[P2P-F] Fwd: Ecuador: Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y contradicciones/The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs

Tue May 13 22:40:54 CEST 2014

*Translation, by Danica Jorden*
*http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php
<http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>*
*Ecuador - The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs: Economics,
Regulation, and Opposition*
*Denying the referendum will have enormous impacts on the quality of
democracy, the protection or lack of the right to participate in
governance, and will give a green light to unopposed oil exploration.*

Written by Eduardo Gudynas, Translated by Danica Jorden
Thursday, 08 May 2014  Source:* Plan V*

The National Electoral Council in Ecuador has announced that a sufficient
number of signatures was not gathered in order to call for a public
referendum concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní park. This decision
will have enormous impacts. It has been interpreted by many as a step
backwards for democracy. This decision has been called out, rightly so, as
not only a hindrance of public expression, but also for the manner in which
the decision was made, referring to unusual bureaucratic and administrative
practices.

The prevailing appetite for the money gushing out of the ITT oil
exploration fields has also been pointed out. I don't discount these
reasons. But getting exploration up and running will take some time and
would hardly benefit the current administration. Others will say that
doesn't matter, that this is really part of a re-election effort, and that
financial profits will be used to sustain the government into the next
cycle. This extreme view, however, has yet to be confirmed.

I am sure that various analysts will delve into these questions, and that's
why I prefer to explore other points of view that are directly related to
the current state of affairs and reflect more urgent needs.
*Capital's Reasons*
Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the intention to continue seeking
bids for oil field concessions. In these negotiations, corporate heads
demand firm investment conditions, in order to ensure that the blocks they
acquire can be effectively exploited. But these assurances would crumble in
light of the possibility of a people's referendum that could prevent oil
exploration in any corner of the country. There's no lack of executives who
fear, or claim to, that if there is a vote for a moratorium in the Yasuní,
that other votes could follow for other locations in the Amazon. Likewise,
the government's difficulties in the recent round of petroleum negotiations
over the Southeast have not gone unnoticed. So, in order to clear the way
for new oil negotiations, the government needs to reassert complete control
over what it offers, and that implies stopping plebiscites that might place
conditions on that control.
*The needs to control and discipline*
Secondly, it must be noted that the mobilization in defense of the Yasuní
was enormous, and the role played by new collectives, especially the
Yasunidos, has had great impact. New forms of political expression were in
evidence, youth activism was reborn, and more horizontal structures were
created, making them more difficult to co-opt. To put it bluntly: There
were examples of an independent people's mobilization that was not under
the government's or any political party's control. Furthermore, all of
their issues pointed to the essence of the Correa administration's
development strategy, debating its extractivism, and demanding compliance
with the ecological mandates set forth in the Montecristi Constitution.

A strong, autonomous, and potential-filled movement will always be
confronted by those in power. So under this hypothesis, it was crucial to
stop a popular referendum in order to prevent the collective from
continuing to operate, increase its base of support, learn from experience
and mature into an unmanageable political adversary.

There is at least one precedent for the confluence of these two factors,
safeguarding oil investment and controlling civil society, and that was
shown in the dissolution of the Pachamama Foundation. These two factors
were present then, and used to justify the extreme way the foundation was
alleged to have affected one of the oil negotiations, while cutting off its
support for local communities, and sending a message to other NGOs.

Under this same logic, one must not exclude the possibility of a supreme
confidence game: that this same President could decide to call for a
popular referendum himself. With the disciplinary period over, the message
to oil investors is also clear, and he could counteract some of the
critics, take over the initiative and call for a referendum himself, but
under his own conditions (and including his own issues).

*It's best to avoid debate*
In addition to these factors, one could also consider a third aspect. It is
truly striking all the costs and criticisms (both national and
international) that were incurred in order to prevent a popular referendum
on the Yasuní. It's that if they had allowed the referendum, the result
would have been uncertain, and I recognize that it is very possible that
the decision to enable oil exploration might have won out. We cannot forget
that the vast majority of voters live in cities, far from the Amazon, and
many of them are more affected and concerned by their daily subsistence
than what is happening in remote regions of Ecuador, and could possibly be
overwhelmed by the government's media campaign. Despite all this, until
now, no one has taken the risk. Any analysis should not ignore that if a
popular referendum were called, a public debate would be enabled that, even
in the case of a loss, would educate the people, strengthen independent
networks, and perhaps ultimately lead to victory.

