No subject

that only Bookchin could be) to the anarchist primitivists and deep
ecologists as well as to those anarchists who he scathingly referred to as
=E2=80=9Clifestyle anarchists=E2=80=9D (he would be appalled by crimethInc;=
 see
www.crimethinc.com). He was sympathetic to but also suspicious of the
anarcho-syndicalism that was so dominant in Barcelona during the 1930s.
Bookchin=E2=80=99s favored anarchism was resolutely social and ecological b=
ut it
also incorporated some features that elicited numerous attacks from fellow
social anarchists in the 1990s.

In part in response to these attacks, Bookchin ultimately severed his links
to the anarchist tradition, but he was also troubled and frustrated by the
fact that anarchism, unlike Marxism, has no discernable theory of society:

The problems raised by anarchism belong to the days of its birth, when
writers like Proudhon celebrated its use as a new alternative to the
emerging capitalist social order. In reality, anarchism has no coherent
body of theory other than its commitment to an ahistorical conception of
=E2=80=9Cpersonal autonomy,=E2=80=9D that is, to the self-willing asocial e=
go divested of
constraints, preconditions, or limitations short of death itself. Indeed,
today, many anarchists celebrate this theoretical incoherence as evidence
of the highly libertarian nature of their outlook and its often dizzying,
if not contradictory, respect for diversity=E2=80=9D (2014: 160- 161).

This lack of theoretical coherence is a criticism that can be made also of
the Marxist autonomistas. As B=C3=B6hm, Dinerstein and Spicer argue, autono=
my
(no matter of what particular sort) is an =E2=80=9Cimpossibility=E2=80=9D i=
n and of itself.
It is theoretically and relationally defined solely by that which it seeks
to be autonomous from. There is, therefore, nothing to stop =E2=80=9Ccapita=
l, the
state and discourses of development continuously seeking to =E2=80=98recupe=
rate=E2=80=99
autonomy and make it work for their own purposes=E2=80=9D (2010: 26). And t=
his is,
of course, exactly what they have done.

Anarchists are fond, however, of arguing that anarchism is not about
theorizing but about practices and the continuous invention of new
organizational forms. But what sort of practices and forms? Horizontality,
rhizomatic practices and decentralization of power are litmus tests it
seems for anarchists as well as autonomistas these days. Springer asserts,
however, =E2=80=9CEvery time you have ever invited friends over to dinner,
jaywalked, mowed your neighbor=E2=80=99s lawn, skipped a day at work, looke=
d after
your brother=E2=80=99s kids, questioned your professor, borrowed your mothe=
r in
law=E2=80=99s car, disregarded a posted sign, or returned a favor, you have=
 =E2=80=93
perhaps unknowingly =E2=80=93 engaged in anarchist principles=E2=80=9D (201=
4: 265).

Now this is an extraordinary statement. It is tempting to parody it by
imagining Springer setting off on his preferred insurrectionary path by
borrowing his mother in law=E2=80=99s car (with or without her permission h=
e does
not say). It contains some absolute principles like =E2=80=9Cdisregarding p=
osted
signs=E2=80=9D (such as =E2=80=9Cpoisonous snakes are in this area=E2=80=9D=
) which, when coupled
with that other absolute, that =E2=80=9Call authority is illegitimate=E2=80=
=9D (itself an
authoritative statement that stands self-condemned as illegitimate),
supposedly leads us to the anarchist heaven. Having lived in Baltimore
where the population, being apparently anarchistically inclined, loved to
run red lights (and having had my car totaled by someone who just happened,
being a good anarchist, to have borrowed his brother=E2=80=99s car without
permission), I find such assertions ridiculous if not dangerous. They give
anarchism a bad name, even as James Scott (2012) offers two cheers for
anarchism when people pluck up courage to cross the street at red lights
when there is no traffic in sight. Scott even suggests the abolition of
traffic lights altogether might be a good anarchist idea. I am much more
skeptical having witnessed 1st Avenue on Manhattan turned into a continuous
roaring race-track northwards during a power outage, to the detriment of
all those locked on the cross streets. And I certainly would not welcome a
pilot landing at JFK proclaiming that as a good anarchist she does not
accept the legitimacy of the air traffic controllers=E2=80=99 authority and=
 that
she proposes to disregard all aviation rules in the landing process.

Historically, mutual aid societies (whether anarchist inspired or not) had,
like the commons, codes and rules of behavior that had to be followed as
part of the membership pact and those who did not conform to these rules
found themselves excluded (a problem which marks the problematic boundary
between individualistic and social anarchism). Perpetually questioning
authority, rules and codes of behavior and disobeying stupid or irrelevant
rules is one thing: disobeying all such mandates on anarchist principle, as
Springer proposes, is quite another. No anarchist commune I have ever known
would tolerate such behaviors. It would not survive more than a day if it
did. The standard anarchist response is that rules and exclusions are ok
provided they are freely entered into. The myth here is that there is some
sort of absolute freedom that exists outside of some mechanisms of
exclusion and even, sorry to say, domination. The dialectic of freedom and
domination cannot be so easily set aside in human affairs (see Harvey,
2014: Chapter 14).

If I take a generous reading of Springer=E2=80=99s statement it would be th=
is:
social anarchists are fundamentally concerned with the intricacies and
problematics of daily life. The ultimate aspiration, says David Graeber
(2002: 70), is =E2=80=9Cto reinvent daily life as a whole=E2=80=9D, though =
he conveniently
leaves aside the thorny question of where does =E2=80=9Cthe whole=E2=80=9D =
begin and end.
Marxists have, by way of contrast, historically been far too preoccupied
with the labor process and productivism as the center of their theorizing,
often treating the politics of realization in the living space as secondary
and daily life issues as contingent and even derivative of the mode of
production (this tendency was early on exhibited with Engels=E2=80=99 other=
wise
interesting treatment of *The Housing Question* back in 1872). Being an
historical-geographical urbanist I have always been troubled by if not at
war with this Marxist prioritization of production at the expense of the
politics of daily life. Class and social inequalities are as much a product
of residential differentiation, I have long argued, as they are of
divisions of labor in the workplace, while the city as a =E2=80=9Cwhole=E2=
=80=9D is itself
a major site of class as well as other forms of social struggle and much of
that struggle occurs in the sphere of daily life. Such struggles are about
the realization of value rather than its production (Harvey, 1975, 1977).
As long ago as 1984 I was arguing that =E2=80=9Ca peoples=E2=80=99 geograph=
y must have a
popular base (and) be threaded into the fabric of daily life with deep
taproots into the well-springs of popular consciousness=E2=80=9D (1984: 7).