*Translation, by Danica Jorden* *http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php <http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>* *Ecuador - The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs: Economics, Regulation, and Opposition* *Denying the referendum will have enormous impacts on the quality of democracy, the protection or lack of the right to participate in governance, and will give a green light to unopposed oil exploration.* Written by Eduardo Gudynas, Translated by Danica Jorden Thursday, 08 May 2014 Source:* Plan V* The National Electoral Council in Ecuador has announced that a sufficient number of signatures was not gathered in order to call for a public referendum concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní park. This decision will have enormous impacts. It has been interpreted by many as a step backwards for democracy. This decision has been called out, rightly so, as not only a hindrance of public expression, but also for the manner in which the decision was made, referring to unusual bureaucratic and administrative practices. The prevailing appetite for the money gushing out of the ITT oil exploration fields has also been pointed out. I don't discount these reasons. But getting exploration up and running will take some time and would hardly benefit the current administration. Others will say that doesn't matter, that this is really part of a re-election effort, and that financial profits will be used to sustain the government into the next cycle. This extreme view, however, has yet to be confirmed. I am sure that various analysts will delve into these questions, and that's why I prefer to explore other points of view that are directly related to the current state of affairs and reflect more urgent needs. *Capital's Reasons* Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the intention to continue seeking bids for oil field concessions. In these negotiations, corporate heads demand firm investment conditions, in order to ensure that the blocks they acquire can be effectively exploited. But these assurances would crumble in light of the possibility of a people's referendum that could prevent oil exploration in any corner of the country. There's no lack of executives who fear, or claim to, that if there is a vote for a moratorium in the Yasuní, that other votes could follow for other locations in the Amazon. Likewise, the government's difficulties in the recent round of petroleum negotiations over the Southeast have not gone unnoticed. So, in order to clear the way for new oil negotiations, the government needs to reassert complete control over what it offers, and that implies stopping plebiscites that might place conditions on that control. *The needs to control and discipline* Secondly, it must be noted that the mobilization in defense of the Yasuní was enormous, and the role played by new collectives, especially the Yasunidos, has had great impact. New forms of political expression were in evidence, youth activism was reborn, and more horizontal structures were created, making them more difficult to co-opt. To put it bluntly: There were examples of an independent people's mobilization that was not under the government's or any political party's control. Furthermore, all of their issues pointed to the essence of the Correa administration's development strategy, debating its extractivism, and demanding compliance with the ecological mandates set forth in the Montecristi Constitution. A strong, autonomous, and potential-filled movement will always be confronted by those in power. So under this hypothesis, it was crucial to stop a popular referendum in order to prevent the collective from continuing to operate, increase its base of support, learn from experience and mature into an unmanageable political adversary. There is at least one precedent for the confluence of these two factors, safeguarding oil investment and controlling civil society, and that was shown in the dissolution of the Pachamama Foundation. These two factors were present then, and used to justify the extreme way the foundation was alleged to have affected one of the oil negotiations, while cutting off its support for local communities, and sending a message to other NGOs. Under this same logic, one must not exclude the possibility of a supreme confidence game: that this same President could decide to call for a popular referendum himself. With the disciplinary period over, the message to oil investors is also clear, and he could counteract some of the critics, take over the initiative and call for a referendum himself, but under his own conditions (and including his own issues). *It's best to avoid debate* In addition to these factors, one could also consider a third aspect. It is truly striking all the costs and criticisms (both national and international) that were incurred in order to prevent a popular referendum on the Yasuní. It's that if they had allowed the referendum, the result would have been uncertain, and I recognize that it is very possible that the decision to enable oil exploration might have won out. We cannot forget that the vast majority of voters live in cities, far from the Amazon, and many of them are more affected and concerned by their daily subsistence than what is happening in remote regions of Ecuador, and could possibly be overwhelmed by the government's media campaign. Despite all this, until now, no one has taken the