*Defending extractivism is regressive*
Under these conditions appears the fourth, and final, point of these
preliminary hypotheses. Governments cannot dive into far-reaching and
multiple debates on extractivism because from these vantage points, there
are too few arguments to defend it. Present day extractivism is only
possible by reigning in democratic plurality. Few projects would surpass
rigorous environmental and social regulation, as they always have great
environmental impacts and few people in local communities would agree to
sacrifice their lands.

This issue is more serious for progressive governments, since the vast
majority of extractivist rationale is based on conservative arguments tied
to the market and reinforcing global commercial subordination. These
arguments are therefore contrary to the very essence of the left.

All this means that a progressive government, when forced to seriously
discuss its appetite for petroleum or mining, must shed its clothes and
reveal its most intimate mercantile thoughts. Public debates on oil
exploration in the Amazon promoted through public referendum could raise
discussion about issues much more far-reaching than the government's
petroleum strategy. There would rapidly also be discussion about
development, government practices, etc., revealing their contradictions.
And this is something that many progressives know, and why they avoid going
there at all costs.
In this current state of affairs, economic interests, the appetite for
control, and the fear of being trapped in ideological contradictions
clarifies how progressivism is a process that is increasingly detached from
the left from which it originated. What just happened concerning oil
exploration in the Yasuní is but one more contribution to this divergence.
In the meantime, the future of the Yasuní remains in question

*Eduardo Gudynas is one of South America's most respected environmental
analysts and activists.*

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: peter waterman <peterwaterman1936 at gmail.com>
Date: Tue, May 13, 2014 at 9:54 AM
Subject: Fwd: Ecuador: Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y
contradicciones/The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs
To: Raphael Hoetmer <Raphael at democraciaglobal.org>, gina vargas <
ginvargas at gmail.com>, Michel Bauwens <michel at p2pfoundation.net>

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Brian K. Murphy <brian at radicalroad.com>
Date: Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:36 PM
Subject: Ecuador: Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y
contradicciones/The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs
To: worldsocialforum-discuss at openspaceforum.net

 *Note, an english translation of this essay, by Danica Jorden, follows
below the original...*
* ~ Brian*
*********************

 *http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/sociedad/yasuni-la-coyuntura-econo
<http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/sociedad/yasuni-la-coyuntura-econo>mia-control-y-contradicciones*
*Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y contradicciones*
*La negación de la consulta tiene enormes impactos sobre la calidad de la
democracia, la vigencia o no de los derechos de participación y la luz
verde para la explotación petrolera sin contradicciones.*

por Eduardo Gudynas  | 07 de Mayo del 2014 |* Plan V*

La autoridad electoral ha anunciado que no se han reunido las firmas
necesarias para llamar a una consulta ciudadana sobre la explotación
petrolera en el parque Yasuní. Esta es una decisión que tiene enormes
impactos. Muchos la interpretarán como un paso atrás en la vida
democrática. Señalarán, con razón, que esto se debe no solamente a que se
impide la expresión ciudadana, sino también a los modos por los cuales se
ha operado, apelando a extraños mecanismos burocráticos y administrativos.

También se apuntará que ha prevalecido el apetito por los dineros que
arrojaría la explotación petrolera en los campos ITT. No descarto esos
razonamientos. Pero la puesta en marcha de esas operaciones llevará un buen
tiempo y difícilmente serán aprovechados por la actual administración.
Otros dirán que eso no importa, ya que esto es en realidad parte de un
proyecto de reelección, y entonces usarán esos recursos financieros para
sostener la continuidad gubernamental en el siguiente período. Pero este
extremo todavía no está confirmado.

