No subject

successful commons. How does a community overcome its collective-action
problem? The recurring challenge facing a group of principals in an
interdependent situation, she wrote, is figuring out how to =E2=80=9Corgani=
ze and
govern themselves to obtain continuing joint benefits when all face
temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically.
Parallel questions have to do with the combinations of variables that will
(1) increase the initial likelihood of self-organization; (2) enhance the
capabilities of individuals to continue self-organized efforts over time;
or (3) exceed the capacity of self-organization to solve CPR [common-pool
resource] problems without eternal assistance of some form.=E2=80=9D

Ostrom=E2=80=99s answer was Governing the Commons, a landmark 1990 book tha=
t set
forth some of the basic =E2=80=9Cdesign principles=E2=80=9D of effective, d=
urable commons.
These principles have been adapted and elaborated by later scholars, but
her analysis remains the default framework for evaluating natural resource
commons. The focus of Ostrom=E2=80=99s work, and of the legions of academic=
s who
now study commons, has been how communities of resource users develop
social norms=E2=80=94and sometimes formal legal rules=E2=80=94that enable t=
hem to use
finite resources sustainably over the long term. Standard economics, after
all, declares that we are selfish individuals whose wants are unlimited.
The idea that we can depend on people=E2=80=99s altruism and cooperation,
economists object, is naive and unrealistic. The idea that commons can set
and enforce limits on usage also seems improbable because it rejects the
idea of humans having unbounded appetites.

Ostrom nonetheless showed how, in hundreds of instances, commoners do in
fact meet their needs and interests in collective, cooperative ways. The
villagers of T=C3=B6rbel, Switzerland, have managed their high alpine fores=
ts,
meadows and irrigation waters since 1224. Spaniards have shared irrigation
waters through huerta social institutions for centuries while, more
recently, diverse water authorities in Los Angeles learned how to
coordinate their management of scarce groundwater supplies. Many commons
have flourished for hundreds of years, even in periods of drought or
crisis. Their success can be traced to a community=E2=80=99s ability to dev=
elop its
own flexible, evolving rules for stewardship, oversight of access and
usage, and effective punishments for rule-breakers.

Ostrom found that commons must have clearly defined boundaries so that
commoners can know who has authorized rights to use a resource. Outsiders
who do not contribute to the commons obviously have no rights to access or
use the common-pool resource. She discovered that the rules for
appropriating a resource must take account of local conditions and must
include limits on what can be taken and how. For example, wild berries can
only be harvested during a given period of time, or wood from the forest
can only be taken from the ground and must be used for household use only,
not sold at markets.

Commoners must be able to create or influence the rules that govern a
commons, Ostrom noted. =E2=80=9CIf external governmental officials presume =
that
only they have the authority to set the rules,=E2=80=9D she discovered, =E2=
=80=9Cthen it
will be very difficult for local appropriators to sustain a rule-governed
CPR over the long run.=E2=80=9D Commoners must be willing to monitor how th=
eir
resources are used (or abused) and must devise a system of sanctions to
punish anyone who violates the rules, preferably through a gradation of
increasingly serious sanctions. When disputes arise, commoners must have
easy access to conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Finally, Ostrom declared that commons that are part of a larger system of
governance must be =E2=80=9Corganized in multiple layers of nested enterpri=
ses.=E2=80=9D
She called this =E2=80=9Cpolycentric governance,=E2=80=9D meaning that the =
authority to
appropriate a resource, monitor and enforce its use, resolve conflicts and
perform other governance activities must be shared across different levels=
=E2=80=94
from local to regional to national to international.

Excerpted from *Think Like A Commoner: A Short Introduction to the Life of
the Commons <http://www.newsociety.com/Books/T/Think-Like-a-Commoner>*.
28 July 2015=E2=80=8B


_______________________________________________
CommonGood Mailingliste
JPBerlin - Politischer Provider
CommonGood at listi.jpberlin.de
https://listi.jpberlin.de/mailman/listinfo/commongood




--=20
Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: http://commonstransition.org


P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net

<http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Update=
s:
http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens

