Citizens as peers complementing government functions: The case of new governance modes in public housing in Warsaw, Poland

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ABSTRACT

This ethnographic and inductive study of tenants' involvement and its results in the governance of public housing in Warsaw will contribute to imagining a model of governance that could be based on radical democratic citizenship norms. The case study will explore the peer production of the control of law enforcement through a governance system where citizens generate governance functions. The sample of variegated interactions between citizens and the local administration will illustrate that confrontational tactics have some impact on street-level bureaucrats in the domains of producing expertise, improving performance, and ensuring responsiveness and compliance. It will also be demonstrated that these new modes of operating retain an arbitrary governance system in which the personality of activists, their personal relations with state bureaucrats, and collective clientelism play a role.

This article presents ways in which citizens participate in the governance of public services and explores the potential impact of these engagement forms on the system of governance. For instance, it brings forward the understanding of new governance forms that have been conceptualized in the literature recently. Wikileaks' activity to enforce the transparency of governments (Curran and Gibson 2013), spectacular as it is, constitutes just one of many expressions of this mode of governance. The literature analysing organizations which function beyond state hierarchy and market logic points to new modes of governance, namely "peer-based approaches to work around nonfunctioning or imperfect state institutions." (Benkler 2013, 235). This anarchic, voluntaristic model is compared to the privatization turn previously seen as a response to the governance failures of state hierarchy (Benkler 2013). This mode of governance is created by peer production of governance functions. Peer production is based on three tenets: (1) Self-selected spontaneous contribution of participants in the production process; (2) creation of use value rather than exchange or market value, which results in free access to public goods; (3) non-delegation and distributed coordination, in contrast to hierarchical state and market providers (Bauwens and Rémi 2005; Benkler 2013; Himanen 2002). Mainly applied in the development of open source software and digital

content creation (such as Wikipedia), this mode of production is believed to induce new citizenship norms and virtues (Benkler and Nissenbaum 2006).

The first attempts to assess the impact of the transformation in the interactions between the public administration (PA) and citizens, resulting from the engagement of citizens in direct action have been undertaken in regard to the case of Wikileaks (Hood 2011). I propose to broaden the conceptualization of the present models of local (municipality-level) PA-citizen relations. While my case studies demonstrate new tendencies in the logic of governance, this paper's aim is NOT to argue that they take over or replace other modes of governance but rather that they are an addition to the present ones. One can imagine the transformation of governance systems as adding patches that reflect the ideologies of the actors that developed them (see Blatter 2003; Genschel 1997 for the elaboration on this conception of the transformation of governance systems in the form of patches). What I am describing in this paper is a new patch to the governance system added to it by critical citizens implementing their concepts of democracy. Their citizenship norms are inspired by anarchism but in its "post-ideological" form, a loose appropriation of ideas and tactics (cp. Curran 2006; Curran and Gibson 2013). The case study method is often used to illustrate and understand new trends, which may statistically not be the dominant ones but still contribute significantly to the shape of the political system. An in-depth analysis of the results of the new tactics employed by citizens will illustrate the type of governance system that can be produced by peer-based approaches to the generation of new governance functions.

The limitations of state-centred and market-centred principles of governance in producing expertise, in improving performance and in ensuring the responsiveness and compliance of street-level bureaucrats are recognized by the present literature, which shows a growing interest in citizen participation (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary 2005; Bingham and O'Leary 2008; Ostrom 2000; Peisakhin and Pinto 2010; Stout 2010; Wagenaar 2007). Both administrative science scholars and practitioners (for instance, the World Bank and the UNDP) recognize the role of participation in PA performance improvement (Petrova 2011; Sintomer, Herzberg, and Röcke 2008; Wagenaar 2007). However, the present scholarship on the relations between the PA and citizens does not account for the involvement of citizens beyond incumbent-defined channels. I refer to citizen involvement that is not steered by administrators (as is the case in the participatory or collaborative model of deliberation) and that is not an expression of voice within the logic of representative democracy (such is the case of demonstrations or petitions). The citizenship norms, defined as a "shared set of expectations about citizen's role in politics" (Dalton 2008, 78), that can be derived from the three dominant models of PA-citizen relations (the classic, new public management, and collaborative models) (Vigoda 2002), correspond to the conventional forms of citizen involvement typical for representative or deliberative democracy. In these models, the PA defines forms and times of citizen feedback as a voter, a client, or a deliberation partner. The final goal is a decision to be executed by the PA.

By contrast, political sociology research demonstrates a shift in citizenship norms: citizens mistrust elites and search for other forms of engagement, which are not steered by the incumbents (Day 2004; Norris 2002; Young 2003). One of the examples of such initiatives is gated communities – adding a privatized governance layer and in the long term changing the governance system (Van der Steen, van Twist, and Karré 2011). Radical democracy, assuming an ongoing conflict between citizens and the state, implies also an ongoing engagement of citizens going beyond the state-defined times and venues.

