already as the European left searched for an exit from the global capitalist crisis of the 1970s. This was especially the case when the Programme Commun <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programme_commun> forged by the French Socialist and Communist Parties ran up against the implicit neoliberalism embedded in the Treaty of Rome's ambitions for free trade and free capital flows across Europe. With the massive capital flight that pursuing Keynesian measures led to in the face of German and American monetarism, it was the German Social Democratic leader Helmut Schmidt <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmut_Schmidt> who forced François Mitterrand <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Mitterrand>'s famous U-turn by telling him capital controls were impossible unless he abandoned the European project. The roots of the arbitrary 3 per cent ceiling on fiscal deficits in today's European Stability Pact go back to the ceiling first imposed on the Mitterrand government in the early 1980s. European Common Market? Those in the Bennite <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tony_Benn> wing of the British Labour Party who stood opposed to the referendum on entry to the Common Market in the mid-1970s, did so not because they were narrow fish-and-chips nationalists as they were accused of being, but because they recognized the limits joining Europe would impose on their Alternative Economic Strategy. The opposition to joining Europe on the left of the Swedish labour movement which advanced the radical wage earners fund proposals was rooted in the same recognition. Those who subsequently looked to the emplacement of a Social Charter at the core of the process of Economic and Monetary Union were consistently disappointed on the march to the establishment of the euro common currency regime. The European Left Parties, led by Die Linke and the other representatives in the European Parliament representing the full spectrum to the left of the social democratic party bloc, have given top priority to completing economic union with a political union whereby fiscal and social policy would be centralized alongside monetary policy. This would leave less, rather than more, room for manoeuvre for the balance of class forces to be effectively registered in each European state, and especially in the smaller ones. It is very significant that so many on the left who oppose neoliberalism, from those clinging to the legacy of Keynesianism to those carrying on the tradition of revolutionary internationalism, should have now joined their voices in supporting a Grexit, and broadly criticized the Syriza leadership for not having prepared for it. One might ask what they were thinking when Alexis Tsipras <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexis_Tsipras> stood at the head of the European Left Party ticket in the European Parliamentary elections last year, with so many of them cheering him on. Those of us who in discussions with Syriza leaders and activists tried to show that the EU, not just the EMU <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_and_Monetary_Union_of_the_European_U…>, had neoliberalism in its DNA, were nevertheless confronted with all the searching questions that Antarsya outside the party and the Left Platform inside the party never could answer. How much would advancing the prospect of this break forestall Greeks voting for Syriza with its promise to form a government to stop the economic torture within Europe? And how much of voters' discomfort with the possibility of a break was based on a sense that the balance of forces internationally was such that Greece would be economically and politically isolated, or dependent on even more unsavoury regimes than the European ones? There was on top of this a cultural and emotional, almost psychological, commitment to Europe among large swathes, not just of the Syriza leadership, but of its political base. It was always clear that a crucial element in the Syriza leadership would never go further than the Europeans would let them, and moreover believed that this is what Syriza's supporters would want them to do. There were others, outside the Left Platform, whose position was more conditional, and were open to a Plan B, but understood that the political conditions for it had to be created. This required not only convincing their supporters it might be necessary but developing their capacities to engage in the economic conversion and reorganization of ways of life to adequately cope with Grexit. That could not be done without making Plan B public, however, which would undermine the ability of Syriza to get elected in the near term and to form a government to stop the economic torture within the EU. February to June: Suspended Animation Not only the party but also the social movements were in a state of suspended animation from February to June as everyone waited for the outcome of the negotiations. This was not something engineered from the top. One very senior minister privately expressed to me his disappointment that the social movements he had expected to light a fire behind him had become largely immobilized. Indeed, the 20 page political resolution passed at Syriza's refounding conference in the summer 2013 had concluded by saying that the party was not a slingshot that would impel its leaders into the state and leave them there but rather the enabler of a “diverse, multidimensional movement of subversion <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/860.php>” without which those in the state would not be able to accomplish much by way of political, economic and social transformation. That there was little spontaneous evidence of this was no doubt a relief to some in the government; but to others it was troubling. There were especially some highly capable Syriza leaders who deliberately remained in the party apparatus in order to facilitate this. But the difficulty of doing this was not just a matter of the rest of the leadership's preoccupation with the negotiations but also the lack of capacity among Syriza activists for animating the creative plans from below to which the state would need to respond. >From the beginning the negotiations with what were now called ‘the Institutions’ could only be about the terms of neoliberal austerity. The stringency of those terms defined the scope of those negotiations by virtue of the very nature of the EU. The longer they dragged on, the more the economy was suffocated and the more it was clear that this could only result in a political crisis. It all came to a head when the government would not pay its IMF debts in June, and when its latest offer of stringent austerity measures to break the deadlock were rejected by the Institutions and even the minimal liquidity being provided by the ECB to the Greek banks was frozen. The referendum was called to prove that the Syriza government had massive public support for unleashing the funds that should have been available to Greece under the previous government's memorandum alongside the measures for fiscal discipline and structural reform the new government was offering. The immobilized movements were mobilized again with the referendum in a stunning display of the highly politicized character of Greek society. The OXI vote was remarkable especially in the face of the media scaremongering and economic blackmail as well as difficulties caused by the bank closures and capital controls which had been forced on the government. But, as Marx pointed out long ago, referenda to show public support for leaders are problematic displays of politicization. Their yes or no character allows for very little political intermediation. What they exactly mean and what political resources they promise beyond showing support for a leader can never be quite clear. But on the referendum's own terms, the resounding OXI could only be read as endorsing Tsipras's argument that the government's latest plan was rejected by the Institutions because it redistributed, even if only marginally, the relative class burdens of austerity. The repeated promises by Syriza that this would not lead to a break from the eurozone, and the government's release of new detailed promises to open even more sectors of the Greek economy to meet EU requirements of free trade, competitiveness and investment, was clearly aimed at undercutting popular misgivings in light of the barrage of propaganda that even membership in the EU was at stake in the vote. There had all along been those elements in the inner cabinet who believed that the Institutions would not relent in the face of popular support but only in face of evidence that the government could ally with those who speak for domestic bourgeois elites. The divisions exposed by the referendum were especially troubling for these elements, as the venerable old Communist and Synaspismos leader, Yannis Dragasakis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yannis_Dragasakis>, the deputy prime minister, made openly clear in the middle of the referendum, while Yanis Varoufakis <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yanis_Varoufakis> now tells us that he finally started really talking about Grexit, although clearly in only the most tactical and tentative ‘damned if you do and damned if you don't’ terms. On the basis of the massive defeat of the forces behind the Yes vote in the referendum, and the opposition party leaders resignation, the other mainstream party leaders joined with Syriza in backing the plan the Institutions had rejected before and coupled that with support for Syriza's position. This was that once the plug had been pulled on the extension of the old government's memorandum, they would all support coupling fiscal restraint and structural reforms with substantial debt restructuring and investment funds in immediate negotiations on a new three year memorandum. This had previously only been expected to be negotiated through the fall, leaving Syriza open to a political crisis all through the summer. The hope that this might be pulled off was enhanced by indications that the U.S. government was putting pressure both on the IMF and the Merkel government. This was fed by IMF signals on the importance of very significant debt restructuring in a new three year deal. Wolfgang Schäuble <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Sch%C3%A4uble>'s decision to try to force Grexit, on the other hand, was an expression of what had always been the key German conditions for the common currency: the ECB would act like the Bundesbank, and the euro would facilitate German exports on the basis of the same monetary stability as the Deutschmark. But European economic union has always also been the material foundation for NATO in Europe and the deeper security linkages between capitalist European states and the American empire. The difficulty of incorporating the oligarchic capitalist Russia state into this system in any stable fashion lay behind the extension of the EU to Russia's borders. A key question hanging over these negotiations, in fact, involved which agencies of the U.S. state would take the lead in handling the Greek problem – the U.S. Treasury or the CIA – although both were of course on very high alert. The game was being played at the highest stakes. What Alexis Tsipras and (the new Finance Minister) Euclid Tsakalotos <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclid_Tsakalotos> took to the final negotiations last Saturday, as passed by the Greek parliament, was not all that different than the plan that has been forwarded to the Institutions and rejected before the referendum. And they took courage from the fact that the negotiations were now about a new three year deal rather than continuing the drip-feeding from the old memorandum with which they had been strangled from February to June. There was now even a clear split on the side of the European interlocutors over whether to accommodate what Tsipras was bringing to the table. But the bitter negotiations through all day Sunday and Monday morning actually turned on whether Schäuble would force a Grexit. Rather than what better terms Tsipras might come away with, the divisions on the side of the interlocutors were over whether to back or oppose Schäuble's proposals to freeze the Greeks out. These were only bridged by humiliating and harsh language redolent of 1980s Structural Adjustment Programs with all the oversight requirements by imperial accountants that came with them, only multiplied by being embedded in European regulatory agencies and mechanisms. In terms of the actual stringency of the fiscal restraint, the extent of structural reform and the further measures to open up Greek markets to foreign capital, the difference with the plan the Syriza government had put to the Institutions before the referendum was still not that great, and even the Syriza red line on restoring basic collective bargaining rights and labour standards was not crossed. But the terms of conditionality to obtain the debt relief and investment funds that might be released over the course of this new three year memorandum are nightmarishly harsh. Break with Capitalism? The first of these series of Bullets from Athens was written when the final negotiations had barely started. But it ended by noting that if Tsipras came away accepting the types of conditionalities he did indeed finally sign on to in the wee hours of Monday morning, this would require everyone on the left to take a long hard look again at possibilities and implications for a break with capitalism at its ‘weakest link’. Lenin could not know when he coined this phrase that the German revolution would fail. But those who invoke the revolutionary legacy to condemn the Syriza leadership so loudly for not choosing to make a break this weekend must know that there is no prospect whatever for such a break in Germany or elsewhere in central or northern Europe in any relevant time horizon. Those of us who counselled comrades in Syriza since even before the 2012 elections to make preparations for such a break could never pretend that the isolation in which they would find themselves would not bring with it the danger of even greater economic suffering for some considerable time than what the Greek people already had been subjected to. We could never deny that merely talking in terms of nationalizing the banks and reorganizing them around a new currency, even apart from the freezing up of economic life in the transition to this, would itself spawn new black markets, further fuelled by the inevitable rationing of many goods that would also be required by Grexit. In a society already characterized by a very large grey economy and in a state in which clientalist practices are deeply embedded, this risked corruption on a scale that even Greece has not heretofore known. But above all, could the ingenuity and resourcefulness shown by the more than 400 Solidarity networks that blossomed in the course of the crisis really be quickly enough expanded and built upon to convert patterns of production and consumption on a broad enough scale to counter these negative developments? The frustration, depression and anger of the people who voted OXI with such pride and determination is palpable in Athens today. There is a real danger the party will split and that parts of the Syriza leadership will – reminiscent of the Ramsay Macdonald Labour Government in Britain in 1931 – kick the party away and join with the bourgeois elites in a national unity government. Were Tsipras to call instead for Grexit today there might finally be a small majority of the population who would respond positively to this. At the least, as one very knowledgeable political scientist who has been closely involved in Synaspismos and Syriza since the beginning assured me last night, there would be a million people chanting Tsipras's name in Syntagma tonight. This would obviate the no less palpable anxiety among such people that Golden Dawn will be the beneficiary of this denouement. It is still to be hoped that somehow the unity of Syriza can be maintained, that a national unity government will not be formed, and that a very different Plan B can yet be put into place whether under this new memorandum, or even in the unlikely event Tsipras decides to adhere to the party's rejection of the deal. This would build on Tsipras's consistent class discourse, already repeated when he came back to Athens yesterday promising that the oligarchs would be made to bear the main burden. But it would have to involve directing as much state and party resources as possible to plans for building economic and social alternatives at every level and the necessary transformations in the state that would be required to support these. Some may at this point conjure up heady visions of what help Russia or China or some other capitalist regime not so fully in the embrace of the American and European agents of capitalist empire might lend to a Syriza government that had been forced to choose Grexit, without counting the many dangers and costs of this. It would be better if would-be revolutionaries calling for a break with capitalism at the weakest link would show some capacity to at least shift the balance of forces where they live. • Leo Panitch is editor of the Socialist Register <http://socialistregister.com/> and distinguished research professor at York University, Canada. He is co-author, with Sam Gindin, of The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire <http://www.versobooks.com/books/1145-the-making-of-global-capitalism> (Verso). He is currently in Athens, Greece. « Previous <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1142.php> Home <http://www.socialistproject.ca/> Today <http://www.socialistproject.ca/today/> Next <http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/> » Comments *Be the first to post a comment: * Display Name: E-mail: Subject: Comment: enter your comment here... 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From Coldwar Communism to the Global Justice Movement: Itinerary of a Long-Distance Internationalist. http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/from_coldwar_communism _to_the_global_emancipatory_movement/ (Free). 2. 2014. Interface Journal Special (Co-Editor), December 2014. 'Social Movement Internationalisms'. (Free).3. 2014. with Laurence Cox, ‘Movement Internationalism/s’, Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements. (Editorial), Vol. 6 (2), pp. 1–12. 4. 2014. ‘The International Labour Movement in, Against and Beyond, the Globalized and Informatized Cage of Capitalism and Bureaucracy. (Interview). Interface: a Journal for and about Social Movements. Vol. 6 (2), pp. 35-58. 5. 2014. 'The Networked Internationalism of Labour's Others', in Jai Sen (ed), Peter Waterman (co-ed), The Movement of Movements: Struggles for Other Worlds (Part I). (10 Euros). 6. 2015. Waterman, Peter. ‘Beyond Labourism, Development and Decent Work’. <https://escarpmentpress.org/globallabour/article/download/2338/2433> Global Labour Journal, 2015, 6(2), pp. 246-50. *More publications, click [////]* _______________________________________________ NetworkedLabour mailing list NetworkedLabour(a)lists.contrast.org http://lists.contrast.org/mailman/listinfo/networkedlabour -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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Communist Dilemmas on the Greek Euro-Crisis: To Exit or Not to Exit?
