

**EXTENSION OF DEADLINE of Call for papers**

**The contribution of the commons to open and shared access to productive resources and essential goods and services**

*special issue under the direction of*

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The theory of the commons developed with the work of Elinor Ostrom and her disciples has shown the relevance of governance as well as the social utility of the production of shared and jointly managed goods. They radically challenged Hardin's common goods curse thesis and took the opposite view to the property rights theory initiated by Alchian and Demsetz. As Coriat shows, however, exclusive and private access to resources has increased in recent decades, particularly on knowledge and technology; the most tangible manifestation being the rise of patents in the life sciences or software. The growing importance of exclusive private rights over productive resources and essential goods and services leads to the term "Tragedy of the Anticommons" according to Heller. To preserve the collective interest, it is necessary to guarantee and develop open and shared access for essential goods and resources, in particular through the public domain or production by the commons.

Various forms of production of common goods have been deployed in recent decades to offer alternatives to exclusive property rights and to allow open and shared access. This is particularly the case with open technology and free software. The joint production of public goods by public and social and solidarity economy (SSE) organizations is another way of expressing the pooling of resources to produce public goods (CIRIEC, 2018). The historical activities of SSE organizations, implemented in various ways throughout the world, also allow making productive resources and/or goods and services available to a greater or lesser number of beneficiaries.

The deployment of commons leads to an analysis of their characteristics and the ways in which stakeholders are involved in the work, explaining how they contribute or can contribute for open and shared access to resources or goods and services, particularly if they are essential. It also leads to the clarification of the forms of governance at work in order to grasp their contributions and potentialities in terms of the expanded production of public or common goods. This also leads to the clarification of the characteristics of new organizational forms that make it possible to involve stakeholders jointly and more broadly in governance. It is also a question of examining the economic repercussions and the future prospects of resource joint management practices. Finally, it is useful to explain the contributive capacity of these governances to the emergence of new paradigms of collective action, in particular through collaborations between or with public authorities.

The purpose of the special issue of the Annals is thus to provide answers to the following questions:

- What are the characteristics of new forms of commons and their particular contribution to open and shared access to resources and essential goods and services?

- What relationships can be established between the nature of the common and the scope of access to resources and goods and services?

- How do traditional social and solidarity economy organizations and emerging or growing organizational forms constitute particular opportunities for open and shared access to resources and goods and services?

- Why and how do the forms of governance implemented by the commons offer prospects for inclusive resource management for their stakeholders?

- How do the forms of governance that are deployed with the commons make it possible to broaden cooperation between actors or between organizations?

- What are the current and potential repercussions of the deployment of commons on the implementation of public action and more broadly on the paradigm of the collective action?

This special issue of the Annals aims to provide research results on these themes.

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