The case of the governance of tenants' issues in Warsaw is an excellent laboratory for examining the modes of governance induced by radical democratic citizenship norms. Since this case is emblematic of two broader trends observable in many various political systems and societies, namely the growing importance of executive power (cp. Vibert 2007) and the transformation of citizenship norms, one can generalize from the findings to predict the transformation of local governance. Housing administration at the city and district level shows the malfunctioning of PA in the realm of performance, responsiveness and accountability. I have mapped the emergent modes of governance by taking stock of new forms of citizen engagement consistent with radical democratic citizenship norms. My ethnographic study demonstrates what the implications for the governance system are, particularly in the realm of producing expertise, in improving performance and in ensuring the responsiveness and compliance of street-level bureaucrats. I mainly concentrate on Warsaw and the time scope of my analysis ranges from November 2009 to the first half of 2012. This article does not provide a complete portrayal of housing issues and tenants' activism in Warsaw but only concentrates on the interactions with the PA that exemplify radical democratic citizenship norms. I have mainly analysed the interactions initiated or accompanied by one of the tenants' organizations due to the availability of complete documentation of their actions. There are other smaller tenants' organizations created on the occasion of privatization of particular buildings. Tenant mobilization is supported by other left organizations, such as the Young Socialists, Left Alternative, squats. The organizations constitute a network mobilizing to improve housing accessibility. A more detailed portrait of this social movement can be found in other publications (Polanska and Piotrowski 2015; Polanska Vengara 2014).

The first section below will compare models of PA-citizen relations in regard to their conceptualization of participation forms. The participation derived from radical democratic citizenship norms will be introduced. After a methodological note, I will explain the malfunctioning of housing administration in Warsaw in its broader historical, political, and institutional context. Two following sections will describe the interactions between tenants and the PA and their outcomes. The former will present forms of involvement consistent with the concepts of representative and deliberative democracy and the latter will analyse the examples of tenants' involvement derived from radical democracy exemplifying their modes of operating and consequences for the system of governance. Analysing the outcomes of peer production of governance functions will illustrate an imperfect system of governance which opens some agency potential for citizens. My conclusions will follow.

Data collection and methodological note

The paper's aim is to analyse and illustrate a new set of strategies in the interactions of citizens with the PA. The paper does not provide a complete description of tenants' tactics and housing policy in Warsaw. I have conducted an inductive case study analysis. The case was selected on the basis of an independent variable to trace the results of tactics consistent with radical democratic citizenship norms. This case study will exemplify what the consequences of the shift in citizens' tactics are for the system of governance. Therefore, I opted for the presentation of selected events. To understand these new dynamics, I have decided to work with cases and stay as detailed as possible when analysing them. The chosen cases ($N = 11$) are stories of tenant-PA interactions in Warsaw. I have selected them based on the independent variable, namely the tactics that correspond to the new trends in citizens'

involvement with the local PA. In order to contextualize the cases within tenants' activism in Warsaw, I have also included a short overview of the tactics that are typical for other models of governance and Citizen–PA relations: the representative democracy model and the collaborative model. The latter took the form of public consultations or consultations with the representatives of tenants' organisations.

I focus on the tactics of KOL, an organization that documents its actions on its website well, which made the content analysis easier. The blog of the Committee for Tenant Defence established in 2008 (Komitet Obrony Lokatorow, KOL) is rich in information and was systematically updated during the period studied. The content analysis consisted of reading all the publications on the website between November 2009 and May 2012. Then I selected the stories about the interactions between tenants and the PA (either municipal government or housing management bodies). I also conducted interviews with two leaders of this organization in a group interview (in November 2009 and in March 2012) and one individual interview with an activist of this organization (in November 2009). The interviews conducted in November 2009 were exploratory interviews to see what the issues in tenants' interactions with the PA are. They have inspired my analysis and helped to frame the research question and develop analytical concepts. I interviewed the organization in 2012 to verify the stories and to ask for follow-ups to the stories I found on their blog. I asked also about additional examples during the interviews. The stories were reconstructed based on the posts on the blog regularly updated by KOL and verifications in the interviews.

Additionally, the data collection consisted of non-participatory observations of meetings within tenant organizations (in October and November 2009 as well as in March and May 2012), and between activists and the vice-president of Warsaw (21 May 2012). The examples of KOL's actions dominate in the presentation due to the better documentation of their activities and their application of the type of tactics that correspond to the independent variable. I have also conducted interviews with two other major organizations dealing with tenant issues. An interview was conducted with the Attorney Office for Social Justice (Kancelaria Sprawiedliwości Społecznej, KSS) on 30 May 2012 and two interviews were conducted with the Warsaw Association of Tenants (Warszawskie Stowarzyszenie Lokatorow, WSL) in November 2009 and May 2012. While these organizations have their specific profiles, they also often collaborate in interactions with the PA. For example, the calls for blockades that I write about are announced across the network of involved organizations and tenants.