by Christian Fuchs 15 Jul '15

15 Jul '15

A very timely and interesting text… It also relates to the question whether issues of a peer-to-peer economy, a co-operative economy, networked labour, digital labour, etc. fit better into a Grexit/Euroexit-communist or a Euro-communist strategy… Christian Communist Dilemmas on the Greek Euro-Crisis: To Exit or Not to Exit? Christos Laskos, John Milios and Euclid Tsakalotos http://www.workersliberty.org/system/files/milios.pdf One section of the Greek left converged on a strategy of default and exiting the euro, together with restructuring the economy through devaluation, nationalization of the banks and the renationalization of public utilities, industrial policies etc. At the intellectual level this approach gained powerful support from a number of Greek academics working abroad. At the political level the exit strategy was promoted as a central policy plank by the extra-parliamentary left, especially Antarsya, but also found a strong, albeit minority, support within some sections of Syriza (see Kouvelakis, 2011, p. 30)[1] . The forces coalescing around the exit strategy obviously had internal differences and we cannot hope to do justice to all the nuances here. Rather we shall focus on the arguments as presented by those providing the intellectual gravitas to the exit strategy. The exit strategy has two main elements. The first relies on a deconstruction of any argument that the EU provides any privileged terrain for left wing strategies. The second relies on showing how debt default and withdrawing from the euro provide the indispensable starting point for such strategies. Thus the first report published in 2010 from the Research in Money and Finance Group, based in SOAS, argued that the “good euro” option (for instance introducing eurobonds, enlarging the EU budget to include larger fiscal transfers between states or transforming the ECB into a lender of last resort) was politically infeasible (Lapavitsas et. al., 2010). Europeanists, whether “reluctant” or “revolutionary”, Lapavitsas (2012) argues, are widely overoptimistic at what can be achieved on the supranational level. Why should “the main powers” accept major losses from a fundamental restructuring of debt at the EU level (p. 292)? Is it surprising that the “eurozone establishmen t” has given short shrift to proposals for direct ECB financing of public debt (p. 293)? Moreover is it likely that we could arrive at a coordinated European-level response to macroeconomic imbalances? After all “There is no capitalist class that would systematically aim at raising the wages of its own workers since it would then be ruined in competition. If wage restraint was broken in Germany, the monetary union would become a lot less attractive to the German ruling class, raising the issue of its own continued euro membership” (p. 294-5). It is difficult to know what to make of this style of argumentation. “Revolutionary Europeanists”, to accept for the sake of the argument Lapavitsas’ widely misleading term for those he disagrees with, are hardly likely to believe that the “main powers” and the “eurozone establishment” will accept willingly either debt restructuring or monetary financing of public debt. Nor do they think that it is somehow in the interests of German, or any other for that matter, capital to increase the wages of their workers. Nor, to take a final example, are they likely to be unaware of the fact that German capital is committed to the euro as a hard currency whose credibility is crucial to providing the framework for capital accumulation[2] . A radical strategy for the Left that gives more weight to the European-wide level is just as likely to point to the need for a fundamental shift in the balance of class forces as is one that places more emphasis on the nation state. Thus Syriza, which did not support the exit strategy, was fully aware of the scale of the task in changing the balance of class forces at the supra-national level. But it considered that building alliances with radical forces in both the PI(I)Gs and in the Northern economies was a critical component of any response; not just to respond to the rising debt crisis, but to seek common ground to challenge ruling ideas and practices concerning both production and redistribution. It was under no illusion about the scale of the resistance to be expected to any restructuring of debt, but its analysis maintained that the global nature of the capitalist crisis presented severe limitations for any merely national response. In any case Syriza’s internationalist interventions were supplemented with national-level initiatives, calling for a radical redistribution of income, socialization of the financial sector and many of the policies supported by those in the exit camp. Moreover Syriza was in s ome sense more radical in its skepticism with respect to leftist strategies that relied on the “reconstruction of the national economy” as a stepping stone towards socialism, thereby somewhat sidelining the issue of the relations of production. In other words, the issue at stake is not the need to think about the balance of class forces, but, rather, where the more favourable terrain for the Left lies, or where should the emphasis be, given that “revolutionary Europeanists” do not ignore national struggles, and nor do supporters of the exit strategy neglect the need for supra-national interventions. Without such an analysis it is difficult to work out why TINA does not hold at the national level, as the entire Left has argued throughout the dark years of neo-liberalism, but somehow the mainstay of capitalist ideology, that there is no alternative, is perfectly correct once we move to the supra-national level. But it turns out that the analysis required opens up nearly the whole gamma of issues concerning Left strategy: from the nature of present day imperialism to that of the state, from the feasibility of national roads to socialism to the nature of leftist alternatives for the economy, from the sources of capitalist i deological hegemony to class strategies for changing the balance of forces. It is for this reason that we believe that the Greek debates are of interest the wider Left. The Eurozone crisis facing the Ghosts of Dependency Theory: A False Dilemma?  Influenced by the anti-colonial struggles many neo- Marxist approaches to imperialism in the post-war period were premised on the idea that ex-colonies and developing economies were subordinated to imperialist countries through relations of dependency. This notion of dependency, together with the related concept of world capitalism, shaped the centre-periphery theories which conceived global economic relationships as relationships of exploitation and polarization between countries, with a developed imperialist “centre” and a dependent “periphery”, with a “semi-periphery” in between these two major poles. The approach was most influential in the 1970s, and it played some role in the thinking of PASOK in its earlier radical phase before its first administration in 1981[3] . The marginalization of this approach is best explained by the failure of this approach to explain contemporary developments in capitalism: the rise of East-Asian capitalist social formations and later China and the other “BRIC” countries, despite the marginalisation of most sub-Saharan, Latin-American and Asian countries (Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2009, ch. 2). But there is a strong element of the centre-periphery schema in many of the supporters of the exit strategy: The European Monetary Union (EMU) has created a split between core and periphery, and relations between the core and periphery, and relations between the two are hierarchical and discriminatory. The periphery has lost competitiveness in the 2000s, therefore developing current account deficits with the core and accumulating large debts to the financial institutions of the core. The result has been that Germany has emerged as the economic master of the Eurozone. [...] the Eurozone also has an external periphery in Eastern Europe which has presented similar tendencies to the internal periphery [...] Italy [...] occupies an intermediate place between periphery and core [...] But what alternative is currently on offer to peripheral countries? Trapped within the Eurozone, they are threatened with continued austerity, low competitiveness, high unemployment, growing social tensions, and loss of national independence Lapavitsas et. al. (2011, p. 5 ff.) The general tenure of the argument suggests that that the competitive capitalist countries of the European “centre” – especially Germany – have experienced gains in competitiveness by achieving low labour costs, primarily through a squeeze on wages and a slowing down of inflation. In this manner they have improved their exports within the Eurozone, while at the same time destroying the “productive base” of the periphery which seems to be caught in an “underdevelopment” trap. The persistent current account imbalances are thought to be the immediate results. For those accepting this line of argumentation, monetary union seems to have been converted into an area for the exploitation of the countries of the periphery by the economic “steam- engine” of the centre. Such an approach displaces a major element of Marx’s problematic, namely class-struggle as the motive force of historical evolution, in favour of a bourgeois theoretical schema, according to which contradictions and exploitative relations between capitalist social formations move history. It has no conception of the state as the political condensation of class relations of domination, the factor that underwrites the cohesion of capitalist society. It therefore fails to grasp that capital is a social relationship that is reproduced in a complex way (politically and ideologically over-determined) in the framework of a specific (national) social formation. The economic development of capitalism, and its crises, does not depend on the “desire” or the “strategies” of powerful states, but on the class struggle as reproduced within the various national state links of the global economic and political order, which through their inter- articulation comprise what may be described as the global imperialist chain (Milios & Sotiropoulos 2009, ch. 10). This is a way of conceptualizing the complex economic, political and ideological links that develop between the different social formations which over-determine the class struggle in each country but never acquire priority over it. The imperialist chain provides, on the one hand, the field of constitution of different, often contradictory national strategies, patently unequal in strength. But at the same time the unequal links in the imperialist chain have a common strategic interest: reproduction of the capitalist system of power. Each state as it forges its own strategy in the internation al arena, on a terrain of shifting correlations of power, also contributes to the reproduction of capitalism at the global level. The EU comprises the integration of capitalistically developed European countries: a strategic coalition of their ruling classes, seeking to strengthen their position both against the USA and other developed capitalist formations and, primarily, against their “own” (the European) working classes. The key prerequisite for unimpeded capital accumulation is that there should be favourable conditions for the valorization of capital, and capitalist competition is to be included among such conditions. Exposure to international competition is the most appropriate strategy for organizing bourgeois power, as a model for continuing reorganization of labour and the elimination of non- competitive individual capitals to the benefit of overall social capital. Exit strategy supporters rightly consider that the EU is a powerful and authoritarian construction furthering capitalist interests. However, what we challenge here is the claim that that the EU essentially a construction which serves the interests of the Northern economies – as if there are no class relations within northern economies. The exposure to international competition, effected through the single market programme and monetary union, imposed significant restructuring to the benefit of capital in all member states. Significantly, this integration secured higher rates of profit, satisfactory rates of growth, and a rise in average productivity, for the less competitive countries, before 2008 at least, went a long way towards closing the gap in per capita GDP that separated them from the more advanced countries of the European north. And all this in an environment of “free” movement of goods and capital is an index of competitiveness! During the period 1995-2008 Greece experienced a real increase in GDP amounting to 61.0%, Spain 56.0% and Ireland 124.1%. Conversely, GDP growth over the same time period was 19.5% for Germany, 17.8% for Italy and 30.8% for France (see OECD, Economic Outlook, Volume 2009/2, IMF & See Milios and Sotiropoulos 2010, p. 228). We note that during the same period, and contrary to what happed in Spain, Italy and some other European economies, the growth of Greek GDP was more heavily based on investment and on a high growth of employment and productivity, rather than government consumption [4] . The higher growth rates in the “peripheral” European economies were accompanied by both a fast reduction in the cost of domestic borrowing and a significant inflow of foreign investment (of various forms). This caused lasting surpluses on the financial account. However, the imbalances in the financial accounts within the eurozone shaped an unstable and vulnerable context of symbiosis which quickl y unraveled after the 2008 crisis. One of the most noteworthy features of the first decade of the euro is the persistent current account imbalances: certain countries show chronic surpluses while others invariably suffer deficits. Nevertheless, the causality between these two “givens” may not be what it is often casually asserted to be in the relevant discussions. The