#82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/

--089e011609da3a0c2b0532ec1165
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<div dir=3D"ltr"><br><div class=3D"gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded messag=
e ----------<br>From: <b class=3D"gmail_sendername">tina ebro</b> <span dir=
=3D"ltr">&lt;<a href=3D"mailto:cgebro at gmail.com">cgebro at gmail.com</a>&gt;</=
span><br>Date: Fri, Apr 22, 2016 at 7:37 AM<br>Subject: [CommonGood] =E2=80=
=8BThe truth about the tragedy of the commons (thanks to veron)<br>To: <br>=
<br><br><div dir=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><fon=
t size=3D"4"><br clear=3D"all"></font></div><div><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div=
 dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-s=
erif">=E2=80=8Bapologies if cross-posting=E2=80=8B</div><br></div><font fac=
e=3D"verdana, sans-serif"><div><div style=3D"color:rgb(166,77,121);font-fam=
ily:verdana,sans-serif"><font size=3D"4">=E2=80=8B</font></div><h1 style=3D=
"color:rgb(0,0,0);border:0px;font-family:Georgia,serif;font-style:inherit;f=
ont-weight:400;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;c=
lear:both;line-height:1.5em;word-wrap:break-word;text-align:center"><font s=
ize=3D"4"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;display:inline">=E2=
=80=8B=E2=80=8B</div>The Only Woman to Win the Nobel Prize in Economics=C2=
=A0</font></h1><h1 style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);border:0px;font-family:Georgia=
,serif;font-style:inherit;font-weight:400;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0p=
x;vertical-align:baseline;clear:both;line-height:1.5em;word-wrap:break-word=
;text-align:center"><font size=3D"4">Also Debunked Mainstream Economics</fo=
nt></h1><center><h2 style=3D"color:rgb(0,0,0);border:0px;font-family:ralewa=
y,sans-serif;font-style:inherit;font-weight:400;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline=
:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;clear:both;line-height:1.3em"><fon=
t size=3D"4"><br></font></h2><h2 style=3D"border:0px;font-family:raleway,sa=
ns-serif;font-style:inherit;font-weight:400;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px=
;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;clear:both;line-height:1.3em"><font co=
lor=3D"#e06666" size=3D"6"><div style=3D"font-family:verdana,sans-serif;dis=
play:inline">=E2=80=8B=E2=80=8B</div>The truth about the tragedy of the com=
mons</font></h2></center><center style=3D"color:rgb(38,38,38)"><font size=
=3D"4"><img src=3D"http://evonomics.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/diamond.=
png" style=3D"width:25px"></font></center><div style=3D"color:rgb(38,38,38)=
;border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;marg=
in:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;min-height:30px"></d=
iv><div style=3D"color:rgb(38,38,38);border-width:1px 0px;border-top-style:=
solid;border-bottom-style:solid;border-top-color:rgb(0,0,0);border-bottom-c=
olor:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;=
margin:0px 0px 25px;outline:0px;padding:0px 3px;vertical-align:baseline"><d=
iv style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:i=
nherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><div sty=
le=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit=
;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;clear:both;line=
-height:0;max-width:100%;text-align:center!important"><font size=3D"4"><div=
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herit;margin:0px 3px 3px 0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:middle;=
color:rgb(182,152,35);overflow:hidden;width:90px;display:inline-block;white=
-space:nowrap;min-height:30px"><a href=3D"http://evonomics.com/the-only-wom=
an-to-win-the-nobel-prize-economics-debunked/#comments" style=3D"border:non=
e;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;out=
line:0px;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:none;display:block;width:9=
0px;min-height:30px;padding:0px!important;color:rgb(0,0,0)!important" targe=
t=3D"_blank"><div style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inheri=
t;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:bas=
eline;float:left;width:90px;background-color:transparent"><i></i></div></a>=
</div><div style=3D"border:none;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font=
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gn:middle;overflow:hidden;width:90px;display:inline-block;white-space:nowra=
p;min-height:30px"><a href=3D"http://evonomics.com/the-only-woman-to-win-th=
e-nobel-prize-economics-debunked/#" style=3D"border:none;font-family:inheri=
t;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;vertical-al=
ign:baseline;text-decoration:none;display:block;width:90px;min-height:30px;=
padding:0px!important;color:rgb(0,0,0)!important" target=3D"_blank"><div st=
yle=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inheri=
t;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;float:left;wid=
th:90px;background-color:transparent"><i></i></div></a></div><div style=3D"=
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idden;width:90px;display:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;min-height:30px"><=
a href=3D"http://evonomics.com/the-only-woman-to-win-the-nobel-prize-econom=