PA meets critical citizens: radical citizenship norms in practice

The literature in PA describes citizen engagement that is consistent with aggregative models of democracy, mainly the representative but also the deliberative democracy model in which the voice of citizens is channelled by the state, whereas the literature in political sociology demonstrates that citizens are sceptical about representative forms of governance. Opening PA to the community is inspired by the ideal of deliberative democracy (Hess and Adams 2007; Wagenaar 2007). However, critical analysis raises doubts about the democratic aspects of participatory innovations designed by authorities. Participatory elements within the new public management (NPM) and neo-Weberian state models may be motivated by the instrumental aim of overcoming resistance (Dunn and Miller 2007, 355). Participatory and deliberative procedures can be used as "public relations" tools by political elites to give citizens

the illusion of engagement (Blondiaux 2005; Blondiaux and Sintomer 2002), so called "participatory window-dressing" (Fung and Wright 2003, 265). Even in Brazil, from where the model of participatory budgeting spread to other countries and where its practice is considered to be more advanced than in other regions (Sintomer et al. 2010), participatory budgeting constitutes another layer of representation and can be derived from the strategic choices of incumbents (Nylen 2011). One needs to analyse citizen involvement, which confronts the authorities with other forms of participation than those designed and approved by them.

Three major stages in the development of administrative science (the classic, new public management, and collaborative model) are based on specific assumptions about the character of democracy and the forms of citizen participation, which are conceptualized by Vigoda (2002). In the classic model, citizens are conceived as voters, the government and PA as trustees, and the type of interaction as delegation. In the NPM model, citizens are clients/customers, administrators are managers, and the type of interaction is responsiveness. A development from this model would be interaction based on collaboration, where citizens are partners of the PA. Vigoda (2002) adds a fourth type, a theoretical ideal being a next stage in democratization, in which citizens are conceptualized as owners, the government and PA are subjects and the type of interaction is citizen-coerciveness (Vigoda 2002, 531). This fourth type is hypothetical and one can only imagine some elements and how the citizenship norms would be translated into practice. The examples of peer production of governance functions presented in this paper contributed some ideas about the modes of operating within this paradigm. What the three dominant models assume, even if it is not explicitly stated, is that citizens trust in the PA and find their involvement as voters, customers, or partners a sufficient engagement with the PA. Citizens' acts of influencing state bureaucrats outside the state-defined channels constitute a manifestation of new citizenship norms in attitudes and actions.

Taking citizenship norms as the departure point, I propose to group the types of PA-citizen relations into ones based on trust in state-defined channels and the PA's execution and a radical democratic type assuming the autonomy of citizens and ongoing opposition between them and the state. The distinction between two forms of democracy; aggregative (which includes the deliberative model) and radical; is useful in describing citizenship norms (Springer 2011; 52f.). In this typology, community governance as put forward by Hess and Adams (2007) and inspired by deliberative democracy also belongs to the aggregative model because the process of feedback is steered by incumbents and the consensus arrived at is the basis for execution by the administrators. The new type of citizen – an "everyday maker" – is involved in the neighbourhood outside the state-defined channels of participation (Bang and Sorenson 1999) and "new politics" happens outside the party-based organizations (Lowndes and Sullivan 2008). These changes reflect citizens' scepticism about the state (Norris 2002). This scepticism towards political elites and state-channelled participation is also present in the post-communist context (Mishler and Rose 1997). Young (2003, 102f.) argued that activists, motivated by deep democratic values, may actually be reluctant to engage in participatory innovations created by the state, being aware of power asymmetry. The autonomy of citizens understood as their mental liberation in the form of disbelief in an encompassing consensus and of a citizen attitude that disregards the incumbent-defined venue for participation are citizenship norms underpinning a radical democracy model. Drawing on Mouffe (2004, after Springer 2011, 530), Springer argues that establishing a rational consensus can

reduce political conflict and forestall articulation of political alternatives. Instead, it is assumed that conflict "cannot and should not be eradicated in democratic societies." (Springer 2011, 530). Dunsire (1993) proposes a model of governance by other means, in the form of collibration, which is defined as a process of isostasy (stability owed to balance of multiple forces). The conflict of opposed forces can be a form of governing.

The radical democracy model corresponds to recent trends in political participation and citizenship norms and is consistent with anarchism (Murray 2010; Springer 2011). It implies an emancipated disbelief in political processes leading to satisfactory outcomes (Day 2004). Therefore, actions outside these processes and venues are undertaken. Direct action can be distinguished from protest and civil disobedience, which are forms of action targeted at the authorities in order to reform them by informing them about citizens' opinions. David Graeber defines direct action as "the insistence, when faced with structures of unjust authority, on acting as if one is already free" (Graeber 2009, 203). The concept of direct action and radical democracy resonates with the peer production logic in the domain of governance. Peers are generating governance functions outside of the co-production (collaborative) model. Benkler exemplifies this with Safecast, an independent expertise production of radiation measurement organized by citizens after the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in response to misinformation by the Japanese government (Benkler 2013).

What happens to the governance system and PA when citizens appropriate direct action tactics and radical democratic ideals? One needs to develop a model of governance that will reflect and derive from the transformation of citizenship norms and go beyond the conceptualizations which take citizens' deference and trust in delegation for granted. Tenant activists in Warsaw add another patch to the housing governance which breaks with the representative or participatory democracy model. They apply tactics reflecting radical democratic citizenship norms, which include the following forms of action: blockades, leaks, occupations, exercising pressure by using persuasion, personalist relations, self-produced media, self-organized monitoring and information gathering. These tactics complement classic and collaborative ways of influencing PA authorities such as using mainstream media, protest, or petitioning. I will explore these new modes of governance and PA–citizen relations, which are distinct from the classic, new public management, and collaborative models to exemplify what this trend implies for the governance system.