current account deficit, in other words, may not be simply the immediate result of a corresponding “deficit” in competitiveness. On the contrary, it is quite possible that both could be the outcome of a different deeper cause, namely, the considerable differences in the levels of capitalist growth and of the specific mode of “symbiosis” within the euro. Two other basic parameters seem pertinent in this respect. On the one hand, the higher rates of profit at the “periphery” boosted financial yields as a whole, with the result that international investors became ever keener to finance these high rates of growth, particularly in an environment where exchange-rate, and other, risks seemed, at the time, so much smaller. The countries of the “periphery” thus recorded strong surpluses on their financial accounts. Investments of various kinds in these countries rendered them attractive to capital from the centre. On the other hand, eurozone economies, with their different rates of growth and different rates of profit, were incorporated into the same regime of uniform nominal interest rates set by the ECB. These interest rates were considerably lower for the countries of the “periphery” than they had been prior to the introduction of the single currency. This fact, in conjunction with the higher rates of inflation prevailing in t hese countries, translated into even lower real interest rates for the local banking sector, laying the ground for the explosion of (private and public) borrowing. These two factors strengthened borrowing and contributed to a further heating up of the “peripheral” economy, orienting production to the needs of a considerable domestic demand [5]. This had the effect of further reinforcing inflationary tendencies. The real level of interest rates fell even further, in this way providing further financial leverage. At the same time conditions of high internal demand caused increasing demand for imports. The flow of capital to the “periphery” on the one hand offset the cost of participation in the single market while at the same time generating the preconditions for a deterioration in competitiveness (as higher inflation boosted the price of domestically produced commodities). Thus the euro contributed to the perpetuation of asymmetries in the current account balances and divergences in unit costs of labour and inflation (competitiveness). Clearly it is not that easy to sort out the line of causation between current account deficits and capital account surpluses, but a “centre-periphery” approach, we would argue, is misleading with respect to understanding the dynamics of the eurozone. Monetary union evidently generates strategic benefits for the collective capitalists of all the countries that participate in it. In other words, the strategy of exposing individual capital to international competition resulted in high growth rates and accumulation in the less-competitive countries of “periphery”. It is not possible to sustain the argument that EMU is exclusively the servant of the “insatiable” schemes of Germany, with its competitive economy. Moreover the experience in Greece, after the adoption of the first stabilization plan, suggests that what we have been witnessing is entirely understandable as a massive assault on the living standards of Greek workers for the benefit of Greek capital. It could further be argued that Greece provides a crucial test case, for European capital’s ability to enforce a “solution” to the crisis which strengthens its hand. The emphasis on Germany’s role severely misrepresents both of these aspects to the detriment of socialist strategy, to which we now turn. A critique of the National Routes to Socialism: Class Politics revisited Above we have argued that the financial and economic architecture of the eurozone, which does not simply rest on the single currency, acts as a mechanism for exerting pressure for reorganizing labour in all member countries. The squeezing of the German working class, which started well before the eruption of the crisis, is an important part of the story. The debt crisis has further served to tighten the screws on labour in all areas of the eurozone. The policies of austerity have been almost universally adopted even though they have been unable to halt the eurozone crisis. Is the exit strategy as a response to the crisis in the eurozone? In our view the basic problem is not the supposed radical nature of the strategy, but that it fails to challenge deeply enough prevailing views about the nature of the Greek predicament. In this way it is also unable to break with ruling ideas concerning the importance of the national economy and competitiveness. The serious economic and social consequences of breaking off from the euro are to be met with, presumably in rapid succession, capital controls, nationalization of the banking sector and leading industries, and industrial policies. That is to say, we have a national response in the face of a globalized world, with all the numerous interdependencies that this entails, and a capitalist class united and organized at the world level. The alternative supported here does not ignore the importance of the nation state and local struggles. On the contrary, it is happy to concede that the primary locus of struggle is within the nation state and against the bourgeois class of that state. But it is also keenly aware of the importance of reaching out to secure alliances, and promoting initiatives, beyond the boundaries of the nation state. Labour in both the PI(I)Gs and the northern economies has a lot of common interests that need to be exploited. Some in the exit camp have been keen to place their approach within the tradition of leftist internationalism. Thus it has sometimes been argued that Greece represents the weakest link in the capitalist chain, and that a radical break with the eurozone in Greece will lead to radicalizing initiatives elsewhere. But it is not that convincing that a strategy that relies, in its initial stages at least, on a competitive devaluation to promote the competitiveness of the Greek capita list economy can be sold as an exercise in internationalism. Moreover the emphasis on the national economy does not suggest that an integral aspect of the strategy is the process of bringing together the largest possible concentration of the forces of labour to take on the class enemy. An additional problem is that such approaches fail to learn from history: national roads together with the demonisation of the foreign ‘other’ without a proper antidote of making the necessary class distinctions and integrating within a regional class struggle are easily manipulated by the forces of nationalism. This is particularly poignant in the Greek context, where the debt default and euro exit option has been taken up wholeheartedly by a wide range of nationalistic forces, whose anti-imperialist rhetoric is not always easily distinguishable from that of certain sections of the Left[6] . Debt default is supported in these currents because Greece does “not owe anything; they owe us”, and that the county is facing a new form of “occupation”, a term that still has a powerful resonance in a country that has not forgotten its wartime experience and all that followed from that. This line of reasoning, needless to say, does not allow any internal division between the “peo ple” and the “nation”. Syriza has taken a clear position on this. Also on a number of times, the general secretary of the KKE, Aleka Papariga, has suggested that in current circumstances a withdrawal from the euro could have catastrophic consequences. For the KKE the exit is postponed to the longer run, under conditions of “popular power”. Thus the stance of Syriza, and also to a certain extent the KKE, with respect to the exit strategy has nothing to do with their acceptance of a “role of passive repositories for popular rage” (Kouvelakis, 2011, p. 31) but more with a class analysis of the capitalist crisis and their historical understanding of the dynamics of nationalistic politics. The long tradition within the Greek Left of placing great emphasis on the reconstruction of the economy has also influenced the dominant discourse, in particular modernizing currents that came to the fore with the first Kostas Simitis PASOK government in 1996. The dominant discourse has argued that it represents the outward- looking pro-European option. In actual fact what has been on offer is a national strategy within the EU. Modernizers, before and after the outbreak of the crisis, were willing to offer some criticism of existing EU policies and institutions, but a shift in these was never seen as an indispensable element of the solutions offered. In the post-1974 period, the Left was concerned with the restructuring of national economy. PASOK and the KKE thought that this could be done best outside the (then) EEC, while the KKE-interior, reflecting the eurocommunist tendency within Greece, argued that a national strategy inside the EEC was more viable. What was lacking from this conflict, which has subsequently re-emerged in different guises a number of times, was a strategy based in part on supra-national solutions. But it is interesting to note that this national emphasis in socialist politics had, in the years before the outbreak of the crisis, had been subjected to very serious criticism. Much of this revolved around the issue of the economism and statism of the traditional Left, as well as its focus on winning elections and forming a government, or its governmentalism to use the Greek expression. It cannot be said that those supporting the exit have shown any great readiness to engage with such criticisms. For instance the economistic bent of the approach can be fathomed from the importance given to acquiring a national currency. There is a case to be made whether devaluation can provide the same level of real wage decline but with lower unemployment, but it is not obvious that devaluation is always to be preferred to the type of internal deflation being pursued at present by the Troika. The statism of the approach seems to have learnt nothing from previous experiences of Left governments, such as the French experiment in the early 1980s. The idea that forming a government of the Left is a sufficient condition for a change in enforceable policies is one that dies hard it seems. And this is especially the case when the emphasis is so much on reconstructing the productive basis of the economy in order to be better able to compete, and so little on changing the relations of production and promoting new forms of social production. This line of argument is taken up more fully in the followi ng section. The governmentalism of the approach is evidenced by the emphasis given to what a Left government would do in order to bring Greece out of the crisis. So the whole Left is entangled in a, often vitriolic, debate of what needs to be done once a government of the Left is formed. This can only sideline the central tasks of building a movement towards that end, with that level of active participation that experience shows is a vital prerequisite for making the best use of government. Underlying this triptych seems a return to a form of popular frontism. It is as if the people have a common interest against large capital, thereby considerably simplifying the problems of popular and state power. This may be also a result of a “centre-periphery” mindset that suggests that Greek capitalism is weak and therefore the forces of reaction are also weak. This approach does, as we have seen, not stand up well in terms of theory, and perhaps more importantly, it has not been borne out by the events after the outbreak of the crisis. As Rylmon (2011) points out that: [the] higher social groups as well as a large section of the middle strata accept the deterioration in inequality with respect to income and social services, as they do the increase in unemployment and the spread of poverty. In spite of the fact that the consequences of the crisis, and the policies that have managed that crisis, have some effect for nearly all the population, the deterioration that has been enforced by these policies has been met with enthusiasm by a large majority of the privileged ... firms are sacking in large numbers those who are struggling to preserve the legal rights of workers ... therefore calls for national unity in these conditions represent a failure to look at the real issue... Austerity has seriously worsened the conditions of labour. The equality of insecurity, to use a telling phrase of John Gray, being imposed on both public and private sector workers, has unified the experience of large numbers of people, and has put severe limits on individualistic responses while leading to the proletarization of sections of the middle class. What we are witnessing is the return of the social question, and the prioritization of the issue of jobs and wages. This is the basis for a return to class politics and the need to start from basics. It is for this reason that one section of the Left has put a radical redistribution of income at the heart of its response. It is not “a simple rejection of austerity”, as suggested by Kouvelakis (2011, p. 29). Such a stance further requires rather more explicitness on possible friends and foes than the supporters of the exit strategy are willing to express. The central issue, for us, at least revolves around whether the basic contradiction is between capital and labour or between capital and the people. What we need is a discourse, or rhetoric, that elevates class, and not the “popular”, and which has the potential to unite the blue- collar worker, the precariously employed and the supermarket employee. This does not imply that there are no middle classes that can take sides with the forces labour. But thinking about this issue relies going beyond the anti-monopoly schemas that dominate some parts of the Greek Left. The category of the middle classes, including the petit bourgeoisie (Milios & Economakis 2011), covers a wide range of experiences and social practices. The Left