risk. Any analysis should not ignore that if a popular referendum were called, a public debate would be enabled that, even in the case of a loss, would educate the people, strengthen independent networks, and perhaps ultimately lead to victory. *Defending extractivism is regressive* Under these conditions appears the fourth, and final, point of these preliminary hypotheses. Governments cannot dive into far-reaching and multiple debates on extractivism because from these vantage points, there are too few arguments to defend it. Present day extractivism is only possible by reigning in democratic plurality. Few projects would surpass rigorous environmental and social regulation, as they always have great environmental impacts and few people in local communities would agree to sacrifice their lands. This issue is more serious for progressive governments, since the vast majority of extractivist rationale is based on conservative arguments tied to the market and reinforcing global commercial subordination. These arguments are therefore contrary to the very essence of the left. All this means that a progressive government, when forced to seriously discuss its appetite for petroleum or mining, must shed its clothes and reveal its most intimate mercantile thoughts. Public debates on oil exploration in the Amazon promoted through public referendum could raise discussion about issues much more far-reaching than the government's petroleum strategy. There would rapidly also be discussion about development, government practices, etc., revealing their contradictions. And this is something that many progressives know, and why they avoid going there at all costs. In this current state of affairs, economic interests, the appetite for control, and the fear of being trapped in ideological contradictions clarifies how progressivism is a process that is increasingly detached from the left from which it originated. What just happened concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní is but one more contribution to this divergence. In the meantime, the future of the Yasuní remains in question *Eduardo Gudynas is one of South America's most respected environmental analysts and activists.* ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: peter waterman <[email protected]> Date: Tue, May 13, 2014 at 9:54 AM Subject: Fwd: Ecuador: Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y contradicciones/The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs To: Raphael Hoetmer <[email protected]>, gina vargas < [email protected]>, Michel Bauwens <[email protected]> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Brian K. Murphy <[email protected]> Date: Tue, May 13, 2014 at 4:36 PM Subject: Ecuador: Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y contradicciones/The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs To: [email protected] *Note, an english translation of this essay, by Danica Jorden, follows below the original...* * ~ Brian* ********************* *http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/sociedad/yasuni-la-coyuntura-econo <http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/sociedad/yasuni-la-coyuntura-econo>mia-control-y-contradicciones* *Yasuní en la coyuntura: economía, control y contradicciones* *La negación de la consulta tiene enormes impactos sobre la calidad de la democracia, la vigencia o no de los derechos de participación y la luz verde para la explotación petrolera sin contradicciones.* por Eduardo Gudynas | 07 de Mayo del 2014 |* Plan V* La autoridad electoral ha anunciado que no se han reunido las firmas necesarias para llamar a una consulta ciudadana sobre la explotación petrolera en el parque Yasuní. Esta es una decisión que tiene enormes impactos. Muchos la interpretarán como un paso atrás en la vida democrática. Señalarán, con razón, que esto se debe no solamente a que se impide la expresión ciudadana, sino también a los modos por los cuales se ha operado, apelando a extraños mecanismos burocráticos y administrativos. También se apuntará que ha prevalecido el apetito por los dineros que arrojaría la explotación petrolera en los campos ITT. No descarto esos razonamientos. Pero la puesta en marcha de esas operaciones llevará un buen tiempo y difícilmente serán aprovechados por la actual administración. Otros dirán que eso no importa, ya que esto es en realidad parte de un proyecto de reelección, y entonces usarán esos recursos financieros para sostener la continuidad gubernamental en el siguiente período. Pero este extremo todavía no está confirmado. Estoy seguro que varios analistas ahondarán en estas cuestiones, y es por ello que prefiero explorar otras aristas que están directamente ligados a la coyuntura actual y expresen necesidades apremiantes. *Las razones del capital* En primer lugar se deben tener muy presentes las intenciones de continuar con las rondas de concesiones de campos petroleros. En esas negociaciones, los empresarios exigen condiciones de inversión firmes, que aseguren que los lotes ganados puedan ser efectivamente explotados. Pero esas certidumbres crujían ante la posibilidad de una consulta ciudadana que pudiera impedir la explotación petrolera en algún rincón del país. No faltarían ejecutivos que temieran, o dijeran temer, que si se vota una moratoria para el Yasuní, otro tanto podría repetirse en distintos sitios amazónicos. A su vez, no pasaron desapercibidas las dificultades del gobierno en la