Tenants' situation in Warsaw – the historical and legal context

This section will clarify the shortcomings of state performance in housing and tenants' issues in its broader historical and political context. Due to the restitutions, the homeownership rate is higher in Poland than in other liberal economies and in 2009, 29.1% of flats were rented with a non-market rent, according to Eurostat. However, housing needs are not met according to Eurostat data, which reveals that 15% of the population is in severe housing deprivation, and Supreme Audit Chamber (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, or NIK) data shows a lack of 1,500,000 flats with 6,500,000 people in a difficult housing situation. The communal housing is owned by local authorities. Financial constraints motivated local authorities to sell housing units to the private sector or tenants (Blunt and Muziol-Weclawowicz 1998). In the absence of legislation to compensate pre-war owners, some entrepreneurial lawyers more and more often managed to gain property rights to nationalized buildings for pre-war owners or from those who inherited or bought rights to them. The rents are usually raised after reprivatization.

According to the estimate of the civil society housing coalition Social Side (Strona Spoleczna), 17,000 applications for the return of real estate in Warsaw have been made. Citizens are not informed about the reprivatization proceedings in the capital (New Poland Express 2010). Since the nationalization decree was targeted on the centre of Warsaw, where no private ownership remained (Muzioł-Węcławowicz 1992), these areas are mostly affected by the current changes. An eviction without providing or ensuring a replacement living space by the owner or municipal authorities is prohibited. The amendment to the law from November 2011 ruled out this obligation in cases where there was no rent contract. On 31 December 2011, there were 84,836 communal flats and 4333 social flats in Warsaw. The share of public housing in the Warsaw housing stock was 11%. One thousand three hundred seventy-seven households were waiting for a communal flat and 3428 for a social flat (of which 2713 allocations were based on court decisions). Altogether 4805 flats were lacking, to meet the demand of eligible inhabitants (Rakowska 2012).

The respect of citizens' rights and the functioning of administration at the local level suffer from inefficiencies, lack of transparency, and corruption. The arbitrariness and irregularities of the PA at the local level cause discrimination and undermine the principle of the rule of law. The problem of lacking transparency is still present and the rights of citizens to information is an ongoing issue, with requests not executed (Meyer-Sahling 2009). Berenson's study shows counter-evidence to this diagnosis, namely that the responsiveness of Polish (and Russian) street-level bureaucrats was satisfactory in the sector of unemployment and child benefits (Berenson 2010). However, studying the case of housing administration sheds new light on the PA practices due to the incentives to engage in corruption or collusion. One needs to highlight that the PA in Central Eastern Europe is very fragmented and there are no common standards of personnel management across units. In Poland, only five per cent of public employees are subject to civil service law – those having a status of civil servant. And this is limited to the central administration (Meyer-Sahling 2009).

The weak performance of the local PA may also be related to financial limitations. The expenditure that is carried out by local governments amounts to slightly less than a third of all public expenditure. From that sum, Polish local governments take care of a wide array of tasks from spatial planning and environmental protection, through maintaining public facilities and infrastructure, supplying heat, gas and electricity, treating sewage and waste, providing local public transport, health care, social welfare, education and culture to ensuring public order (Oulasvirta and Turala 2009, 323). Warsaw is a city-commune. It is divided into 18 districts, many of which have offices for public real estate management (Zakład Gospodarowania Nieruchomościami, or ZGN). One of the vice-presidents of Warsaw is responsible for housing and public real estate and there is a special unit for housing policy at the city level.

The overview below exemplifies the irregularities in the area of management and expertise, responsiveness, and accountability and control of PA in the public housing sector in Warsaw that can be derived from the stories/cases that I have collected (they can be found in Appendix 1 and they are analysed in further sections):

Inefficient management and lack of expertise

Empty housing is maintained despite the insufficient provision of communal housing.

The housing stock is deteriorating because of insufficient management and the lack of expertise relating to buildings' condition.

Responsiveness of bureaucrats

Bureaucrats refuse to take written complaints from tenants or to respond to requests for information although they are obliged to do this by law.

Bureaucrats assign non-existent flats and do not provide social or replacement flats despite eligibility of evicted tenants.

Bureaucrats do not inform citizens about their rights or provide the wrong information.

Accountability and control of public administrators

Criminal practices accompanying the taking over of public real estate belonging to a commune, such as falsification of documents. (KOL's activists indicated that control is better organized in Lodz, where a special unit is supposed to check the documents.)

Real costs of renovation are exaggerated or renovation not conducted.

Conflicts of interest and collusion.

Housing-related interactions between the PA and citizens

The aim of this study is to illustrate models of involvement derived from radical democracy citizenship norms. However, they do not replace or take over other forms of participation but rather constitute an additional patch in the system of governance. In this section, I will present tactics typical for representative and deliberative democracy. Struggle over housing in Warsaw is part of a broader range of initiatives against the privatization of public space in several Polish cities. Issue by issue involvement stimulates building new structures and coalitions across the political spectrum, and activates new actors (Mergler and Pobłocki 2010). Tenants applied such conventional forms of participation as petitioning local and national authorities (as well as a petition to the Council of Europe in March 2010), writing letters to the human right ombudsman and other authorities, and demonstrations.