needs to analyse these distinctions. It also needs a hegemonic politics that seeks to reach out to some these classes, not on the basis of their traditional mode of operation, which in the Greek case could simply imply tax evasion or worse, but on the basis of new practices and new consumption and production prototypes. Alternatives to the Hegemony of Capitalism We are criticizing here a position which has a curious conservative quality. It is as if the Left has always known the path to socialism, including the optimum economic interventions along that path, and all that is needed is the appropriate political climate to reactivate the given formula. Making a virtue out of necessity, exiting the euro and suspending debt repayment provides an ideal framework, it seems, for implementing the usual panoply of leftist economic responses: capital controls and the nationalization of the banks, price controls, renationalization of most of the public utilities privatized by the ND and PASOK administrations since 1996, industrial policy and so on. Those who recall the experience, or better the fate, of the Alternative Economic Strategy in Britain or the Common Programme of the Left in France, might be tempted to express some mild surprise that so little has changed in the rather extensive intervening period. Nor can it be said that the proponents of th e exit strategy displayed any great interest in discussing the reasons behind past failures in alternative economic experiments or the extent to which economic developments since the 1970s, such as globalization and financialisation, necessitated certain new departures. But thinking about alternatives is not only a matter of assessing past failures. In most Marxist conceptualizations, theory, and therefore practice, should in part be based on the generalization of the actual experience of working class. More recently, leftists would be keen to extend this formulation to the experience of the feminist, anti-racist and other movements, such as those that have been struggling against the commodification of social and public goods. The experience of the anti-globalization movement, given its prevalence in the lean years of neo-liberal hegemony, would seem to provide an excellent workshop for leftists seeking guidance about how to think about alternative economic and political strategies. Grass roots activism, self-organization, self-management, the social economy, social auditing, fair trading and ethical banking would seem to be just some of the experiences that have sprung up across the world which could realistically form the elements of a new approa ch. Not necessarily as alternatives to, say, democratic planning or industrial policy, but at least as useful additions. We would stress two themes, common to many of these innovations: that social needs provide the essential starting point for thinking about any alternative (see Lebowitz, 2003), and that an active response from the agents of change is indispensable for addressing those needs and therefore also for the political aspects of any transition strategy[7] . It is not that either of these themes was entirely missing from previous experiments. To take just one example, British leftists who engaged with the Alternative Economic Strategy were keen to stress the role of industrial democracy and workers’ participation. It would go too far to claim that the strategy relied exclusively on the transfer into state ownership of large banks and enterprises. But it is no exaggeration to claim that there was an inflated expectation concerning the degree to which such a transfer would, by itself, open new opportunities for a socialist transition. In retrospect it seems that the dominant view was that a state controlled by the Left could be relied upon to know which needs of labour have to be prioritized, while the active involvement of those from below was, at best, an additional extra. In our conception, on the other hand, what the two themes – needs and active participation from below – provide is a basis for uniting the experiences of a wide range of movements, some of which are anti-capitalist, but many of which have an anti-capitalist dynamic without any conscious commitment to that effect. The connecting threads seek to challenge both production and consumption prototypes of capitalism, and not just of the neo-liberal variety. They bring to the fore, in new and interesting ways, the historical Marxist problematic concerning who produces what for whom and how. They open up the question of new technologies and how these can serve communities rather than the control of capitalists over production and distribution processes. They relate directly to ecological concerns about sustainable development or feminist ones about the role of “care” in our societies. At the same time after 2008, and in Greece especially after 2010, social resistance to austerity included diverse forms of solidarity and initiatives to set up a parallel social economy. It could be argued that these experiments were hesitant and sporadic, while they lacked the critical mass necessary to provide viable alternative modes of consumption and production, let alone to seriously challenge the system. But in the position we are criticizing here such experiments tended to be seen, if at all, as useful protests that expressed disaffection with the austerity policies of the government. They had little bearing on the big picture of setting up a viable socialist economy. We would argue that this is too limited a conception. When Kouvelakis (2011) argues that Syriza limited its political strategy to opposing austerity and hoping that the Greek debt problem would be solved at some unspecified moment in the future he is doubly misleading. First, one section of the radical Left argues that we need to go beyond the issue of debt, important though it is, if the Left is to provide convincing answers to the crisis. To conceptualize the issue as a straight fight between those arguing for austerity within the euro and those arguing for exiting the euro to provide space for the restructuring of the economy and growth, is to remain on the terrain of the dominant ideology. For that ideology, most often experienced as a threat, maintains that the only alternative to austerity is being expelled of the eurozone and all the significant costs this entails. This dilemma can only be transcended when the problem of debt is given its proper weighting, along with the issue s of the crisis in capitalist production and consumption prototypes discussed above. Secondly, that part of the Left, criticized by Kouvelakis, was intensely engaged in all those movements discussed above. Not only as an expression of solidarity, but also through a belief that if the Left was to regain its hegemony it needed to prove that it was not only saying different things from the dominant elites, but also doing different things. Neo-liberalism has, as it is often argued, led to a devaluation of politics and its potential to actually change things. The issue, therefore, resolves around the agency of social change. For us these forms of solidarity and social economy are better seen as practices with radical potential. At one level they provide an immediate response to the needs of those at the butt end of the neo-liberal response to the crisis. But at another they provide transformative structures (Suchting, 1983), in which people come to see the value, of say solidarity, in practice and come to see that politics, widely defined, can actually change things. To b e sure, people primarily shift position because of material circumstances and ideological reconsideration. But practices that are antithetical to capitalist values can also play a key role: in a context where trade unions, or working class associations of all types, are unable to fulfill such a role, at least to the extent they did in the past, the Left needs to think very seriously about the role of alternative practices. Unless that is, one thinks that the most important element in transforming consciousness is the homing in on the “correct” political line with respect to present conjuncture. For many on the Greek Left, we fear, the response of exiting the euro and the suspension of debt repayments was/is just such a line, which, for reasons that have already been elucidated we question. But the point here is that there is only so much that the correct “line” can achieve. Given the above, it is not surprising that the position we are critiquing here failed to ask difficult questions about the level of support for its chosen strategy. Often it assumed exactly what needed to be shown. In Greece, even amongst progressive sections of the population, there is widespread skepticism that the existing state can be a vehicle for change in anything resembling a desired direction. This reflects not only the effects of so many years of neo-liberal hegemony but the actual workings of the Greek state – a hierarchical, inefficient, clientelistic and authoritarian state which has served Greek capitalists and their allies well. How to challenge such a state, how to democratize it, how to make it sensitive to social needs, and how to link it to forms of direct democracy would seem to be some of the more pressing questions for the Greek Left. But not for the view we are critiquing here where it is assumed that: 1) the state is in a position to carry out the traditional panoply of leftist economic alternatives and 2) that enough people believe this to be the case. There seems little warrant for either assertion. It is not as if there any easy answers to such questions. But it is difficult to believe that progress can be made without at least setting them, and at various levels. Can, for instance, public sector unions transform themselves to be able to integrate their traditional demands to those consumer groups and social movements demanding better public services? But are we seriously suggesting that progress towards socialism, or at least a leftist exit from the crisis that opens up new agendas, needs to wait for the resolution of such difficult questions? Of course not, but our objections do resolve around a long debated issue of the Left. In the context of the Greek conjuncture it can be stated simply in terms of whether the programme of the Left can be said to preexist independently of the movement. Notice that this question holds whether we conceive the movement towards a different society in terms of a long process of evolutionary changes within capitalism, in terms of a more condensed period of rupture with the capitalist system or something in between (of intermediate “ruptures” along the path to socialism as left eurocommunists used to argue). Opponents of the line of exiting the euro and the suspension of debt repayment were/are keen to argue that, whatever we think of the issue, it need not become an obstacle to finding common ground in the here and present. After all nobody in their right minds actually announces a devaluation - just think what would happen to bank deposits on the eve of an election when a victory for the Left was on the cards. But the main issue is whether, in the period when the movement to support a radical break with the present system is emerging, we prioritize the essential unity of the movement and its interconnectedness on common concerns and aspirations, or, on the other hand, the “correct” political line? Is the movement to be divided now because of the very different answers to what a Left government needs to do once in power concerning the exchange rate and reducing the level of debt repayments? More than the actual answer to the question of the appropriate exchange rate regime, it is th e priority given to the question that we have found immensely problematic, and especially when it has been used as an excuse to resist social pressures for the unity of the Left in response to the austerity programmes. Notes  [1] Antarsya represents a political alliance of a number of extra-parliamentary leftist parties from various traditions (Trotskyist, orthodox Marxist, and others). Syriza represents a much larger grouping, in terms of numbers and electoral appeal (it currently has 9 Members of Parliament), based around Synaspismos, the largest Greek Left party after the KKE, with a number of smaller leftist parties also stemming from different traditions (Trotskyist, Maoist, left-eurocommunist etc). The main orthodox communist party, the KKE, remained rather aloof from the debate concerning the euro. While the KKE is a virulently anti-EU party, and is clear that progress to socialism requires Greece leaving not only the euro, but the EU itself, it was, on the whole, unwilling to commit itself to a short-term strategy of exiting the euro. [2]We are less convinced, however, of the argument that Germany is so committed, as Lapavitsas (2012) seems to believe, to the importance of the euro as a form of world money. Germany, before the euro, was always sceptical about the deutschmark turning into a major reserve currency, and this scepticism has carried over with respect to the euro. [3] It is an uncomfortable fact for present day supporters of the exit strategy that their approach has so much resonance with the failed “socialist” experience of the early 1980s in Greece. PASOK in that period was also committed to a national road in which industrial policy, planning agreements and socialization of the public sector were to play a major role, in an environment where capital controls, the exchange rate and monetary policy were freely available as policy tools. [4]Alpha Bank, Greece and Southeastern Europe. Economic & Financial Outlook, n.74, May 2010 (internet: http://www.alpha.gr/files/infoanalyses/Greece_&_Southe astern_201005.pdf). [5] This, be it noted, does not apply in the case of Ireland. [6] Thus D. Kazakis, an independent economist, originally from the KKE, has set up his own party with identifiable nationalistic sentiments. Before that his support for the default and exit option ensured that he was given a platform by leftist organizations that should have known