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t;color:rgb(0,0,0)!important" target=3D"_blank"><div style=3D"border:0px;fo=
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ily:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 3px 3px 0px;o=
utline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:middle;overflow:hidden;width:90px;dis=
play:inline-block;white-space:nowrap;min-height:30px"><a href=3D"http://evo=
nomics.com/the-only-woman-to-win-the-nobel-prize-economics-debunked/#us-mod=
al-JeCjs" style=3D"border:none;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-=
weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:baseline;text-decorati=
on:none;display:block;width:90px;min-height:30px;padding:0px!important;colo=
r:rgb(0,0,0)!important" target=3D"_blank"><div style=3D"border:0px;font-fam=
ily:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;p=
adding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;float:left;width:90px;background-color:t=
ransparent"><i></i></div></a></div><div style=3D"border:none;font-family:in=
herit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 3px 3px 0px;outline=
:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:middle;overflow:hidden;width:90px;display:i=
nline-block;white-space:nowrap;min-height:30px"><a href=3D"http://evonomics=
.com/the-only-woman-to-win-the-nobel-prize-economics-debunked/#us-modal-cBz=
wy" style=3D"border:none;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight=
:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;vertical-align:baseline;text-decoration:non=
e;display:block;width:90px;min-height:30px;padding:0px!important;color:rgb(=
0,0,0)!important" target=3D"_blank"><div style=3D"border:0px;font-family:in=
herit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding=
:0px;vertical-align:baseline;float:left;width:90px;background-color:transpa=
rent"><i></i></div></a></div></font></div></div></div><div style=3D"color:r=
gb(38,38,38);border:0px;font-family:georgia,sans-serif;margin:auto;outline:=
0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline;width:700px;max-width:100%;line-hei=
ght:30px"><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;fon=
t-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align=
:baseline"><em style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-weight:inherit;=
margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4=
">By David Bollier</font></em></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inheri=
t;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;pa=
dding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">=E2=80=9CPicture a past=
ure open to all.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inhe=
rit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;=
padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">For at least a genera=
tion, the very idea of the commons has been marginalized and dismissed as a=
 misguided way to manage resources: the so-called tragedy of the commons. I=
n a short but influential essay published in Science in <a href=3D"tel:1968=
" value=3D"+661968" target=3D"_blank">1968</a>, ecologist Garrett Hardin ga=
ve the story a fresh formulation and a memorable tagline.</font></p><p styl=
e=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;=
margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font =
size=3D"4">=E2=80=9CThe tragedy of the commons develops in this way,=E2=80=
=9D wrote Hardin, proposing to his readers that they envision an open pastu=
re:</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit=
;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-a=
lign:baseline"><font size=3D"4">It is to be expected that each herdsman wil=
l try to keep as many cattle as possible in the commons. Such an arrangemen=
t may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poa=
ching and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the car=
rying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, t=
hat is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a re=
ality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly gener=
ates tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain=
. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, =E2=80=9CWha=
t is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?=E2=80=9D</font=
></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-wei=
ght:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:base=
line"><font size=3D"4">The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensib=
le course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And anoth=
er=E2=80=A6. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational =
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into=
 a system that compels him to increase his herd with- out limit=E2=80=94in =
a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,=
 each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the free=
dom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.</font></p><p s=
tyle=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inher=
it;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><fo=
nt size=3D"4">The tragedy of the commons is one of those basic concepts tha=
t is drilled into the minds of every undergraduate, at least in economics c=
ourses. The idea is considered a basic principle of economics=E2=80=94a cau=
tionary lesson about the impossibility of collective action. Once the class=