reciente ronda de negociaciones petroleras para el suroriente. Por lo tanto, para despejar el camino para nuevas negociaciones petroleras, el gobierno debería retomar el control absoluto sobre lo que ofertaba, y ello implica detener mecanismos plebiscitarios que lo pudieran condicionar. *Las necesidades controlar y disciplinar* En segundo lugar, se debe reconocer que la movilización a favor del Yasuní, fue enorme, y el papel de nuevos colectivos, notablemente Yasunidos, fue impactante. Quedaron en evidencia nuevas formas de expresión política, un retorno de la militancia juvenil, estructuras más horizontales, y por lo tanto más difíciles de cooptar. Dicho de modo muy esquemático: eran ensayos de movilización ciudadana independiente, que no eran controladas desde el gobierno o desde partidos políticos. Además, sus contenidos apuntaban a la esencia de la estrategia de desarrollo de la administración Correa, poniendo en discusión su extractivismo, y reclamando el cumplimiento de los mandatos ecológicos de la Constitución de Montecristi. Un movimiento autónomo, potente y con muchas más potencialidades, siempre es enfrentado desde el poder. Entonces, bajo esta hipótesis, era crucial impedir la consulta ciudadana para evitar que ese colectivo siguiera operando, continuara ampliando sus bases de apoyo, ganara en experiencia, y madurara hasta convertirse en un adversario político inmanejable. Existe al menos un antecedente de la confluencia de estos dos factores, la salvaguarda a la inversión petrolera y el control sobre la sociedad civil, y se expresó con la disolución de la fundación Pachamama. Allí estuvieron presentes estos dos factores, ya que se justificó esa medida extrema aduciendo que esa fundación afectó una de las negociaciones petroleras, mientras que se cortaba con sus apoyos a comunidades locales, y se mandaba un mensaje a las demás ONGs. Bajo esa misma lógica, no puede excluirse un golpe de timón dramático: que el propio Presidente decidiera llamar a la consulta ciudadana. Como el ejercicio disciplinario ya se completó, el mensaje a los inversores petroleras también está claro, se podrían contrarrestar algunas de las críticas, retomar la iniciativa, y llamar a una consulta, pero bajo sus condiciones (incluyendo sus propias preguntas). *Es preferible evitar el debate* Considerando estos factores, se puede abordar un tercer aspecto. Es que de todos modos llama mucho la atención que se asumieran todos los costos y críticas (nacionales e internacionales), de impedir la consulta popular sobre el Yasuní. Es que si se hubiera permitido esa consulta, el resultado era incierto, y reconozco que es muy posible que hubiera triunfado la opción de habilitar la explotación petrolera. No podemos olvidar que la mayor parte de los votantes están en ciudades, lejos de la Amazonia, muchos con conocimientos y sensibilidades más preocupadas por la subsistencia diaria que por lo que ocurre en regiones remotas del Ecuador, y que posiblemente oirían apabullantes campañas publicitarias gubernamentales. A pesar de todo esto, hasta ahora, no se han aceptado riesgos. No debe escapar al análisis que si se llamaba a la consulta ciudadana, se habilitaba un proceso de debate público que aún en caso de perderse, serviría para el aprendizaje ciudadano, el fortalecimiento de redes independientes, y tal vez, hasta se podía ganar. *Defender los extractivismos es retroceder* Bajo estas condiciones asoma el cuarto, y último punto, en estas hipótesis primarias. Los gobiernos no pueden adentrarse en debates amplios y plurales sobre los extractivismos porque a estas alturas, tienen muy escasos argumentos para defenderlos. El extractivismo actual sólo es posible acotando la pluralidad democrática. Pocos proyectos pasarían controles ambientales y sociales rigurosos, ya que siempre implican altos impactos ambientales y poca gente en las comunidades locales aceptarían sacrificar sus territorios. Este asunto es más grave con los gobiernos progresistas, ya que la mayor parte de las razones extractivistas además terminan en razonamientos conservadores, anclados en el mercado y reforzando la subordinación comercial global. Son, por lo tanto, argumentos contrarios a la propia esencia de la izquierda. Todo esto hace que para el progresismo gobernante, cuando se ve forzado a debatir en serio sobre su apetencia petrolera o minera, se desnudan sus íntimos pensamientos mercantiles. Debates públicos sobre la explotación petrolera en la Amazonia promovidos por una consulta ciudadana, pondría en discusión asuntos que van mucho más allá de la estrategia petrolera gubernamental. Rápidamente se estaría discutiendo sus ideas sobre el desarrollo, sus prácticas gubernamentales, etc. dejando en evidencia sus contradicciones. Y esto es algo que muchos en el progresismo lo saben, y por ello evitan con todas sus fuerzas entrar en esos terrenos. Bajo esta coyuntura, los intereses económicos, la apetencia por controlar y el miedo a quedar atrapado en contradicciones ideológicas, deja muy en claro que el progresismo es un proceso que se está separando cada vez más de la izquierda que le dio origen. Lo que acaba de suceder con la explotación petrolera en el Yasuní es una contribución más a esa divergencia. Entretanto, el futuro del Yasuní queda en entredicho. ******* *Translation, by Danica Jorden* *http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php <http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>* *Ecuador - The Yasuní and the Current State of Affairs: Economics, Regulation, and Opposition* *Denying the referendum will have enormous impacts on the quality of democracy, the protection or lack of the right to participate in governance, and will give a green light to unopposed oil exploration.