better. Another case is that of Spitha (spark), a group that has coalesced around the famous musician Mikis Theodorakis. Theodorakis is a historic figure of the Left, but his increasingly patriotic rhetoric, and some unsavoury company, has meant that it is the nationalistic aspects of the Spitha that dominate. [7] These two themes are central to Laskos and Tsakalotos’ (2011) book, in Greek, which looks at the Left’s response to the crisis in a historical perspective. The ‘no turning back’ title of the book refers not only to the social democratic and neo-liberal experiments of the post-war period, but also to the Left’s response to the crisis of the 1970s in terms of national strategies, essentially of reconstruction of the domestic economy. References Kouvelakis S. (2011) ‘The Greek Cauldron’, New Left Review, 72, November-December, pp. 17-32. Lapavitsas C., Kaltenbrunner A., Lindo D., Michell J., Painceira J. P., Pires E., Powell J., Stenfors A., Teles E. (2010) Eurozone Crisis: begger thyself and thy neighbour, Research on Money and Finance, Occasional Report. Lapavitsas C., A. Kaltenbrunner, G. Lambrinidis, D. Lindo, J. Meadway, J. Michell, J.P. Painceira, E. Pires, J. Powell, A. Stenfors, N. Teles y L. Vatikiotis (2011) Breaking Up? A Route Out of the Eurozone Crisis, Research in Money and Finance, Special Report 3. Lapavitsas K. ‘Default and Exit from the Eurozone: A Radical Left Strategy’, Socialist Register 2012: The Crisis and the Left, vol. 48. Laskos Ch. and Tsakalotos E. (2011) No Turning Back: capitalist crises, social needs, socialism, KaPsiMi publications, Athens (in Greek). Lebowitz D. (2003) Beyond Political Economy: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class, Palgrave Macmillan. Milios J. and Sotiropoulos D. (2009) Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule, Palgrave Macmillan. Milios J. and G. Economakis (2011), ‘The Middle Classes, Class Places, and Class Positions: A Critical Approach to Nicos Poulantzas’s Theory’, Rethinking Marxism Vol. 23 No. 2 (April), pp. 226-245. Rylmon (2011) ‘There is no quick exit strategy’, Epoxi, 30/12/11. Suchting W. A. (1983) Marx: An Introduction, Wheatsheaf Books

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Fwd: Call for papers - Special volume: Technology & Degrowth
by Michel Bauwens 14 Jul '15

14 Jul '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Mikuláš Černík <mikulas.cernik(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 11:01 PM Subject: Call for papers - Special volume: Technology & Degrowth To: Cc: Christian Kerschner <christian.kerschner(a)gmail.com>, petra.waechter(a)univie.ac.at, linda.nierling(a)kit.edu, melfhinrichehlers(a)gmail.com Dear colleague, I am very happy to inform you, that the proposal of our special issue has been accepted by the Journal of Cleaner Production. For more information follow the link or read the full Call for Papers below: *http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.06.107 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.06.107>* As invited authors we are looking forward to your full paper contribution, which should be sent to us no later than the 1st of December 2015 for an internal review. After passing this stage, we will forward your papers for peer review by the 15th of January 2016. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to get back to us. Mikuláš Černík for the Editorial Team: Christian Kerschner, Petra Wächter, Linda Nierling, Melf-Hinrich Ehlers ############################################################################ Call for papers Special volume: technology and Degrowth Christian Kerschnera, Petra Wächterb, Linda Nierlingc, Melf-Hinrich Ehlersd a Department of Environmental Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic b Post-Doc, University of Vienna, Austria c Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany d Social, Economic and Geographical Sciences Group, The James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen, Scotland Received 24 June 2015, Accepted 24 June 2015, Available online 10 July 2015 Under a Creative Commons license *http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.06.107 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2015.06.107>* Few issues in the rapidly expanding body of Degrowth research (e.g. D'Alisa et al., 2014, Sekulova et al., 2013 and Kallis et al., 2010) are as controversial and at the same time scientifically underexplored as the role of technology in the transition to a Degrowth society. The declaration of the Barcelona conference in 2010 called for selective moratoria on certain technologies (“Barcelona Declaration”, 2010), but discussions in Leipzig in 2014 were far from such a consensus. Two contrapositions were apparent: technology criticism following Illich, 1973, Elull, 1964 and Schumacher, 1973 and other critical authors versus technology enthusiasm that, for example, agrees with Gorz (1994) on the potential of digital fabricators. Ideas of simplification of life with less or low technology clash with visions of a true democratisation of society through the use of certain technologies (both high and low tech) such as open source programming, DIY tractors and photovoltaic panels. However, reality is not as “black and white” as it may seem. There is a wide range of potentially overlapping positions around scepticism and enthusiasm towards the role of technologies in Degrowth. This special volume aims to present and discuss these positions based on theoretical and empirical perspectives from authors with diverse backgrounds such as Science and Technology Studies, Philosophy of Technology, Ecological Economics, Industrial Ecology, Technology Assessment, Innovation Studies, Political Science and Anthropology. It focuses on how technology transforms ecology, society and the economy and emphasizes inter- and transdisciplinary approaches. The special volume aims to both provide 1) a state of the art selection of current discussions of the role of technology within Degrowth in academia and practice and 2) a deepened reflection on technologies with the aim to specify perspectives and to overcome their entrenchment. The first section will revisit influential thinkers (Illich, Elull, Schumacher, Georgescu-Roegen, Castoriadis, the Luddites, etc.) and introduce promising approaches towards technology, which have not yet entered the Degrowth discourse. The second section will provide space for authors calling for a “democratisation of technology”, including practice-oriented case studies. These argue, among others, that problems of technology can be overcome through open access and elimination of undemocratic control by corporations and elites. A third section includes contributions from authors showing how technologies can be evaluated and assessed from a Degrowth perspective. These contributions depart from the premise that technologies are neither per se beneficial nor detrimental for a Degrowth society. They develop normative guidelines and selection criteria for a framework to map roles of technologies in the Degrowth context. Finally, we are open to complementary analyses of Degrowth and technology, which explore novel takes on this important issue and provide outlooks on how future practice and research on technology and Degrowth might or should unfold. 1. List of sub-topics for this special issue 1.1. Degrowth and technology: theoretical and historical perspectives The existing Degrowth literature builds on the ideas and concepts of a variety of past and contemporary perspectives on technology (Latouche, 2009), starting from the works of Georgescu Roegen (1971), Illich (1973), over Mumford (1967) to Elull, 1964 and Castoriadis, 1985 and others such as Bijker, 1995, Dickson, 1975, Feenberg, 1999 and Sclove, 1995 and Winner (1980). 1.1.1. Key authors revisited We would welcome contributions, be it reviews, empirical applications or other rigorous analyses that revisit these authors and others that further the debate on technology and Degrowth. We are looking for new insights and interpretations as well as succinct summaries from a Degrowth perspective. How can the work of these authors shed light on the challenges of today and provide an interpretative framework for the role of technology in a Degrowth society and for mainstream concepts such as the Green Economy or of Alternative Technology as it was popular in the 1970s? We also encourage authors to scrutinize theories of democratization of technology, which are popular in the Degrowth community, particularly with respect to feasibility of democratization of technology in Degrowth contexts. 1.1.2. Historical events and analyses of alternative approaches to technology Continuing to examine the past, we would like to invite historical analysis of past events or experiences of communities that consciously rejected the introduction of new technologies for cultural, social or other reasons. Movements like the (Neo-)Luddites or communities like the Amish would be examples. These reject, for example, goals of economic rationalization and technological efficiency and optimization, in favor of other values. Authors should look into these phenomena with scientific rigor and method and avoid mere description. Biophysical (e.g. social metabolisms), social, economic and political science perspectives are welcome. 1.1.3. New developments and debates Research on the relationship between society and science and technology has developed its own fields such as STS (Science and Technology Studies), Philosophy of Technology, Risk Research and Innovation Studies. We are looking for authors from these fields, who engage critically with the role of technology for a Degrowth society. Authors may take critical standpoints towards the mainstream dogma of accelerating whatever technological development and adoption to pursue economic growth. We are looking for new ways of seeing innovation and technologies, well-elaborated critiques of mainstream technological optimism and economic efficiency improvements as well as insights from other perspectives, which do not necessarily engage directly with technology, like ethics, feminism, critical theory or Marxism. Contributions can focus on technology in general or on specific (controversial) technologies. Many of these may be reactions and developments in relation to unavoidable decisions, like whether or not to apply a controversial, or new and potentially harmful technology. 1.2. Democratisation of technology – practical approaches For the second topical area, we are looking for contributions from authors who are suggesting that certain technologies may be conducive to a Degrowth society (e.g. Domènech et al., 2013), if they are made widely available such as FAB labs, DIY, Digital Fabricators and open source software. We invite authors to use rigorous scientific analysis to support their arguments such as case studies, discourse and content analysis informed by social and political theory or other established approaches advanced in science and technology studies. Contributions can take into account the perspectives of established scholars in the Degrowth community (see 1.1.1), provide a critical perspective on the idea of democratization of technology or highlight and investigate the dangers and pitfalls. They can also present empirical research on successful and unsuccessful democratization of technology, which informs Degrowth debates. These can include analyses of participatory governance and assessment of technologies of relevance for Degrowth. Empirical examples can be from advanced capitalist economies, emerging economies and the Global South. 1.3. Evaluating technologies from a Degrowth perspective For the third section of the special volume we are interested in articles that start from the premise that some practical engagement with technology will be inevitable in a Degrowth society. Thus contributions to this section develop or explore approaches for evaluating technologies from a Degrowth perspective. Once again they can build on established concepts such as Illich's convivial technology, or Schumacher's appropriate technology, but they can also develop their own frameworks or borrow from other literatures. Examples may be participatory approaches as those proposed in Post Normal Science. Authors can provide case studies, share insights from projects or experiences or build their frameworks on consistent theoretical approaches. They can also contribute critical analysis of the mono-dimensionality of decision-making in the context of new technologies, focused on economic costs and benefits, while many other dimensions remain unnoticed. We are particularly interested in contributions, which apply well-developed evaluation frameworks to specific technologies, able to capture Degrowth concerns. 1.4. Further approaches towards technology and Degrowth In addition, we are open to other original and inspiring contributions, which explore technology as such or particular technologies from a Degrowth perspective. These contributions go beyond the themes suggested by us, but should equally advance our understanding of technology in Degrowth contexts. Contributions, which open up new horizons, provide outlooks or develop research agendas, are particularly welcome. They can either be short, but fully referenced think pieces (up to 4000 words) or thorough analyses (up to 8000 words). 