 has been escorted through a ritual shudder, the professor whisks them alon=
g to the main attraction, the virtues of private property and free markets.=
 Here, finally, economists reveal, we may surmount the dismal tragedy of a =
commons. The catechism is hammered home: individual freedom to own and trad=
e private property in open markets is the only way to produce enduring pers=
onal satisfaction and social prosperity.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;f=
ont-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30=
px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Hardin=
 explains the logic this way: we can overcome the tragedy of the commons th=
rough a system of =E2=80=9Cmutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the maj=
ority of the people affected.=E2=80=9D For him, the best approach is =E2=80=
=9Cthe institution of private property coupled with legal inheritance.=E2=
=80=9D He concedes that this is not a perfectly just alternative, but he as=
serts that Darwinian natural selection is ultimately the best available opt=
ion, saying, =E2=80=9Cthose who are biologically more fit to be the custodi=
ans of property and power should legally inherit more.=E2=80=9D We put up w=
ith this imperfect legal order, he adds, =E2=80=9Cbecause we are not convin=
ced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternati=
ve of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable=
 to total ruin.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inher=
it;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;p=
adding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Such musings by a libe=
rtarian-minded scientist have been catnip to conservative ideologues and ec=
onomists (who are so often one and the same). They see Hardin=E2=80=99s ess=
ay as a gospel parable that affirms some core principles of neoliberal econ=
omic ideology. It affirms the importance of =E2=80=9Cfree markets=E2=80=9D =
and justifies the property rights of the wealthy. It bolsters a commitment =
to individual rights and private property as the cornerstone of economic th=
ought and policy. People will supposedly have the motivation to take respon=
sibility for resources if they are guaranteed private ownership and access =
to free markets. Tragic outcomes=E2=80=94=E2=80=9Ctotal ruin=E2=80=9D=E2=80=
=94can thereby be avoided. The failure of the commons, in this telling, is =
conflated with government itself, if only to suggest that one of the few re=
cognized vehicles for advancing collective interests, government, will also=
 succumb to the =E2=80=9Ctragedy=E2=80=9D paradigm. (That is the gist of Pu=
blic Choice theory, which applies standard economic logic to problems in po=
litical science.)</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font=
-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:=
0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Over the past several decades=
, the tragedy of the commons has taken root as an economic truism. The Hard=
in essay has become a staple of undergraduate education in the US, taught n=
ot just in economics courses but in political science, sociology and other =
fields. It is no wonder that so many people consider the commons with such =
glib condescension. The commons =3D chaos, ruin and failure.</font></p><p s=
tyle=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inher=
it;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><fo=
nt size=3D"4">There is just one significant flaw in the tragedy parable. It=
 does not accurately describe a commons. Hardin=E2=80=99s fictional scenari=
o sets forth a system that has no boundaries around the pasture, no rules f=
or managing it, no punishments for over-use and no distinct community of us=
ers. But that is not a commons. It is an open-access regime, or a free-for-=
all. A commons has boundaries, rules, social norms and sanctions against fr=
ee riders. A commons requires that there be a community willing to act as a=
 conscientious steward of a resource. Hardin was confusing a commons with =
=E2=80=9Cno-man=E2=80=99s-land=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94and in the process, he smea=
red the commons as a failed paradigm for managing resources.</font></p><p s=
tyle=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inher=
it;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><fo=
nt size=3D"4">To be fair, Hardin was following a long line of polemicists w=
ho projected their unexamined commitments to market individualism onto the =
world. As we will see later, the theories of philosopher John Locke have be=
en widely used to justify treating the New World as terra nullius=E2=80=94o=
pen, unowned land=E2=80=94even though it was populated by millions of Nativ=
e Americans who managed their natural resources as beloved commons with unw=
ritten but highly sophisticated rules.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;fon=
t-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px=
;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Hardin=
=E2=80=99s essay was inspired by his reading of an <a href=3D"tel:1832" val=
ue=3D"+661832" target=3D"_blank">1832</a> talk by William Forster Lloyd, an=
 English lecturer who, like Hardin, was worried about overpopulation in a p=
eriod of intense enclosures of land. Lloyd=E2=80=99s talk is notable becaus=
e it rehearses the same line of argument and makes the same fanciful error=