The human rights ombudsman wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, pointing to the lack of housing provision. Public officials organized several meetings with citizens, mainly in October 2010 and the first half of 2012. These two periods were strategic for the authorities due to the election campaign in 2010 and the EURO 2012 sports tournament in June 2012. Tenant organizations boycotted an event on 4 October 2010 which was supposed to be a consultation because it was structured and dominated by the authorities. In the end, officials talked with tenants about their individual situations. On 15 May 2012, a panel discussion on housing in Warsaw was organized.

After a 2000-person demonstration against the closure of the Elba squat on 23 March 2012 and a new occupation of an empty public building, the vice-president of Warsaw responsible for real estate issues agreed to talk about housing problems in Warsaw. A couple of meetings took place. On 21 May 2012, tenant activists proposed conducting a social audit to verify whether the authorities were aware of all the empty flats in their stock. They requested a list of empty flats so as to be able to compare their data with the register of the authorities. However, the vice-president was reluctant explaining that this could enable the

illegal occupation of empty flats. Furthermore, activists proposed that tenants should contribute to the renovation of housing currently not available to tenants because of its bad condition. The vice-president of Warsaw explained that this was impossible because of legal constraints.

Confrontational involvement of tenants: radical democratic modes of governance in action

In this section I will examine how the oppositional involvement of citizens shapes outcomes with regard to housing governance. The 11 stories of interactions between PA and citizens that are presented in Appendix 1 are the empirical basis for the analysis. Gajewska (2013) elaborates on some of the stories and problems of law enforcement in tenant issues in Warsaw. I have chosen stories where the final outcome is already known and which represent a broad variety of problems, tactics, and outcomes. The way the expertise and management of public service provision, the responsiveness, accountability and control of bureaucrats are executed by the means of citizens' involvement will be described below.

Expertise and management

The Warsaw Office for Housing Policy has conducted an audit of communal flats by sending public employees to visit tenants. Consequently, many irregularities have been detected, such as subletting public housing. Districts supply the data on housing to the city-level authorities. Also external expertise is hired, as in the NPM model. However, as one of the stories illustrates, external expertise may be instrumentalized to pursue the interests of the incumbents to free a building in an attractive area for investors, as was suspected by tenants in story 7. Consultations organized by the authorities in Warsaw, in theory supposed to create knowledge relevant to performance improvement (Fung 2006) and inspired by a deliberative democracy model (Hess and Adams 2007), were usually dominated by incumbents. Although the role envisioned for consultation is to overcome the reluctance of administrators to get involved in street level issues or their limited capacity to deal with complex systems and update their knowledge (Wagenaar 2007), city level and district level authorities were not interested in collaborative knowledge production. This can be illustrated by the refusal by the aforementioned vice-president of Warsaw to cooperate on a social audit proposed by tenants.

Tenants apply a confrontational approach (for conceptual differences between collaborative and confrontational approaches see Jenkins and Goetz [1999]) to knowledge production and its use. The counter-expertise provided by tenants is about the analysis of official documents and confronting them with the reality. Documents are obtained by using the right to public information, document leaks, or with the help of mobilization. Tenants participate in gathering information on the condition of the public housing stock. In story 7, tenants controlled a technical check to prevent falsification by the local authorities. In story 9, tenants collected data on the housing stock themselves. While some administrators may make use of this information, the main objective is to pressure and control administrators. In story 10, tenants complemented the tasks of the police in monitoring buildings to prevent arson. Activist tactics in these cases are similar to the peer production of expertise presented in the conceptualization of peer-based approaches to governance, such as Safecast, which

produced independent information on the radiation level after Fukushima in Japan (Benkler 2013, 235f.).

Responsiveness

In the case of public housing in Warsaw, the exit option considered to regulate bureaucrats' behaviour according to the NPM model is hardly applicable due to the unavailability of choice and the large demand for this public service. Bureaucrats do not show a customer-oriented attitude in their interactions with tenants of communal housing. So far consultations and exchanges between tenants and the administration, which may improve responsiveness according to conceptualization in the literature (cp. Fung 2006; Wagenaar 2007) have induced hardly any changes.

The use of the right to information, a sign that an administrator is dealing with a well-informed citizen, can pressure administrators to be more responsive and less corrupt (Peisakhin and Pinto 2010). Street-level bureaucrats in Warsaw seldom inform citizens about their rights. They execute the law only when pressured by organizations. For instance, KSS' volunteers write letters to administrators informing them about citizens' rights or intervene in person. Furthermore, tenants pressured local administrators to be responsive to their requests by calling in the mainstream media (see story 3) and publishing stories on their own website. They used the possibility of media coverage as an argument in conflicts with administrators. The mere presence of a camera can change the behaviour of a local bureaucrat as story 2 illustrates.