2. Editorial team Christian Kerschner, Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, Masaryk University. *More information <http://www.degrowth.org/christian-kerschner-2>*. Email: *christian.kerschner(a)gmail.com <christian.kerschner(a)gmail.com>* Petra Wächter: Post-Doc, University of Vienna. *More information <http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/en/about-us/the-ita-team/former-staff-members/pet…>*. Email: *petra.waechter(a)univie.ac.at <petra.waechter(a)univie.ac.at>* Linda Nierling: research fellow at the Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Germany. *More information <http://www.itas.kit.edu/mitarbeiter_nierling_linda.php>*. Email: *linda.nierling(a)kit.edu <linda.nierling(a)kit.edu>* Melf-Hinrich Ehlers: Researcher at the James Hutton Institute, Aberdeen, Scotland. *More information <http://www.hutton.ac.uk/staff/melf-hinrich-ehlers>*. Email: *melfhinrichehlers(a)gmail.com <melfhinrichehlers(a)gmail.com>* 3. Formats and procedures Full papers are invited for potential publication in this Special Volume of the JCLP. Submissions should be between 4000 and 6000 words for in-depth case studies, 6000 and 8500 words for full scientific papers based upon theoretical and empirical foundations, and 9000 and 13,000 words for comprehensive, integrative reviews. Think pieces have a length of up to 4000 words. All submissions should be developed based upon the editorial guidelines provided in the instructions for authors for the Journal of Cleaner Production, which can be accessed from the website: *http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30440/authorinstructions <http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30440/authorin…>* . Upon receipt of the completed documents, independent reviewers will be invited to provide peer reviews for each document. Upon receipt and acceptance of the author's revised documents, all will be published in this SV of the Journal of Cleaner Production. Authors should take great care to show their awareness of the large amount of related articles published within the Journal of Cleaner Production (among them two special issues on Degrowth). Articles must be written in English. Authors with limitations in command of written English are recommended to send their papers to a ‘Native English Science Editor,’ before the first submission because poorly written documents can compromise the decisions during the review process. The authors should resubmit the final version of their document to ensure top quality of English for all documents of this SV. 4. Timeline • Submission of extended abstracts (400–500 words) to the editors: by August 31, 2015. • Notification of acceptance for paper submission: September 30, 2015. • Submission of full papers for peer review to Elsevier via the EES System: by January 15th, 2016. • Submission of revised manuscript: late spring 2016 (individual deadlines). • Review process ending with notification of needs for minor changes: early summer 2016 (individual deadlines). • Final manuscripts due as corrected proofs: late summer 2016 (individual deadlines). • Publication date: late autumn 2016. Note: Authors are encouraged to send their contributions as early as possible, as we would like to present the special issue at the Degrowth conference in Budapest in September 2016. In case you have a paper you would like to submit, but are unable to meet the deadlines, please write to us. In exceptional cases we may grant extensions and your article can always be submitted for publication in a general volume of the Journal of Cleaner Production. References Barcelona Declaration, 2010 Barcelona Declaration [WWW Document] (2010) URL *http://www.barcelona.degrowth.org/fileadmin/content/documents/Degrowth_Declaration_Barcelona_2010.pdf <http://www.barcelona.degrowth.org/fileadmin/content/documents/Degrowth_Decl…>* (accessed 21.01.14.) Bijker, 1995 W. Bijker Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs: towards a Theory of Sociotechnical Change MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1995) Castoriadis, 1985 C. Castoriadis Reflections on “Rationality” and “Development” Thesis Eleven, 10/11 (1) (1985), pp. 18–35 D'Alisa et al., 2014 G. D'Alisa, F. Demaria, G. Kallis Degrowth: a Vocabulary for a New Era Routledge, New York and London (2014) Dickson, 1975 D. Dickson The Politics of Alternative Technology Universe Books, New York (1975) Domènech et al., 2013 L. Domènech, H. March, D. Saurí Degrowth initiatives in the urban water sector? A social multi-criteria evaluation of non-conventional water alternatives in Metropolitan Barcelona J. Clean. Prod., 38 (2013), pp. 44–55 Article | PDF (391 K) | View Record in Scopus | Citing articles (10) Elull, 1964 J. Elull The Technological Society Vintage, New York (1964) Feenberg, 1999 A. Feenberg Questioning Technology Routledge, New York (1999) Georgescu-Roegen, 1971 N. Georgescu-Roegen The Entropy Law and the Economic Process Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (1971) Gorz, 1994 A. Gorz Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology Verso, London (1994) Illich, 1973 I. Illich Tools for Conviviality Harper & Row, New York (1973) Kallis et al., 2010 G. Kallis, F. Schneider, J. Martinez-Alier Growth, recession or Degrowth for sustainability and equity? (Special Issue) J. Clean. Prod., 18 (6) (2010), pp. 511–518 Latouche, 2009 S. Latouche Farewell to Growth Polity Press, Cambridge, UK (2009) Mumford, 1967 L. Mumford The Myth of the Machine – Technics and Human Development Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San Diego (1967) Schumacher, 1973 E.F. Schumacher Small is Beautiful: a Study of Economics as if People Mattered Blond & Briggs, London (1973) -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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blockupy analysis of greece
by Michel Bauwens 14 Jul '15

14 Jul '15

-- first published Sunday, July 12th, at http://athens.blockupy.org/post/123881416885/die-niederlage-verstehen-heiss… Niederlage verstehen heisst den Sieg vorbereiten” <http://athens.blockupy.org/post/123881416885/die-niederlage-verstehen-heiss…> - Understanding the Defeat Means Preparing a Victory - http://www.transform-network.net/fr/blog/blog-2015/news/detail/Blog/-6a0d92… - 14 Jul 15 Posted under: Grèce <http://www.transform-network.net/fr/tags.html?categoryUid=47&categoryTitle=…> - *The Greek Dilemma and Us. Nine provisional considerations after both the popular Oxi and Syriza’s Yes to the Memorandum. This is being written after the vote in the Greek parliament and before the final decision of the Eurogroup. At the moment, everything is open, and we are certain of only a couple of things. Almost everything can change, but some things will remain true.* 1. From Blackmail to Coup *The alternative of Grexit or a third Memorandum is not the same as reform or revolution; it is only a matter of the lack of alternatives dictated by the creditors. It corresponds to the relation of forces within Europe, which can at the moment only produce defeats.* The blackmailing of Greece by the creditors leaves open two paths, both of which would be defeats. This is unavoidable. First, Grexit: It means: ‘We’ll take from you the possibility of carrying out Europe’s class conflict within European political space. If you want to keep fighting, then fight for your survival at home and let the world watch the hopelessness of your struggle. If you want to keep on fighting in the name of your population, then your population is going to suffer the consequences.’ A Grexit makes the problem of inner-European politics into one of developmental and humanitarian aid. It isolates the political conflict in Europe, limiting it to Greek territory. Second, a new Memorandum: This means staying with the EU structures as they are, although at the cost of complete subjugation and now, in addition, the political oversight that is being insisted on. The Eurogroup’s and IMF’s programme amounts not only to an administration of debt and insolvency but also the attempt at nation building from outside – trusteeship as a shadow government. Its goal is a new Greek body politic in the economic-technocratic sense: deregulation, privatization, capitalism with ‘Asiatic values’ (Žižek). 2. Political submission as strategy *Apparently, the SYRIZA government has decided, on strategic grounds, to end the policy of negotiations with a symbolic defeat in order to ‘pacify’ the fiscal and economic situation**. **It changes nothing in terms of social devastation.* The events of recent days catapulted SYRIZA into a new decision-making arena in a completely contradictory situation: The emphatic liberatory act of the popular ‘No’ (Oxi) occurred simultaneously with the intensified vulnerability to fiscal blackmail of the state (bank closures, state bankruptcy). Complete collapse would occur in a matter of days. Money was running out. In the last days, the preliminary outer limits of this institutional national uprising against the European ‘institutions’ were reached. The negotiations were at an end, and the economic war against the Greek government reached its preliminary high point. Tsipras hoped a new aid package would ease the dramatic situation. And there are not a few that are hoping now for time to prepare a Grexit for real. It is questionable whether this strategy can work. SYRIZA hoped a Memorandum would give it breathing space and the possibility of preparing a new political offensive. The creditors, therefore, have set themselves the goal of moving from fiscal blackmail to direct political control – in the event it cannot manage, despite all, to bring down the SYRIZA government. They are formulating not only the contractual framework of Greek politics but now want to tie the next disbursements to the government’s political obedience and oversee it permanently. They will try to prevent Greece getting even an atom of manoeuvring space for a new offensive. From now on Brussels is no longer interested merely in economic subjugation under a third Memorandum; the creditors are forcing Tsipras to prove his ‘credibility’ by doing everything they ask of him: to stand up to the population, to the ‘dissenters’, to the party. This is blackmail whose conditions are now the public-image destruction of political unity. It leaves no room for strategic retreat, no possible future offensive. The submission achieved so far can and must be criticised. However, those who see this as a break with a political project and the death of reformism should hold their fire. Because what is now in the air – the Eurogroup’s ‘No’ to the current level of Greece’s submission – will not only decide SYRIZA’s future but also the future configuration of Europe. Whether there is Grexit or a Memorandum, on Monday we will all know that there is most probably no possibility of even the slightest improvement of Greece’s situation if this is done in concert with the creditors. And since the referendum a break has become an option for society. Starting Monday there will be a new political process in Greece, which will put the left and the party to the test. 3. Government and collective process *The government is taking on an identity distinct from the party and the movement. The negotiation process hampers the democratic process and concentrates power in the hands of a few, whom people have to trust. It is precisely the popular aspect of the referendum that has paradoxically reinforced this concentration: The masses of young and poor people, who are not activists and not organised, have tied themselves directly to the government and to Alexis Tsipras as a person.* Through its campaign in the urban peripheries and poor neighbourhoods, SYRIZA reached all those who yearned for ‘life with dignity’; but the population did not want this to occur in the form of a permanent general assembly of the people, which required them to make permanent decisions affecting precisely the one person whom they consciously empowered for this purpose through their ‘No’: Alexis Tsipras. They not only said ‘No’ but also placed their trust in Tsipras so that he could end their suffering. This reinforced his possibilities of acting unilaterally. At the same time, this highlighted a vacuum in the movement of the streets. The democracy of the squares consciously rejected centralist politics and, in so doing, the figure of a charismatic leadership. How do movements speak to those who are not a movement and don’t want to be one? How do we deal with the possible difference between the plebiscite of the assemblies and the supposed common will of all? The societal factor of the non-represented and the ‘invisible’ does not necessarily seek happiness through grassroots movements and engaged self-organisation. How do movements act if real majorities are not only possible under conditions of contemporary post-representation but are also decisive? The SYRIZA experiment has freshly put the open question of societal and popular collectivism on the table. And that’s a good thing! 4. First get food, then go for the big challenge *The biggest problem with the major submission to the European status quo is not the betrayal of a decrepit concept of revolution espoused by the KKE or other radical ‘revolutionaries’. The biggest problem is that Greece and its poorest citizens find themselves in a situation of immediate urgency. The social catastrophe cannot be resolved with a five-year plan.* In this sense, in the coming months, what will show us whether SYRIZA has really capitulated is the policies of the government, not a piece of paper. In this process, the required measures can also take place in a legal grey area, or they can produce the next public arena of struggle. What’s important is that this arena is defined and opened up. ‘Absurd’, ‘capitulation’, ‘traders in hope’ – all those who are now basing their own radicalism on SYRIZA’s ‘failure’ should think hard about what they would have done if it were up them. Almost all ‘radical leftists’ within SYRIZA have approved this Memorandum, precisely because they are against it. For the moment it appears to be the only option for keeping the other options open. It was a strategic mistake to not have contemplated other options earlier on. But in order to be able to take the leap into the unknown – a controlled Grexit and the options of nationalising production and the banks – it is not only time and real majorities that are needed but also ‘breathing space’ right now. SYRIZA was not prepared for this step. Nobody was. 5. Grexit as the solution? *The discussion of Grexit in the German left is romantic. In great part it adheres to an old party-communist political conception: A process of rupture is not to occur socially, as social transformation and political movement; rather, it is to be enacted through a decree and according to a technical discussion of social models undertaken by the government. What is more, the demand is irresponsible because – and this is what is most important – it does not correspond to the actual political process.