=E2=80=94that people are incapable of negotiating a solution to the =E2=80=
=9Ctragedy.=E2=80=9D Instead of a shared pasture, Lloyd=E2=80=99s metaphor =
was a joint pool of money that could be accessed by every contributor. Lloy=
d asserted that each individual would quickly deplete more than his share o=
f the pool while a private purse of money would be frugally managed.</font>=
</p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weig=
ht:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:basel=
ine"><font size=3D"4">I mention Lloyd=E2=80=99s essay to illustrate how rid=
iculous yet persistent the misconceptions about the =E2=80=9Ctragedy=E2=80=
=9D dynamic truly are. Commons scholar Lewis Hyde dryly notes, =E2=80=9CJus=
t as Hardin proposes a herdsman whose reason is unable to encompass the com=
mon good, so Lloyd supposes persons who have no way to speak with each othe=
r or make joint decisions. Both writers inject laissez-faire individualism =
into an old agrarian village and then gravely announce that the commons is =
dead. From the point of view of such a village, Lloyd=E2=80=99s assumptions=
 are as crazy as asking us to =E2=80=98suppose a man to have a purse to whi=
ch his left and right hand may freely resort, each unaware of the other=E2=
=80=99.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-=
style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0=
px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">This absurdity, unfortunately,=
 is the basis for a large literature of =E2=80=9Cprisoner=E2=80=99s dilemma=
=E2=80=9D experiments that purport to show how =E2=80=9Crational individual=
s=E2=80=9D behave when confronted with =E2=80=9Csocial dilemmas,=E2=80=9D s=
uch as how to allocate a limited resource. Should the =E2=80=9Cprisoner=E2=
=80=9D cooperate with other potential claimants and share the limited rewar=
ds? Or should he or she defect by grabbing as much for himself as possible?=
</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;fo=
nt-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-alig=
n:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Needless to say, the complications are endless=
. But the basic premise of such social science experiments is rigged at the=
 outset. Certain assumptions about the selfishness, rational calculation of=
 individuals and lack of context (test subjects have no shared social histo=
ry or culture) are embedded into the very design of the =E2=80=9Cgame.=E2=
=80=9D Test subjects are not allowed to communicate with each other, or dev=
elop bonds of trust and shared knowledge. They are given only limited time =
and opportunity to learn to cooperate. They are isolated in a lab setting f=
or a single experiment, and have no shared history or future together. Agha=
st at the pretzel logic of economic researchers, Lewis Hyde suggested that =
the =E2=80=9Ctragedy=E2=80=9D thesis be called, instead, =E2=80=9CThe Trage=
dy of Unmanaged, Laissez-Faire, Common-Pool Resources with Easy Access for =
Noncommunicating, Self-Interested Individuals.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=
=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;m=
argin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font s=
ize=3D"4">The dirty little secret of many prisoner=E2=80=99s dilemma experi=
ments is that they subtly presuppose a market culture of =E2=80=9Crational=
=E2=80=9D individuals. Most give little consideration to the real-life ways=
 in which people come to cooperate and share in managing resources. That is=
 changing now that more game theory experiments are incorporating the ideas=
 of behavioral economics, complexity theory and evolutionary sciences into =
their design.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-sty=
le:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;=
vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Yet the fact remains that a great=
 deal of economic theory and policy presume a rather crude, archaic model o=
f human being. Despite its obvious unreality, Homo economicus, the fictiona=
l abstract individual who actively maximizes his personal =E2=80=9Cutility =
function=E2=80=9D through rational calculation, continues to hold sway as t=
he idealized model of human agency in the cultural entity we call the =E2=
=80=9Ceconomy.=E2=80=9D Two introductory economics textbooks widely used in=
 the US, by Samuelson and Nordhaus (2004) and Stiglitz and Walsh (2006), co=
nsider cooperative behaviors to be so inconsequential that they do not even=
 mention the commons. If economists show any inclination to discuss the com=
mons, you can be sure that the word =E2=80=9Ctragedy=E2=80=9D will be lurki=
ng very nearby.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-s=
tyle:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0p=
x;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Paradoxically enough, the heedl=
ess quest for selfish gain=E2=80=94 =E2=80=9Crationally=E2=80=9D pursued, o=
f course, yet indifferent toward the collective good=E2=80=94is a better de=
scription of the conventional market economy than a commons. In the run-up =
to the 2008 financial crisis, such a mindset propelled the wizards of Wall =
Street to maximize private gains without regard for the systemic risks or l=
ocal impacts. The real tragedy precipitated by =E2=80=9Crational=E2=80=9D i=