Estoy seguro que varios analistas ahondarán en estas cuestiones, y es por
ello que prefiero explorar otras aristas que están directamente ligados a
la coyuntura actual y expresen necesidades apremiantes.
 *Las razones del capital*
En primer lugar se deben tener muy presentes las intenciones de continuar
con las rondas de concesiones  de campos petroleros. En esas negociaciones,
los empresarios exigen condiciones de inversión firmes, que aseguren que
los lotes ganados puedan ser efectivamente explotados. Pero esas
certidumbres crujían ante la posibilidad de una consulta ciudadana que
pudiera impedir la explotación petrolera en algún rincón del país. No
faltarían ejecutivos que temieran, o dijeran temer, que si se vota una
moratoria para el Yasuní, otro tanto podría repetirse en distintos sitios
amazónicos. A su vez, no pasaron desapercibidas las dificultades del
gobierno en la reciente ronda de negociaciones petroleras para el
suroriente. Por lo tanto, para despejar el camino para nuevas negociaciones
petroleras, el gobierno debería retomar el control absoluto sobre lo que
ofertaba, y ello implica detener mecanismos plebiscitarios que lo pudieran
condicionar.
 *Las necesidades controlar y disciplinar*
En segundo lugar, se debe reconocer que la movilización a favor del Yasuní,
fue enorme, y el papel de nuevos colectivos, notablemente Yasunidos, fue
impactante. Quedaron en evidencia nuevas formas de expresión política, un
retorno de la militancia juvenil, estructuras más horizontales, y por lo
tanto más difíciles de cooptar. Dicho de modo muy esquemático: eran ensayos
de movilización ciudadana independiente, que no eran controladas desde el
gobierno o desde partidos políticos. Además, sus contenidos apuntaban a la
esencia de la estrategia de desarrollo de la administración Correa,
poniendo en discusión su extractivismo, y reclamando el cumplimiento de los
mandatos ecológicos de la Constitución de Montecristi.
 Un movimiento autónomo, potente y con muchas más potencialidades, siempre
es enfrentado desde el poder. Entonces, bajo esta hipótesis, era crucial
impedir la consulta ciudadana para evitar que ese colectivo siguiera
operando, continuara ampliando sus bases de apoyo, ganara en experiencia, y
madurara hasta convertirse en un adversario político inmanejable.

Existe al menos un antecedente de la confluencia de estos dos factores, la
salvaguarda a la inversión petrolera y el control sobre la sociedad civil,
y se expresó con la disolución de la fundación Pachamama. Allí estuvieron
presentes estos dos factores, ya que se justificó esa medida extrema
aduciendo que esa fundación afectó una de las negociaciones petroleras,
mientras que se cortaba con sus apoyos a comunidades locales, y se mandaba
un mensaje a las demás ONGs.

Bajo esa misma lógica, no puede excluirse un golpe de timón dramático: que
el propio Presidente decidiera llamar a la consulta ciudadana. Como el
ejercicio disciplinario ya se completó, el mensaje a los inversores
petroleras también está claro, se podrían contrarrestar algunas de las
críticas, retomar la iniciativa, y llamar a una consulta, pero bajo sus
condiciones (incluyendo sus propias preguntas).
 *Es preferible evitar el debate*
Considerando estos factores, se puede abordar un tercer aspecto. Es que de
todos modos llama mucho la atención que se asumieran todos los costos y
críticas (nacionales e internacionales), de impedir la consulta popular
sobre el Yasuní. Es que si se hubiera permitido esa consulta, el resultado
era incierto, y reconozco que es muy posible que hubiera triunfado la
opción de habilitar la explotación petrolera. No podemos olvidar que la
mayor parte de los votantes están en ciudades, lejos de la Amazonia, muchos
con conocimientos y sensibilidades más preocupadas por la subsistencia
diaria que por lo que ocurre en regiones remotas del Ecuador, y que
posiblemente oirían apabullantes campañas publicitarias gubernamentales. A
pesar de todo esto, hasta ahora, no se han aceptado riesgos. No debe
escapar al análisis que si se llamaba a la consulta ciudadana, se
habilitaba un proceso de debate público que aún en caso de perderse,
serviría para el aprendizaje ciudadano, el fortalecimiento de redes
independientes, y tal vez, hasta se podía ganar.
 *Defender los extractivismos es retroceder*
Bajo estas condiciones asoma el cuarto, y último punto, en estas hipótesis
primarias. Los gobiernos no pueden adentrarse en debates amplios y plurales
sobre los extractivismos porque a estas alturas, tienen muy escasos
argumentos para defenderlos. El extractivismo actual sólo es posible
acotando la pluralidad democrática. Pocos proyectos pasarían controles
ambientales y sociales rigurosos, ya que siempre implican altos impactos
ambientales y poca gente en las comunidades locales aceptarían sacrificar
sus territorios.

Este asunto es más grave con los gobiernos progresistas, ya que la mayor
parte de las razones extractivistas además terminan en razonamientos
conservadores, anclados en el mercado y reforzando la subordinación
comercial global. Son, por lo tanto, argumentos contrarios a la propia
esencia de la izquierda.