* With their ‘No’, people voted not for exit but to reject the ‘liberal’ politics of fear; in their readiness for battle they went a good distance in the direction of a real break, but they did not formulate the momentum of a revolutionary wish – whether or not we would have wanted them to. A Grexit at this moment would also be irresponsible because it has not been prepared – either by SYRIZA as a government or a party, or by municipal and local social councils, not to mention by assemblies and movements. And so questions of further strategy and the next steps are on the table. But for now we have to understand that a break with Europe’s fiscal regime would aggravate the social disaster, and the plebiscitary moment of the ‘Oxi’ vote would be transformed into a guided democracy and then into the authoritarianism of a left government, which would govern the social catastrophe in an increasingly authoritarian way and would have to reorganise the state and economy against the social majority. Those who argue for a revolutionary Grexit are doing so at a comfortable distance and are, in the last analysis, ignoring those who have fought, starved, suffered, and hoped in the last six years. All of these people deserve time to breathe. They, and not SYRIZA’s Central Committee or a distant revolutionary romanticism, need to decide on the right point in time. 6. Necessary failure? *Whatever the ideologies and false conceptions of the possibility of reforms might have been at work in SYRIZA, its line in the last months corresponded to the tendency of the will of the majority. The hope for a solution within the framework of the European treaties has been the point of departure of SYRIZA’s political strategy. In acting on this basis it has managed to radicalise society.* The government has the people behind it and has absorbed this wish and, together with the public throughout Europe, learned from experience that this wish is just as unrealistic as the neoliberal order is obdurate. If they had chosen to make this insight possessed by a revolutionary minority into the point of departure of their politics they would have failed spectacularly. The last months have made it possible for the whole world to experience the real concrete existence of this antagonism, to see it, to feel it. SYRIZA has not stoked reformist desires but destroyed them in a series of practical object-lessons – whether they wanted to or not. In so doing, the real possibility of a break, about which people throughout the whole of society are now talking seriously for the first time, has become an option. Nobody could have presupposed the experience that has by now been gained without alienating the population and the party. SYRIZA did not take its own truths as a point of departure; instead it looked to the level of consciousness of the population and radicalised it. In this sense, they initiated a revolutionary process – something that those who always knew better and what was coming are not in a position to do. The question now is whether the government will be in sync with this process. 7. Movement and government *After almost six months SYRIZA has come up against the limits of being a protest government. Now the party has to actually take ‘governmental responsibility’. It cannot fall back on programmatic positions but has to face the real dilemma for which there is no pragmatic solution. This also necessarily entails political alienation of the movements from the government.* But this is a good and far from being a bad thing. Movements, in the best sense of the concept, also act for themselves; they have to do so in their immediate struggles and radical demands, which do not always incorporate social majorities – for example, solidarity with refugees in Greece, the struggle against special prisons, police violence, the fascist danger, and against ruinous extractivism (gold mining). Left parties that do not enter government based solely on their own strength, but also because the political caste of an austerity regime has imploded, should try to develop left politics for majorities, and they need to concretely improve the daily conditions of life of many people. Especially under conditions of the nightmarish impoverishment and plunge into the void caused by the Troika’s two Memoranda. In its feverish week of permanent mobilisation, the ‘Oxi’ campaign, too, lived not from a central leadership but from the free self-empowerment of innumerable activists who created, multiplied, and consequently also socialised their own Oxi via social media and in the streets. Can this kind of mobilisation still be called upon? It probably can. The disillusion is palpable. Does it have to stay that way? Does the tremendously arid game of parliamentary reformism versus radical movements that want more have to start again? Maybe, but there is something else. The relationship between broad parts of the movement and the government still exists; it has been humiliated but not broken. What will be decisive is how SYRIZA not only explains its decision in this situation but makes it into a point of departure for further mobilisation. Only at this point could a possible capitulation be spelled out. However, what is also decisive is whether the movements continue to exert pressure on their government; whether they are actually in a position not only to think through the question of socialising the break with the existing fiscal regime, embodied in part by the euro, but also to organise around it as a social process involving many people. We have no specific advice on how to do this and are consciously refraining from giving any. However, two things seem equally clear to us: it is possible under present conditions to govern unpragmatically, and, at the same time, the movements must not subordinate themselves or be subordinate to the logic of governing. 8. A reorganising of the political *Whatever happens, the referendum has re-measured political space not only in Greece but also in Europe. **In almost every conceivable way, it has politicised the crisis and European governance. The technocratic veils are falling away and the brute force of politics is becoming apparent. Their natural laws determine the laws of their policies, but their laws can be called into question. ‘There is no alternative’ is now being confronted by social democracy.* The parties of the old ‘left’, whether in France, Spain, Italy, England – or especially Germany (the SPD) – are by now nothing more than ‘managers of global capitalism’ (Badiou). Their ‘Yes’ against SYRIZA and the Greek population extinguished from their memory the last vestiges of Keynesianism and the last elements of social-democratic solidarity. They marshalled all means at their disposal to repel the first powerful counter-offensive to neoliberalism and its austerity. It was a declaration of war against the new and any attempt to burst the bounds of the current order. Many were able to understand this, and many found were outraged at openly democratic self-empowerment was subjected to intimidation and manipulation through ‘fiscal structural reform’. Europe is no longer what it was. It is now only a question of time before the demand for a European referendum on TTIP will come into focus and before other excluded groups demand their rights. For decades now, the crisis of representation has only seen a right-wing response: Hungary, Le Pen, Denmark, Pegida. Now it has a left response, which can no longer disappear in the medium term, whatever concrete form it takes. It positioned itself as a political force way before the 34 per cent of the January election. And even in the parliamentary systems there is – at least in the long run the possibility of rebellious actions. OXI remains the central political antagonism of the years to come and is at the same time ten years ahead of the rest of the movements in Europe. 9. The empire is being destroyed from inside, not from outside. *Those who say that the European empire cannot be reformed should not conclude that one should leave it. Of course, there is nothing to be expected from Merkel. She is a real warrior for her class. But it is just as self-evident that one has to be and stay precisely where the enemy is, where one’s own enmity can be brought to bear.* Ultimately, we fight in the factory and in the city neighbourhood and not in a place where the relations of domination are absent. In any case, there is and will be no such place, even in Greece after a Grexit. Whether inside or outside the euro and the EU, the European reality forms the objective boundaries of the Greek breakthrough. This is where the responsibility of the European movements begins, especially in Germany. Crossing borders is now in our hands. This involves all social movements and political struggles for a Europe of rights for all and true democracy. It involves anchors of transnational protest like Blockupy, as well as other cross-border connections of the radical left. And, of course, it involves the Party of the European Left around Die LINKE. Everyone has to change something; everyone has to reassess their policies and ask: How can we internationalise the Greek cause and Europeanise the OXI vote? Together, separately, united, in each place, in each form. We have to modernise our practice – within this constellation. And one more thing: SYRIZA doesn’t need a fan club. We should appreciate the great value of a left government, without being ‘faithful to Moscow’. ‘Unfortunately, small steps forward still require big sacrifices’, is what a Diktio comrade texted us from deep inside the government during the Friday in which the momentous decision was made. Yes, it’s a lot of rubbish. Just carry on. What else? *Blockupy goes Athens, 12 July2015 (12.00, Berlin)* *PS:* As a team we are now ending our report and going back into action. Whatever happens from now on we have already been changed by the recent events. In Athens we fought to the point of exhaustion along with others, but also spoke with far-sighted comrades and courageous common people who told us the reasons for their OXI. We saw how much we desired more Greek friendship against Germany’s order. It was exciting and historic, and we learned a lot. *PPS:* All our basic assessments still stand up, though many things could turn out differently in the next hours and days. ‘There is no alternative’ is supposed to win – shock and awe, nothing is to survive. If the enormous level of submission is insufficient then Greek society will have to risk the great leap into the unknown. Either they remain in a repeatedly produced void or they are to go under. Then for the moment something will again have occurred. But that will be decided not by the government alone; then all the stakes will really be in the streets. This text first appeared in German in the blog ‘Blockupy goes Athens <http://athens.blockupy.org/post/123881416885/die-niederlage-verstehen-heiss…> ’. Translation by Eric Canepa Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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Fwd: Appelons tous les parlements à voter contre cet accord #ThisIsACoup
by Michel Bauwens 14 Jul '15

14 Jul '15

This is the deal between Tsipras and the EU http://www.tovima.gr/files/1/2015/07/13/ssss.pdf Please read it carefully. Note that voting this text in the Parliament by Wednesday is "a condition to allow banks to reopen" and to start "discussing" a new MoU to get more loans the majority of which will be used to recapatilise Greek banks while keeping them private and repay the unsustainable and illegitimate debt. The program contains pension reductions, VAT increases, privatisation of everything even the supervisory authority of the electricity grid, TNCs into the pharmacies, milk and bread markets. The EU will have a veto right on all legislative projects before they go the the Greek parliament. All law initiatives since February except the humanitarian bill will have to be revised. If you agree this is a dictatorial, colonial, disgraceful austerity agreement please call Parliamentarians all over Europe - especially the left-wing - to vote against it! ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: 'Yiorgos Vassalos' via Platforme Solidarite Grece-Belgique < solidaritegrece-belgium(a)googlegroups.com> Date: Mon, Jul 13, 2015 at 8:58 PM Subject: Appelons tous les parlements à voter contre cet accord #ThisIsACoup To: "solidaritegrece-belgium(a)googlegroups.com" < solidaritegrece-belgium(a)googlegroups.com> Chers camarades, je me permet un message personel vu les circumstances... Au lieu de vouloir continuer à soutenir le gouvernement grec même si il viole des enfants sur place Syntagma parce que "Shauble l'a demandé et bon puisque les sondages disent que les Grecs veulent rester dans l'euro, Tsipras ne pouvait pas faire autrement" faites campagne pour que les parlements grec et belge rejettent cette troisième plan d'austérité coloniale. Si non la nouvelle gauche sera morte ici aussi, parce qu'une gauche radicale qui saigne le peuple ça n'a pas de raison d'être. This is the deal between Tsipras and the EU http://www.tovima.gr/files/1/2015/07/13/ssss.pdf Please read it carefully. Note that voting this text in the Parliament by Wednesday is "a condition to allow banks to reopen" and to start "discussing" a new MoU to get more loans the majority of which will be used to recapatilise Greek banks while keeping them private and repay the unsustainable and illegitimate debt. The program contains pension reductions, VAT increases, privatisation of everything even the supervisory authority of the electricity grid, TNCs into the pharmacies, milk and bread markets. The EU will have a veto right on all legislative projects before they go the the Greek parliament. All law initiatives since February except the humanitarian bill will have to be revised. If you agree this is a dictatorial, colonial, disgraceful austerity agreement please call Parliamentarians all over Europe - especially the left-wing - to vote against it! ‪#‎NoMoreAusterity‬ ‪#‎ΟΧΙ‬ ‪#‎ThisIsACoup‬ ‪ Στις 1:21 μ.