Personalist politics, conceptualized as a citizenship practice, has turned out to make redistribution more representative and to counter bureaucratic indifference in Bolivia (Lazar 2004). Similarly, tenants use personalized relationships with local politicians (motivated by elections) or with people with authority to pressure administrations. Activists have established good relations with some of the administrators, which has helped them speeding up a flat allocation for individual tenants. One of the KOL's leaders regularly gathers tenants' stories and persuades administrators, also using threats, to find solutions (for instance, story 4). He once accompanied a tenant who had been refused her request, in a return visit to an administrative office. At first staying out of sight, he made his presence known at the moment when the administrator started to refuse the request again. The administrator immediately changed her response when she saw the well-known activist. More confrontational tactics like court trials have been met with provisional measures, for instance the administration improved the conditions in a building only to win a case in which the administration was tried for not providing decent quality of social housing (see story 6). A leak of a secret public document was orchestrated to increase the transparency of housing administration (story 5). An occupation of a ZGN building led to the allocation of replacement flats for protesting tenants (story 7).

Accountability and control of PA

Vertical accountability deriving from the logic of delegation and representative democracy has been applied in an ad hoc manner; for instance, the local authorities in Warsaw have organized consultations with tenant activists before elections but no changes followed. Control mechanisms typical for the NPM, such as performance indicators and evaluation are

applied in the form of an internal audit between the city level and districts. Horizontal accountability in the form of the involvement of state agencies, such as the human rights ombudsman, corruption control agencies, legislative investigative commissions and administrative courts (Ackerman 2004, 449) can be exemplified with the report of the NIK and interventions by the ombudsman criticizing the insufficient engagement of the state in housing provision.

"Societal accountability," defined by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2000, 150) as "actions that aim at exposing governmental wrongdoing, bringing new issues into the public agenda, or activating the operation of horizontal agencies" compensates the insufficiency of vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms (Ackerman 2004; Bourgon 2007; Paul 1992). Tenant activists have communicated wrongdoings in the realm of housing management and allocation to the ombudsman, anti-corruption agencies, and administrative courts, most often in vain. For instance, the Warsaw City Hall ignored the conflict of interest of a vice-mayor of the Praga Północ district who belongs to the ruling party (story 11). Similarly, informing the incumbents about a potential falsification in the re-privatization process did not stop the administration from transferring management of a building to a private firm (story 8).

Whereas the right to information is a pillar of the modern democratic system, PAs tend to restrict access to information (Pasquier and Villeneuve 2007). Tenants' organizations gather information on the number of empty communal flats and on the way the income from rents is spent from documents supplied by the administration, and have published information on conflicts of interest (story 11). Tenants improved the transparency of the reprivatization process by a document leak (story 5). This form of direct action subscribes to the concept of radical transparency, considered by one of the leaders of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, as a means of increasing the accountability of public officials and reducing corruption (Curran and Gibson 2013; Hood 2011).

Activists also use cameras as a control mechanism, for instance to prevent the falsification of technical expertise (story 7). Blockades of evictions are regularly organized to ensure the enforcement of the law and to force the authorities to fulfil their obligations to provide a replacement flat. Since decisions over eviction often do not take into account the protection of certain categories of tenants by law, these actions can be considered as improving the execution of the law. In this way many evictions have been postponed or other solutions found (story 1). However, many evictions are blocked despite their legality.

Results of peer production and radical democracy as a mode of governance

The new ways in which citizens organize the provision of government functions need to be analysed from the perspective of their impact on the entire system in the long run (cp. Van der Steen, van Twist, and Karré 2011). The governance system shaped by the confrontational tactics is characterized by arbitrariness because the response of administrations is unpredictable and sporadic. The effects of mobilization and of interaction between citizens and PAs can be analysed using Fung's criteria for evaluating the outcomes of participatory measures, namely the social inclusion of marginalized actors, redistributive effects, and the efficient use of public resources and control mechanisms (cp. Fung 2006).

Overall, one can observe that the oppositional involvement brought about some redistributive results in the form of flat allocation or renovations. The intervention in individual

cases resembles rather the logic of collective clientelism, which can be seen as a way of increasing the inclusiveness and representativeness of the political system. Clientelism conceived as a form of exercising citizenship contrasts with its usual perception as being anti-democratic (Lazar 2004). Mobilization, direct action, persuasion and personalist relationships defined the redistributive outcomes in the form of public housing allocation. However, their outcomes are arbitrary and unpredictable. Self-organized monitoring had a limited impact on the improvement of management; however, it constituted a pressure on the local administration.

The judicial system also generates arbitrary results, as tenant activists observe. They pointed to different outcomes despite the similarity of the cases. Opposing the administration's or landlords' decisions on rent increases in court bears a financial risk. Tenants may need to pay compensation in case they lose in court. Nevertheless, the help of grass roots organizations has contributed to the increased use of courts to achieve more social justice and defend tenants.

The involvement of tenants contributed somewhat to the efficient use of public resources. The register of empty flats has been of help and has encouraged the administration to make a better use of its stock. Persuasion to allocate a flat (story 4) can be also seen as a way of increasing the use of public stock. Generally, administrations are reluctant to use counter-expertise provided by tenants.