ndividualism is not the tragedy of the commons, but the tragedy of the mark=
et.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit=
;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-a=
lign:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Happily, contemporary scholarship has done =
much to rescue the commons from the memory hole to which it has been consig=
ned by mainstream economics. The late American political scientist Elinor O=
strom of Indiana University deserves special credit for her role in expandi=
ng the frame of analysis of economic activity. In the 1970s, the economics =
profession plunged into a kind of religious fundamentalism. It celebrated h=
ighly abstract, quantitative models of the economy based on rational indivi=
dualism, private property rights and free markets. A child of the Depressio=
n, Ostrom had always been interested in cooperative institutions working ou=
tside of markets. As a young political scientist in the 1960s, she began to=
 question some of the core assumptions of economics, especially the idea th=
at people are unable to cooperate in stable, sustainable ways. Sometimes wo=
rking with political scientist Vincent Ostrom, her husband, she initiated a=
 new kind of cross-disciplinary study of institutional systems that manage =
=E2=80=9Ccommon-pool resources,=E2=80=9D or CPRs.</font></p><p style=3D"bor=
der:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0=
px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"=
4">CPRs are collective resources over which no one has private property rig=
hts or exclusive control, such as fisheries, grazing lands and groundwater.=
 All of these resources are highly vulnerable to over-exploitation because =
it is difficult to stop people from using them. We might call it the =E2=80=
=9Ctragedy of open access.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-f=
amily:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;ou=
tline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">What distin=
guished Ostrom=E2=80=99s scholarship from that of so many academic economis=
ts was her painstaking empirical fieldwork. She visited communal landholder=
s in Ethiopia, rubber tappers in the Amazon and fishers in the Philippines.=
 She investigated how they negotiated cooperative schemes, and how they ble=
nded their social systems with local ecosystems. As economist Nancy Folbre =
of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, explained, =E2=80=9CShe would =
go and actually talk to Indonesian fishermen or Maine lobstermen, and ask, =
=E2=80=98How did you come to establish this limit on the fish catch? How di=
d you deal with the fact that people might try to get around it?=E2=80=99=
=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:i=
nherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vert=
ical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">From such empirical findings, Ostrom =
tried to figure out what makes for a successful commons. How does a communi=
ty overcome its collective-action problem? The recurring challenge facing a=
 group of principals in an interdependent situation, she wrote, is figuring=
 out how to =E2=80=9Corganize and govern themselves to obtain continuing jo=
int benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise ac=
t opportunistically. Parallel questions have to do with the combinations of=
 variables that will (1) increase the initial likelihood of self-organizati=
on; (2) enhance the capabilities of individuals to continue self-organized =
efforts over time; or (3) exceed the capacity of self-organization to solve=
 CPR [common-pool resource] problems without eternal assistance of some for=
m.=E2=80=9D</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style=
:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;ve=
rtical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Ostrom=E2=80=99s answer was Governi=
ng the Commons, a landmark <a href=3D"tel:1990" value=3D"+661990" target=3D=
"_blank">1990</a> book that set forth some of the basic =E2=80=9Cdesign pri=
nciples=E2=80=9D of effective, durable commons. These principles have been =
adapted and elaborated by later scholars, but her analysis remains the defa=
ult framework for evaluating natural resource commons. The focus of Ostrom=
=E2=80=99s work, and of the legions of academics who now study commons, has=
 been how communities of resource users develop social norms=E2=80=94and so=
metimes formal legal rules=E2=80=94that enable them to use finite resources=
 sustainably over the long term. Standard economics, after all, declares th=
at we are selfish individuals whose wants are unlimited. The idea that we c=
an depend on people=E2=80=99s altruism and cooperation, economists object, =
is naive and unrealistic. The idea that commons can set and enforce limits =
on usage also seems improbable because it rejects the idea of humans having=
 unbounded appetites.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;=
font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padd=
ing:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Ostrom nonetheless showed=
 how, in hundreds of instances, commoners do in fact meet their needs and i=
nterests in collective, cooperative ways. The villagers of T=C3=B6rbel, Swi=
tzerland, have managed their high alpine forests, meadows and irrigation wa=
ters since <a href=3D"tel:1224" value=3D"+661224" target=3D"_blank">1224</a=