μ. Δευτέρα, 13 Ιουλίου 2015, ο/η MANIOU Panayota < panayota.maniou(a)europarl.europa.eu> έγραψε: Chers ami-e-s, Encore une fois, seulement a titre indicatif et non pas pour commencer un échange, je vous envoie une note qui a été préparé après le contacte avec l'équipe de négociation après la fin du Sommet. amitiés, panayota [image: top_GUE] *Panayota MANIOU* Policy Advisor - Political Group of the GUE/NGL › PHS 05C015 / ' +32 (0) 228 44567 ( +32 (0) 491738855 * panayota.maniou(a)ep.europa.eu [image: bottom_GUE] *From:* MANIOU Panayota *Sent:* 13 July 2015 13:15 *To:* GUE-All *Subject:* update on Greece Dear all, after the very long and tough meetings that have started yesterday and finished a few hours ago, and before taking the plane back to Greece, we had a short explanation of the situation to share with you. We can confirm that since the eurogroup meeting but also after, during the Summit, the Greek government has faced blunt threats and blackmails which would have serious consequences to the Greek people as it was foreseeing a concrete plan of complete isolation of the country by Wednesday at all levels, including the collapse of the banks and lack in provisions of all kind. The way a "grexit" was appearing would be translated in leaving the eurozone but still having to apply a memorandum with harsh terms. Therefore, in order to survive and not give in to the pressures that would lead to the famous "left parenthesis", the Greek government lead a battle with all its forces which resulted in a difficult to bare compromise but, also, to some success on important levels: *The reprofiling of the debt is included in the agreement * The Greek government managed to block the proposal for the creation of a fund in Luxembourg (in a bank related to V. Schauble) with all its possible assets summing up to 50 billion euros. Instead, there is going to be a fund in Greece, commonly managed by the Greek government and the EU Commission, which will (in depth of 3 years' time) use 25 billion euros for bank recapitalisation and then around 15 billion euros from which 50% will be used to finance the debt but the rest 50% will be used as direct investments to fund development. * The proposal for a "roll back" of the legislation already put in place by the Greek government was also blocked. In practise this means that all laws relating to people hired back in the public sector (for example the cleaning ladies or the people working in the ERT public radio-tv broadcaster etc) or the law regulating the possibility of paying debts towards the State or the social security funds under 100 times, are maintained and whatever is to be done according to this in the future is under the control of the Greek government. *It seems that, also by the ECB teleconference meeting today, the ELA will be adjusted in a way that will end the asphyxiation of the Greek banks. Admitting once again that the whole package is very difficult, the Greek government remains still in its position that this is a situation that it is best to be handled by the current government in order to avoid the political choices of the previous governments which chose to put the burden mostly on the weakest classes. Making those who had not paid yet finally take their part in it, making all efforts possible to stabilise the country, to keep legislating on a different direction of the previous governments on a series of things can be the most important guarantee for a general change of cap of the country in favour of the people. Finally, an element that also has to be retained is that through all these procedures and the tough negotiations, peoples and public opinion of Europe has been able to clearly see and realize the political behaviour of their leaderships and, hopefully, on this basis they will act and mobilise accordingly. Below and attached, for your convenience, you may find an UNEDITED translation of PM Alexis Tsipras' statement after the Summit this morning and the statement on Greece by the Eurozone Summit. As things will be moving on in the next days with parliamentary activities, we will try to keep you fully updated. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’ statement following the conclusion of the Eurozone Summit: "We have been fighting hard for six months now and we fought until the end in order to get the best possible outcome, an agreement that will enable the country to stand on its feet and for the Greek people to be able to continue to fight. We faced tough decisions, tough dilemmas. We assumed the responsibility of the decision in order to prevent the implementation of the most extreme objectives, of the most extreme conservative circles in the European Union. The agreement is a tough one. However, we prevented the goal of transferring public property abroad, we prevented the plan of the financial asphyxiation and the collapse of the financial system, a plan which had – down to the last detail – been recently designed to perfection and had begun to being implemented. Finally, in this tough battle, we managed to gain the reconstruction, restructuring of the debt and a certain financing process for the medium term. We were aware that it would not be an easy task, but we have left a very important legacy behind us. An important legacy and a much needed change throughout Europe. Greece will continue to fight and we will continue to fight, so that we can return to growth, regain our lost national sovereignty. We earned our popular sovereignty. We sent throughout Europe and the world the message of democracy, the message of dignity. This is the most important legacy. Finally, I would like to thank all my colleagues, ministers, colleagues and associates who gave with me a very tough fight to the end. A fight which at the end of the day will be vindicated. Today’s decision maintains Greece in conditions of financial stability, it provides recovery potential, but at the same time we knew beforehand that it would be an agreement whose implementation is difficult. The measures include the measures which were voted in parliament. Measures which will inevitably create recessionary trends. However, I have the feeling, the belief and the hope that the growth package of 35 billion that we achieved, the debt restructuring, as well as the secured funding for the next three years will create a feeling in the markets, the investors that a Grexit belongs to the past. And this feeling can create a wave of investment which will offset the recessionary trends. At the same time, I believe that a large majority of the Greek people will support the effort to return to growth as, on the one hand they acknowledge that we fought for a just cause, we fought until the end, we have been negotiating hard all night, on the other hand because no matter what the burdens are, they will be allocated – our presence guarantees this – with social justice. And it will not be the case that the bill will be footed again only by those who during the last years have shouldered the burdens. This time, those who over the previous period had managed to escape or had found a way to escape, because they were protected by the previous governments, will also pay, they will shoulder the burdens. Finally, I want to make a promise: We need to fight just as hard now as we fought to get the best outcome abroad, in Europe, in order to get rid of the vested interests within the country. Greece needs radical reforms in favor of the social forces and against the oligarchy that led it to this point. And this is the promise concerning the new effort that commences tomorrow." Thank you all! Best, panayota [image: top_GUE] *Panayota MANIOU* Policy Advisor - Political Group of the GUE/NGL › PHS 05C015 / ' +32 (0) 228 44567 ( +32 (0) 491738855 * panayota.maniou(a)ep.europa.eu [image: bottom_GUE] -- Vous recevez ce message, car vous êtes abonné au groupe Google Groupes "Platforme Solidarite Grece-Belgique". Pour vous désabonner de ce groupe et ne plus recevoir d'e-mails le concernant, envoyez un e-mail à l'adresse solidaritegrece-belgium+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. Pour envoyer un message à ce groupe, envoyez un e-mail à l'adresse solidaritegrece-belgium(a)googlegroups.com. Cette discussion peut être lue sur le Web à l'adresse https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/solidaritegrece-belgium/08A833A94646A645A… <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/solidaritegrece-belgium/08A833A94646A645A…> . Pour obtenir davantage d'options, consultez la page https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Vous recevez ce message, car vous êtes abonné au groupe Google Groupes "Platforme Solidarite Grece-Belgique". Pour vous désabonner de ce groupe et ne plus recevoir d'e-mails le concernant, envoyez un e-mail à l'adresse solidaritegrece-belgium+unsubscribe(a)googlegroups.com. Pour envoyer un message à ce groupe, envoyez un e-mail à l'adresse solidaritegrece-belgium(a)googlegroups.com. Cette discussion peut être lue sur le Web à l'adresse https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/solidaritegrece-belgium/614649008.1083162… <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/solidaritegrece-belgium/614649008.1083162…> . Pour obtenir davantage d'options, consultez la page https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

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New issue -- Journal of Peer Production #7: Policies for the Commons
by george dafermos 13 Jul '15

13 Jul '15

Dear friends and colleagues, It is our great pleasure to announce the public release of Issue #7 of the Journal of Peer Production! In this issue, which is co-edited by me and Vasilis Kostakis, we have collected several articles which explore how the principles of the commons, of peer production and of the social economy can form the basis for a paradigm shift in society. We are hoping you will enjoy them and find them useful! Best, George and Vasilis *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* New issue -- Journal of Peer Production #7: Policies for the Commons <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/> *-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------* A spectre is haunting the world - the spectre of the Commons. Without a doubt, the world system is in a crisis of such magnitude that the existing state of affairs cannot possibly be maintained for much longer. At the same time, models based on the collective management of common goods and the social economy have sprung up amidst this state of permanent crisis, which suggest that another world is possible. Taking the policy proposals originally developed by the FLOK Society project in Ecuador as a starting point, this JoPP issue explores how the principles of the Commons, of peer production, of free software and of the social economy can constitute the basis for the development of appropriate policies enabling the transition to alternative, post-capitalist social and economic models. The articles collected in this issue address some crucial aspects of this transformation: the transition process from a capitalist knowledge economy towards a social knowledge economy; the transformation of the secondary sector of the economy, with an emphasis on manufacturing and energy; and the reconfiguration of the state and the commonification of public services in the direction of a "Partner State" in which the resources and functions of the state are primarily used to enable and empower autonomous social production. +=================================================+ | T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S | +=================================================+ +-----Editorial section---------------------------------------------------------------------+ Editorial notes: Public policy proposals for a society of the commons <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/editorial…> by George Dafermos and Vasilis Kostakis The FLOK doctrine <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/the-flok-…> by David Vila-Viñas and Xabier Barandiaran +-----Peer-reviewed papers-------------------------------------------------------------+ Transforming the productive base of the economy through the open design commons and distributed manufacturing <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/peer-revi…> by George Dafermos Transforming the energy matrix: Transition policies for the development of the distributed energy model <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/peer-revi…> by George Dafermos, Panos Kotsampopoulos, Kostas Latoufis, Ioannis Margaris, Beatriz Rivela, Fausto Paulino Washima, Pere Ariza-Montobbio and Jesús López Public policy for a social economy <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/peer-revi…> by John Restakis ICT, open government and civil society <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/peer-revi…> by John Restakis, Daniel Araya, Maria José Calderon and Robin Murray Towards a new configuration between the state, civil society and the market <http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-7-policies-for-the-commons/peer-revi…> by Michel Bauwens and Vasilis Kostakis +-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: [P2P-F] [NetworkedLabour] Greece: A World-Historic Defeat???
by Orsan 13 Jul '15

13 Jul '15

Is this the link? http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/1139.php > On 12 jul. 2015, at 22:57, Bob Haugen <bob.haugen(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Interesting (to me, anyway, who only sees all of this from afar). > > Panich seems to have a significantly different opinion than I've seen > on this list so far. > > Comments? Analysis? > _______________________________________________ > NetworkedLabour mailing list > NetworkedLabour(a)lists.contrast.org > http://lists.contrast.org/mailman/listinfo/networkedlabour

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