The pressure of activists has worked as a control mechanism in some cases, such as control over the privatization process and decisions on technical conditions. However, the lack of a decisive reaction in cases of irregularities shows that exposing wrongdoing is not sufficient (stories 8, 11). The control of expertise relating to building by tenants did not change tenants' situation; only the most militant ones were allocated a replacement flat. The interactions with street-level administrators have shown some improvement in the execution of the law and better provision of information. In these cases, mainly use of the media and persuasion have been successful.

Conclusions

The growing importance of the executive results in a new style of democracy requiring the focused involvement of the informed citizen. New forms of representation are created (Vibert 2007). The example of tenants' issues in Warsaw illustrates that the power of administrations in influencing the redistribution of public goods does not only derive from the discretion and decentralization of authority but also from the possibility to make arbitrary decisions at the local level – the consequence of a weak state apparatus. Faced with a system in which the final outcomes depend on single decisions of administrators, tenants invented tactics that created new modes of governance to tackle inherent administrative malfunctioning.

The tenants applied different modes for regulating the behaviour of administrators than those present in the classic, NPM, or the collaborative model. The new mechanisms of governance within the radical democracy framework are blockades, leaks and occupations, exerting pressure using mainstream and self-produced media, self-organized monitoring and information gathering, and activating other institutions such as the courts. The political system becomes more personalized. The administrators are targeted personally by activists, either by exposing their misdealing in the media or by using personal relations to improve their responsiveness. A system of collective clientelism develops. Tenants also fulfil roles

traditionally attributed to the PA such as ensuring that technical expertise is not falsified by administrators or verifying the register of empty flats in the public stock. However, these have a limited effect. The main achievement of the unconventional involvement seems to be arbitrary: an increased responsiveness of street-level bureaucrats in individual cases and the allocation of flats to those who mobilize.

The system of governance observable in the case under study resembles an anarchist paradigm in the conceptualization of governance. The relations among actors are the product of links between actors and not structures from above. Self-organization is most prominent in building the entire network that co-governs at the local level. The relations are not based on authority (cp. Bookchin 1971; Read 1971; after Reedy 2014; Wachhaus 2012, 37). This system combines several modes of operating, in which the citizen plays an independent role in the governance system, despite not having authority.

Vigoda's (2002) ideal-types representing the stages of development in the relations between citizens and PA should be considered as overlapping and coexisting modes of operating. This is what imaginaries about the process of institutional change suggest. Institutions are not necessarily replaced by each other in the form of systemic change but their evolution may follow a trajectory of patching up new logics of governance into the system (Blatter 2003; Genschel 1997). While arbitrary in its results, oppositional citizen involvement seems to be a complementary mode of governance in addressing situations of low capacities in local administrations. Transformation of citizenship norms in PA-citizen relations as a constitutive part of a governance system needs further systematic study, which is a much more challenging task than a mere evaluation of institutional reforms. The research agenda launched in this article may inspire further case studies. Their comparison may result in a more exact assessment of the impact of the context in these new modes of governance.

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Katarzyna Gajewska is an independent scholar and futurist imagining and analysing postcapitalism with the focus on basic income, peer production, post-employment, public services and health. She studies emotional and psychological aspects of transformation to a new economic and political system.

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Appendix 1. 11 examples of the interactions between public housing administration and citizens in Warsaw

Story 1 Eviction decision to a wrong category of flat

In October 2011, a tenant with a mental illness was about to be evicted from her flat to a room in a hotel, which is rented by the district to allocate a replacement flat as required by the law for those evicted. However, taking into account her condition, she should not have been evicted at all until a social flat with lower rent and a long-term rent contract (a different category of flat than a replacement flat) was provided. First the eviction was postponed thanks to a blockade organized by around 70 activists. Later, KOL and journalists pressurized the hotel owner to decline a rent contract. Activists came with a camera to record the refusal from the owner, which made an eviction impossible due to the non-provision of a replacement flat. This was one of the many eviction blockades organized by the activists. Not all of them were successful.

Story 2 Responsiveness and the execution of the law

A clerk in housing administration (ZGN) refused to fill and take a form required to apply for a rent contract for a communal replacement flat on 3 November 2009. KOL leaders went to the office with a camera and demanded the document once more. At first the clerk refused but she promised to prepare the document for the next day. And so she did.

Story 3 Responsiveness and the execution of the law

A family, after having to move out from its communal flat due to renovation work conducted by a new owner, was allocated another flat. This flat required financial investment in renovation, which the family could not afford. On these grounds the administration did not allocate them any flat. KOL informed the television media and channel TVN24 made reportage about the case. After the intervention of the television, the mayor of the Rembertów district found resources for renovation.

Story 4 Responsiveness

Due to arson, a family had to move out of a communal flat. They were accommodated in a hotel for three months. Afterwards, despite a promise of a replacement flat, a rejection of a flat allocation followed. Thanks to the personal intervention of one of KOL's leaders in the form of a talk with administrators and the presentation of the case at a session of the district council, a flat was allocated to the family. However, it was in a bad technical condition. After another intervention of a KOL leader, the family was allocated a temporary flat for six months.

Story 5 Responsiveness and the lack of transparency in the restitution process

Tenants are informed about restitution claims first after a building has been transferred. Taking part in a City Council meeting on 30 September 2010, tenants and Oskar Hejka, one of the leaders of an alliance of about 30 organizations, asked for a list of the real estate for which ownership is claimed. The request was ignored and the vice-president of Warsaw responsible for housing claimed that there was no such list.