>. Spaniards have shared irrigation waters through huerta social institutio=
ns for centuries while, more recently, diverse water authorities in Los Ang=
eles learned how to coordinate their management of scarce groundwater suppl=
ies. Many commons have flourished for hundreds of years, even in periods of=
 drought or crisis. Their success can be traced to a community=E2=80=99s ab=
ility to develop its own flexible, evolving rules for stewardship, oversigh=
t of access and usage, and effective punishments for rule-breakers.</font><=
/p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weigh=
t:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseli=
ne"><font size=3D"4">Ostrom found that commons must have clearly defined bo=
undaries so that commoners can know who has authorized rights to use a reso=
urce. Outsiders who do not contribute to the commons obviously have no righ=
ts to access or use the common-pool resource. She discovered that the rules=
 for appropriating a resource must take account of local conditions and mus=
t include limits on what can be taken and how. For example, wild berries ca=
n only be harvested during a given period of time, or wood from the forest =
can only be taken from the ground and must be used for household use only, =
not sold at markets.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;f=
ont-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;paddi=
ng:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Commoners must be able to =
create or influence the rules that govern a commons, Ostrom noted. =E2=80=
=9CIf external governmental officials presume that only they have the autho=
rity to set the rules,=E2=80=9D she discovered, =E2=80=9Cthen it will be ve=
ry difficult for local appropriators to sustain a rule-governed CPR over th=
e long run.=E2=80=9D Commoners must be willing to monitor how their resourc=
es are used (or abused) and must devise a system of sanctions to punish any=
one who violates the rules, preferably through a gradation of increasingly =
serious sanctions. When disputes arise, commoners must have easy access to =
conflict-resolution mechanisms.</font></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-famil=
y:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outlin=
e:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline"><font size=3D"4">Finally, Ostrom=
 declared that commons that are part of a larger system of governance must =
be =E2=80=9Corganized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.=E2=80=9D Sh=
e called this =E2=80=9Cpolycentric governance,=E2=80=9D meaning that the au=
thority to appropriate a resource, monitor and enforce its use, resolve con=
flicts and perform other governance activities must be shared across differ=
ent levels=E2=80=94 from local to regional to national to international.</f=
ont></p><p style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;font-=
weight:inherit;margin:0px 0px 30px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:b=
aseline"><font size=3D"4">Excerpted from=C2=A0<em style=3D"border:0px;font-=
family:inherit;font-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;verti=
cal-align:baseline"><a href=3D"http://www.newsociety.com/Books/T/Think-Like=
-a-Commoner" style=3D"border:0px;font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;fon=
t-weight:inherit;margin:0px;outline:0px;padding:0px;vertical-align:baseline=
;color:rgb(50,149,199);text-decoration:none" target=3D"_blank">Think Like A=
 Commoner: A Short Introduction to the Life of the Commons</a></em>.</font>=
</p></div><div style=3D"color:rgb(166,77,121);font-family:verdana,sans-seri=
f"><font size=3D"4"><span style=3D"font-family:inherit;font-style:inherit;f=
ont-weight:inherit;color:rgb(38,38,38);line-height:30px">28 July 2015</span=
>=E2=80=8B</font></div><br></div></font></div></div></div></div></div>
</div>
<br>_______________________________________________<br>
CommonGood Mailingliste<br>
JPBerlin - Politischer Provider<br>
<a href=3D"mailto:CommonGood at listi.jpberlin.de">CommonGood at listi.jpberlin.d=
e</a><br>
<a href=3D"https://listi.jpberlin.de/mailman/listinfo/commongood" rel=3D"no=
referrer" target=3D"_blank">https://listi.jpberlin.de/mailman/listinfo/comm=
ongood</a><br>
<br></div><br><br clear=3D"all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class=3D"gmail_s=
ignature"><div dir=3D"ltr"><div><div dir=3D"ltr"><div>Check out the Commons=
 Transition Plan here at: <a href=3D"http://commonstransition.org" target=
=3D"_blank">http://commonstransition.org</a>=C2=A0=C2=A0</div><div><br></di=
v>P2P Foundation: <a href=3D"http://p2pfoundation.net" target=3D"_blank">ht=
tp://p2pfoundation.net</a>=C2=A0 - <a href=3D"http://blog.p2pfoundation.net=
" target=3D"_blank">http://blog.p2pfoundation.net</a> <br><br><a href=3D"ht=
tp://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation" target=
=3D"_blank"></a>Updates: <a href=3D"http://twitter.com/mbauwens" target=3D"=
_blank">http://twitter.com/mbauwens</a>; <a href=3D"http://www.facebook.com=
/mbauwens" target=3D"_blank">http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens</a><br><br>#8=
2 on the (En)Rich list: <a href=3D"http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/=
" target=3D"_blank">http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/</a> <br></div>=
</div></div></div>
</div>

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