* Written by Eduardo Gudynas, Translated by Danica Jorden Thursday, 08 May 2014 Source:* Plan V* The National Electoral Council in Ecuador has announced that a sufficient number of signatures was not gathered in order to call for a public referendum concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní park. This decision will have enormous impacts. It has been interpreted by many as a step backwards for democracy. This decision has been called out, rightly so, as not only a hindrance of public expression, but also for the manner in which the decision was made, referring to unusual bureaucratic and administrative practices. The prevailing appetite for the money gushing out of the ITT oil exploration fields has also been pointed out. I don't discount these reasons. But getting exploration up and running will take some time and would hardly benefit the current administration. Others will say that doesn't matter, that this is really part of a re-election effort, and that financial profits will be used to sustain the government into the next cycle. This extreme view, however, has yet to be confirmed. I am sure that various analysts will delve into these questions, and that's why I prefer to explore other points of view that are directly related to the current state of affairs and reflect more urgent needs. *Capital's Reasons* Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the intention to continue seeking bids for oil field concessions. In these negotiations, corporate heads demand firm investment conditions, in order to ensure that the blocks they acquire can be effectively exploited. But these assurances would crumble in light of the possibility of a people's referendum that could prevent oil exploration in any corner of the country. There's no lack of executives who fear, or claim to, that if there is a vote for a moratorium in the Yasuní, that other votes could follow for other locations in the Amazon. Likewise, the government's difficulties in the recent round of petroleum negotiations over the Southeast have not gone unnoticed. So, in order to clear the way for new oil negotiations, the government needs to reassert complete control over what it offers, and that implies stopping plebiscites that might place conditions on that control. *The needs to control and discipline* Secondly, it must be noted that the mobilization in defense of the Yasuní was enormous, and the role played by new collectives, especially the Yasunidos, has had great impact. New forms of political expression were in evidence, youth activism was reborn, and more horizontal structures were created, making them more difficult to co-opt. To put it bluntly: There were examples of an independent people's mobilization that was not under the government's or any political party's control. Furthermore, all of their issues pointed to the essence of the Correa administration's development strategy, debating its extractivism, and demanding compliance with the ecological mandates set forth in the Montecristi Constitution. A strong, autonomous, and potential-filled movement will always be confronted by those in power. So under this hypothesis, it was crucial to stop a popular referendum in order to prevent the collective from continuing to operate, increase its base of support, learn from experience and mature into an unmanageable political adversary. There is at least one precedent for the confluence of these two factors, safeguarding oil investment and controlling civil society, and that was shown in the dissolution of the Pachamama Foundation. These two factors were present then, and used to justify the extreme way the foundation was alleged to have affected one of the oil negotiations, while cutting off its support for local communities, and sending a message to other NGOs. Under this same logic, one must not exclude the possibility of a supreme confidence game: that this same President could decide to call for a popular referendum himself. With the disciplinary period over, the message to oil investors is also clear, and he could counteract some of the critics, take over the initiative and call for a referendum himself, but under his own conditions (and including his own issues). *It's best to avoid debate* In addition to these factors, one could also consider a third aspect. It is truly striking all the costs and criticisms (both national and international) that were incurred in order to prevent a popular referendum on the Yasuní. It's that if they had allowed the referendum, the result would have been uncertain, and I recognize that it is very possible that the decision to enable oil exploration might have won out. We cannot forget that the vast majority of voters live in cities, far from the Amazon, and many of them are more affected and concerned by their daily subsistence than what is happening in remote regions of Ecuador, and could possibly be overwhelmed by the government's media campaign. Despite all this, until now, no one has taken the risk. Any analysis should not ignore that if a popular referendum were called, a public debate would be enabled that, even in the case of a loss, would educate the people, strengthen independent