On 13 October 2010, tenants' organizations presented a document that had been created in City Hall and hidden by the officials. The document was classified as secret. This 60-page document leak consisted of 1500 real estate addresses in the Śródmieście district and their restitution status.

Story 6 Insufficient responsiveness and the knowledge of housing stock

A tenant in Wawer district waited for a flat allocation for 7 years. She declined the allocated flat on the grounds of its technical condition. Due to the decline, the administration removed her from the waiting list. Once the tenant challenged the housing administration in court, the administration renovated the corridor in the building and showed pictures of the renovated corridor in the court to win the case.

Story 7 Conflict of interest

A unit of Warsaw housing administration (the ZGN) cut off the gas supply in three buildings, explaining this through the necessity to protect the inhabitants from the danger caused by the bad condition of the installation. Tenants suspected that the real reason was someone's interest in liberating real estate in an attractive location from tenants so that more profitable real estate could be developed. On 11 December 2009, KOL (with a camera) and tenants monitored the technical examination of the buildings. This control revealed an overall good condition but certain repairs needed to be done. Nevertheless, a vice-mayor of the Śródmieście district spoke of a danger for inhabitants in a television interview on 31 December 2009. On 7 January 2010, a tenant reported the irregularities to the CBA (Central Anti-Corruption Office).

On 19 January 2010, about 20 tenants occupied the building of the ZGN in the Śródmieście district. They demanded technical expertise on the condition of the building. After negotiations, it turned out that expertise had been contracted out to an institution where a conflict of interest was suspected. On 15 February 2010, 40 tenants came to the Council of the Śródmieście district to demand a replacement of flats and the provision of independent expertise. Consequently, an institute from Cracow was tendered to conduct the examination of the gas installation, and this revealed that cutting off the gas was not justified. The ZGN did not want to accept the outcomes of the examination and refused to publish the results of the investigation or to pay for it to the institute. Out of 150 families living in the buildings, more than a dozen of the most active tenants received replacement flats. They were calmed this way and the gas was still cut off in the buildings (in May 2012).

Story 8 The lack of control over the reprivatization process

The privatization of a building was suspicious because the public ownership share inexplicably diminished from 43%, according to the information previously given to tenants, to 25%. Furthermore, the tenants were not given an opportunity to buy their flats and there was no official decision by the district to sell the shares in the building. KOL wrote letters to the Court, City Hall and District Hall. KOL's representatives spoke during a session of the Council of the Praga Północ district. On 2 September 2010, the District Council decided to examine the legality of the privatization of the building and to suspend privatization. The district mayor informed the President of Warsaw about this case. All these initiatives turned out to be in vain. In the end, the administration of the entire building was transferred to a private enterprise (despite being partly owned by the municipality) in August 2011, and rents were raised by 30% in May 2012. A protest of inhabitants of the building in front of the ZGN on 9 August 2011 and talks with the district mayor have not brought any results.

Story 9 Stocktaking of empty communal flats

KOL gives tenants the opportunity to report empty flats they know of anonymously on their website. As of 29 June 2012, there were 159 posts in this section. However, some posts consist of more than one

address and many are comments or requests for help. The 2009 official register of empty flats in Praga contains 27 items. Bogumiła Sosińska, the director of the housing department in the Praga-Północ district, told the daily journal *Gazeta Wyborcza* that she uses this information to manage communal housing better. In June 2009, there were 1101 empty flats, which could be allocated to tenants after renovation. This initiative made incumbents wary because of the danger that empty flats would be squatted, and therefore, the President of Warsaw, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz ordered districts to react to all news about empty flats (Zubik 2009).

Story 10 Lack of monitoring and prevention of arson

Neither the police nor the administration engaged in preventive measures in the case of 20 arson cases in the Praga Północ district in December 2011. It is suspected that the arson was supposed to lower standards of buildings in order to sell them at lower prices or to get rid of tenants. Interestingly, some arson happened in the vicinity of a fire brigade but there was no sufficient reaction. Altogether tenant activists have estimated that there were 50 arson cases in the district. A 100-person demonstration gathered on 10 December 2011. Activists from KOL and tenants organized a monitoring of buildings, including night shifts. They warned arsonists by labelling buildings that they monitored. While arson was suspended, it is difficult to assess whether this outcome can be directly linked to the mobilization of tenants.

Story 11 Conflict of interest

The vice-mayor of the Praga Północ district responsible for housing works for a company that prepares real estate for commercial use. Since she is in possession of information about public real estate, this implies a conflict of interest. KOL wrote a letter to her in November 2009 to confirm her affiliation with the company. She responded that she worked for the company indeed but denied any conflict of interest. KOL informed the anti-corruption office (CBA), which forwarded the information to the City Hall. The letter has not provoked a reaction, which may be related to the fact that the person in question belongs to the ruling party at the time, Civic Platform. Further actions, such as the protest in the District Council on 31 May 2012 or the publishing of her income declaration from February 2011 on KOL's blog/website in June 2012 have not brought any results.