Todo esto hace que para el progresismo gobernante, cuando se ve forzado a
debatir en serio sobre su apetencia petrolera o minera, se desnudan sus
íntimos pensamientos mercantiles. Debates públicos sobre la explotación
petrolera en la Amazonia promovidos por una consulta ciudadana, pondría en
discusión asuntos que van mucho más allá de la estrategia petrolera
gubernamental. Rápidamente se estaría discutiendo sus ideas sobre el
desarrollo, sus prácticas gubernamentales, etc. dejando en evidencia sus
contradicciones. Y esto es algo que muchos en el progresismo lo saben, y
por ello evitan con todas sus fuerzas entrar en esos terrenos.

Bajo esta coyuntura, los intereses económicos, la apetencia por controlar y
el miedo a quedar atrapado en contradicciones ideológicas, deja muy en
claro que el progresismo es un proceso que se está separando cada vez más
de la izquierda que le dio origen. Lo que acaba de suceder con la
explotación petrolera en el Yasuní es una contribución más a esa
divergencia. Entretanto, el futuro del Yasuní queda en entredicho.
*******

*Translation, by Danica Jorden*
*http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php
<http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>*
*Ecuador - The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs: Economics,
Regulation, and Opposition*
*Denying the referendum will have enormous impacts on the quality of
democracy, the protection or lack of the right to participate in
governance, and will give a green light to unopposed oil exploration.*

Written by Eduardo Gudynas, Translated by Danica Jorden
Thursday, 08 May 2014  Source:* Plan V*

The National Electoral Council in Ecuador has announced that a sufficient
number of signatures was not gathered in order to call for a public
referendum concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní park. This decision
will have enormous impacts. It has been interpreted by many as a step
backwards for democracy. This decision has been called out, rightly so, as
not only a hindrance of public expression, but also for the manner in which
the decision was made, referring to unusual bureaucratic and administrative
practices.

The prevailing appetite for the money gushing out of the ITT oil
exploration fields has also been pointed out. I don't discount these
reasons. But getting exploration up and running will take some time and
would hardly benefit the current administration. Others will say that
doesn't matter, that this is really part of a re-election effort, and that
financial profits will be used to sustain the government into the next
cycle. This extreme view, however, has yet to be confirmed.

I am sure that various analysts will delve into these questions, and that's
why I prefer to explore other points of view that are directly related to
the current state of affairs and reflect more urgent needs.
 *Capital's Reasons*
Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the intention to continue seeking
bids for oil field concessions. In these negotiations, corporate heads
demand firm investment conditions, in order to ensure that the blocks they
acquire can be effectively exploited. But these assurances would crumble in
light of the possibility of a people's referendum that could prevent oil
exploration in any corner of the country. There's no lack of executives who
fear, or claim to, that if there is a vote for a moratorium in the Yasuní,
that other votes could follow for other locations in the Amazon. Likewise,
the government's difficulties in the recent round of petroleum negotiations
over the Southeast have not gone unnoticed. So, in order to clear the way
for new oil negotiations, the government needs to reassert complete control
over what it offers, and that implies stopping plebiscites that might place
conditions on that control.
 *The needs to control and discipline*
Secondly, it must be noted that the mobilization in defense of the Yasuní
was enormous, and the role played by new collectives, especially the
Yasunidos, has had great impact. New forms of political expression were in
evidence, youth activism was reborn, and more horizontal structures were
created, making them more difficult to co-opt. To put it bluntly: There
were examples of an independent people's mobilization that was not under
the government's or any political party's control. Furthermore, all of
their issues pointed to the essence of the Correa administration's
development strategy, debating its extractivism, and demanding compliance
with the ecological mandates set forth in the Montecristi Constitution.

A strong, autonomous, and potential-filled movement will always be
confronted by those in power. So under this hypothesis, it was crucial to
stop a popular referendum in order to prevent the collective from
continuing to operate, increase its base of support, learn from experience
and mature into an unmanageable political adversary.

There is at least one precedent for the confluence of these two factors,
safeguarding oil investment and controlling civil society, and that was
shown in the dissolution of the Pachamama Foundation. These two factors
were present then, and used to justify the extreme way the foundation was
alleged to have affected one of the oil negotiations, while cutting off its
support for local communities, and sending a message to other NGOs.

Under this same logic, one must not exclude the possibility of a supreme
confidence game: that this same President could decide to call for a
popular referendum himself. With the disciplinary period over, the message
to oil investors is also clear, and he could counteract some of the
critics, take over the initiative and call for a referendum himself, but
under his own conditions (and including his own issues).