networks, and perhaps ultimately lead to victory. *Defending extractivism is regressive* Under these conditions appears the fourth, and final, point of these preliminary hypotheses. Governments cannot dive into far-reaching and multiple debates on extractivism because from these vantage points, there are too few arguments to defend it. Present day extractivism is only possible by reigning in democratic plurality. Few projects would surpass rigorous environmental and social regulation, as they always have great environmental impacts and few people in local communities would agree to sacrifice their lands. This issue is more serious for progressive governments, since the vast majority of extractivist rationale is based on conservative arguments tied to the market and reinforcing global commercial subordination. These arguments are therefore contrary to the very essence of the left. All this means that a progressive government, when forced to seriously discuss its appetite for petroleum or mining, must shed its clothes and reveal its most intimate mercantile thoughts. Public debates on oil exploration in the Amazon promoted through public referendum could raise discussion about issues much more far-reaching than the government's petroleum strategy. There would rapidly also be discussion about development, government practices, etc., revealing their contradictions. And this is something that many progressives know, and why they avoid going there at all costs. In this current state of affairs, economic interests, the appetite for control, and the fear of being trapped in ideological contradictions clarifies how progressivism is a process that is increasingly detached from the left from which it originated. What just happened concerning oil exploration in the Yasuní is but one more contribution to this divergence. In the meantime, the future of the Yasuní remains in question *Eduardo Gudynas is one of South America's most respected environmental analysts and activists.* *See also:* ************* *http://lalineadefuego.info/2014/04/14/lectura-sobre-el-retorno-del-e <http://lalineadefuego.info/2014/04/14/lectura-sobre-el-retorno-del-e>cuador-al-banco-mundial-por-alberto-acosta/* *LECTURA SOBRE EL RETORNO DEL ECUADOR AL BANCO MUNDIAL.* *La cuadratura capitalista del círculo revolucionario* POR ALBERTO ACOSTA | * la linea de fuego* | 11 Abril 2014 *Available in English translation at:** http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php <http://www.upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php>* *A Reading on Ecuador's Return to the World Bank* *The squaring of capitalism in the revolutionary circle* by Alberto Acosta,* La Línea de Fuego*, Tuesday, 06 May 2014, translated by Danica Jorden _______________________________________________ ** WSFDiscuss is an open and unmoderated forum for the exchange of information and views on the experience, practise, and theory of the World Social Forum at any level (local, national, regional, and global) and on related social and political movements and issues. Join in !** _______________________________________________ WSFDiscuss mailing list POST to LIST : Send email to [email protected] SUBSCRIBE: Send empty email to [email protected] UNSUBSCRIBE: Send empty email to [email protected] LIST ARCHIVES: http://openspaceforum.net/pipermail/worldsocialforum-discuss_openspaceforum.... LIST INFORMATION: http://openspaceforum.net/mailman/listinfo/worldsocialforum-discuss_openspac... -- 1. *EBook, November 2012: Recovering Internationalism <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/recovering_internationalism/>. [A compilation of papers from the new millenium. Now free in two download formats] <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/> <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/>* 2. *EBook (co-editor), February 2013: World Social Forum: Critical Explorations http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/ <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/world_social_forum/> * 3. *Interface Journal Special (co-editor), November 2012: For the Global Emancipation of Labour <http://www.interfacejournal.net/current/>* 4. *Blog: http://www.unionbook.org/profile/peterwaterman. <http://www.unionbook.org/profile/peterwaterman.> * 5. *Interface Journal Special (Co-Editor) Social Movement Internationalisms. See Call for Papers <http://www.interfacejournal.net/>, (Deadline: May 1, 2014). * 6. *Needed: a Global Labour Charter Movement (2005-Now!) <http://interfacejournal.nuim.ie/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Interface-1-2-pp255-262-Waterman.pdf>* 7. *Under, Against, Beyond: Labour and Social Movements Confront a Globalised, Informatised Capitalism <http://www.into-ebooks.com/book/under-against-beyond/>(2011) Almost 1,000 pages of Working Papers, free, from the 1980 <1980>'s-90's.* 8. *Google Scholar Citation Index:* *http://scholar.google.com.pe/citations?user=e0e6Qa4AAAAJ <http://scholar.google.com.pe/citations?user=e0e6Qa4AAAAJ> * - -- *Please note an intrusion wiped out my inbox on February 8; I have no record of previous communication, proposals, etc ..* P2P Foundation: http://p2pfoundation.net - http://blog.p2pfoundation.net <http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation>Updates: http://twitter.com/mbauwens; http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens #82 on the (En)Rich list: http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/