[Solar-general] por que ser vegetariano?

[Rev3lde]

El Saturday 13 December 2008 20:13:24 Sebastian Bassi escribió:
> 2008/12/13 Pablo Manuel Rizzo <info en pablorizzo.com>:
> > Los vegetales tiene otro sistema de transmisores y control, pero de
> > todos modos, por qué sería una diferencia esencial?
>
> No es comparable, dichos sistemas vegetales no están integrados en
> nada que se paresca a un sistema nervioso central y por ende, no
> "sienten". Que respondan a estimulos no significan que puedan sentir.
> Si sacas un tomate de una planta de tomates, dicha planta no sufre.
> ¿Hace falta explicar esto?

"But who can say that the vapour engine has not a kind of
consciousness? Where does consciousness begin, and where end? Who
can draw the line? Who can draw any line? Is not everything
interwoven with everything? Is not machinery linked with animal
life in an infinite variety of ways? The shell of a hen's egg is
made of a delicate white ware and is a machine as much as an egg-
cup is: the shell is a device for holding the egg, as much as the
egg-cup for holding the shell: both are phases of the same
function; the hen makes the shell in her inside, but it is pure
pottery. She makes her nest outside of herself for convenience'
sake, but the nest is not more of a machine than the egg-shell is.
A 'machine' is only a 'device.'"

Then returning to consciousness, and endeavouring to detect its
earliest manifestations, the writer continued:-

"There is a kind of plant that eats organic food with its flowers:
when a fly settles upon the blossom, the petals close upon it and
hold it fast till the plant has absorbed the insect into its
system; but they will close on nothing but what is good to eat; of
a drop of rain or a piece of stick they will take no notice.
Curious! that so unconscious a thing should have such a keen eye to
its own interest. If this is unconsciousness, where is the use of
consciousness?

"Shall we say that the plant does not know what it is doing merely
because it has no eyes, or ears, or brains? If we say that it acts
mechanically, and mechanically only, shall we not be forced to
admit that sundry other and apparently very deliberate actions are
also mechanical? If it seems to us that the plant kills and eats a
fly mechanically, may it not seem to the plant that a man must kill
and eat a sheep mechanically?

"But it may be said that the plant is void of reason, because the
growth of a plant is an involuntary growth. Given earth, air, and
due temperature, the plant must grow: it is like a clock, which
being once wound up will go till it is stopped or run down: it is
like the wind blowing on the sails of a ship--the ship must go when
the wind blows it. But can a healthy boy help growing if he have
good meat and drink and clothing? can anything help going as long
as it is wound up, or go on after it is run down? Is there not a
winding up process everywhere?

"Even a potato {5} in a dark cellar has a certain low cunning about
him which serves him in excellent stead. He knows perfectly well
what he wants and how to get it. He sees the light coming from the
cellar window and sends his shoots crawling straight thereto: they
will crawl along the floor and up the wall and out at the cellar
window; if there be a little earth anywhere on the journey he will
find it and use it for his own ends. What deliberation he may
exercise in the matter of his roots when he is planted in the earth
is a thing unknown to us, but we can imagine him saying, 'I will
have a tuber here and a tuber there, and I will suck whatsoever
advantage I can from all my surroundings. This neighbour I will
overshadow, and that I will undermine; and what I can do shall be
the limit of what I will do. He that is stronger and better placed
than I shall overcome me, and him that is weaker I will overcome.'

"The potato says these things by doing them, which is the best of
languages. What is consciousness if this is not consciousness? We
find it difficult to sympathise with the emotions of a potato; so
we do with those of an oyster. Neither of these things makes a
noise on being boiled or opened, and noise appeals to us more
strongly than anything else, because we make so much about our own
sufferings. Since, then, they do not annoy us by any expression of
pain we call them emotionless; and so qua mankind they are; but
mankind is not everybody.

If it be urged that the action of the potato is chemical and
mechanical only, and that it is due to the chemical and mechanical
effects of light and heat, the answer would seem to lie in an
inquiry whether every sensation is not chemical and mechanical in
its operation? whether those things which we deem most purely
spiritual are anything but disturbances of equilibrium in an
infinite series of levers, beginning with those that are too small
for microscopic detection, and going up to the human arm and the
appliances which it makes use of? whether there be not a molecular
action of thought, whence a dynamical theory of the passions shall
be deducible? Whether strictly speaking we should not ask what
kind of levers a man is made of rather than what is his
temperament? How are they balanced? How much of such and such
will it take to weigh them down so as to make him do so and so?"

The writer went on to say that he anticipated a time when it would
be possible, by examining a single hair with a powerful microscope,
to know whether its owner could be insulted with impunity. He then
became more and more obscure, so that I was obliged to give up all
attempt at translation; neither did I follow the drift of his
argument. On coming to the next part which I could construe, I
found that he had changed his ground.

"Either," he proceeds, "a great deal of action that has been called
purely mechanical and unconscious must be admitted to contain more
elements of consciousness than has been allowed hitherto (and in
this case germs of consciousness will be found in many actions of
the higher machines)--Or (assuming the theory of evolution but at
the same time denying the consciousness of vegetable and
crystalline action) the race of man has descended from things which
had no consciousness at all. In this case there is no a priori
improbability in the descent of conscious (and more than conscious)
machines from those which now exist, except that which is suggested
by the apparent absence of anything like a reproductive system in
the mechanical kingdom. This absence however is only apparent, as
I shall presently show.

"Do not let me be misunderstood as living in fear of any actually
existing machine; there is probably no known machine which is more
than a prototype of future mechanical life. The present machines
are to the future as the early Saurians to man. The largest of
them will probably greatly diminish in size. Some of the lowest
vertebrate attained a much greater bulk than has descended to their
more highly organised living representatives, and in like manner a
diminution in the size of machines has often attended their
development and progress.

"Take the watch, for example; examine its beautiful structure;
observe the intelligent play of the minute members which compose
it: yet this little creature is but a development of the cumbrous
clocks that preceded it; it is no deterioration from them. A day
may come when clocks, which certainly at the present time are not
diminishing in bulk, will be superseded owing to the universal use
of watches, in which case they will become as extinct as
ichthyosauri, while the watch, whose tendency has for some years
been to decrease in size rather than the contrary, will remain the
only existing type of an extinct race.

--------

Voy a buscar la traducción al español de "Un mundo sin maquinas" de Bulter. 
sobre la parte que habla de los vegetales.. Por ahora creo que esa esa l 
parte en inglés. Saludos

-- 
"Primero te ignoran, después se ríen de ti, luego te atacan, entonces ganas."
www.redstarlinux.com.ar