*It's best to avoid debate*
In addition to these factors, one could also consider a third aspect. It is
truly striking all the costs and criticisms (both national and
international) that were incurred in order to prevent a popular referendum
on the Yasuní. It's that if they had allowed the referendum, the result
would have been uncertain, and I recognize that it is very possible that
the decision to enable oil exploration might have won out. We cannot forget
that the vast majority of voters live in cities, far from the Amazon, and
many of them are more affected and concerned by their daily subsistence
than what is happening in remote regions of Ecuador, and could possibly be
overwhelmed by the government's media campaign. Despite all this, until
now, no one has taken the risk. Any analysis should not ignore that if a
popular referendum were called, a public debate would be enabled that, even
in the case of a loss, would educate the people, strengthen independent
networks, and perhaps ultimately lead to victory.

*Defending extractivism is regressive*
Under these conditions appears the fourth, and final, point of these
preliminary hypotheses. Governments cannot dive into far-reaching and
multiple debates on extractivism because from these vantage points, there
are too few arguments to defend it. Present day extractivism is only
possible by reigning in democratic plurality. Few projects would surpass
rigorous environmental and social regulation, as they always have great
environmental impacts and few people in local communities would agree to
sacrifice their lands.

This issue is more serious for progressive governments, since the vast
majority of extractivist rationale is based on conservative arguments tied
to the market and reinforcing global commercial subordination. These
arguments are therefore contrary to the very essence of the left.

All this means that a progressive government, when forced to seriously
discuss its appetite for petroleum or mining, must shed its clothes and
reveal its most intimate mercantile thoughts. Public debates on oil
exploration in the Amazon promoted through public referendum could raise
discussion about issues much more far-reaching than the government's
petroleum strategy. There would rapidly also be discussion about
development, government practices, etc., revealing their contradictions.
And this is something that many progressives know, and why they avoid going
there at all costs.
 In this current state of affairs, economic interests, the appetite for
control, and the fear of being trapped in ideological contradictions
clarifies how progressivism is a process that is increasingly detached from
the left from which it originated. What just happened concerning oil
exploration in the Yasuní is but one more contribution to this divergence.
In the meantime, the future of the Yasuní remains in question

*Eduardo Gudynas is one of South America's most respected environmental
analysts and activists.*

*See also:*
*************
*http://lalineadefuego.info/2014/04/14/lectura-sobre-el-retorno-del-e
<http://lalineadefuego.info/2014/04/14/lectura-sobre-el-retorno-del-e>cuador-al-banco-mundial-por-alberto-acosta/*
*LECTURA SOBRE EL RETORNO DEL ECUADOR AL BANCO MUNDIAL.*
*La cuadratura capitalista del círculo revolucionario*
POR ALBERTO ACOSTA | * la linea de fuego*  | 11 Abril 2014

*Available in English translation at:**
http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php
<http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>*
*A Reading on Ecuador's Return to the World Bank*
*The squaring of capitalism in the revolutionary circle*
by Alberto Acosta,* La Línea de Fuego*, Tuesday, 06 May 2014, translated by
Danica Jorden

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-- 

   1. *EBook, November 2012: Recovering Internationalism
   <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/recovering_internationalism/>.  [A
   compilation of papers from the new millenium. Now free in two download
   formats] <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/>
   <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/>*
   2.
*EBook (co-editor), February 2013: World Social Forum: Critical
   Explorations http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/
   <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/> *
   3. *Interface Journal Special (co-editor), November 2012: For the Global
   Emancipation of Labour <http://www.interfacejournal.net/current/>*
   4. *Blog: http://www.unionbook.org/profile/peterwaterman.
   <http://www.unionbook.org/profile/peterwaterman.> *
   5. *Interface Journal Special (Co-Editor) Social Movement
   Internationalisms. See Call for Papers <http://www.interfacejournal.net/>,
   (Deadline: May 1, 2014). *
   6.
*Needed: a Global Labour Charter Movement (2005-Now!)
   <http://interfacejournal.nuim.ie/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Interface-1-2-pp255-262-Waterman.pdf>*
   7. *Under, Against, Beyond: Labour and Social Movements Confront a
   Globalised, Informatised Capitalism
   <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/under-against-beyond/>(2011) Almost 1,000
   pages of Working Papers, free, from the 1980 <1980>'s-90's.*
   8. *Google Scholar Citation Index:*
    *http://scholar.google.com.pe/citations?user=e0e6Qa4AAAAJ
   <http://scholar.google.com.pe/citations?user=e0e6Qa4AAAAJ> *

   -

-- 
*Please note an intrusion wiped out my inbox on February 8; I have no
record of previous communication, proposals, etc ..*

P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net  - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net

<http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates:
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