<div dir="ltr">a mustread<div><br><div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b class="gmail_sendername">Dante-Gabryell Monson</b> <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:dante.monson@gmail.com">dante.monson@gmail.com</a>></span><br>Date: Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 4:44 PM<br>Subject: Fwd: <nettime> The Communard Manifesto (1/2)<br>To: "<a href="mailto:econowmix@googlegroups.com">econowmix@googlegroups.com</a>" <<a href="mailto:econowmix@googlegroups.com">econowmix@googlegroups.com</a>><br><br><br><div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b class="gmail_sendername">Felix Stalder</b> <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:felix@openflows.com" target="_blank">felix@openflows.com</a>></span><br>Date: Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 10:49 AM<br>Subject: <nettime> The Communard Manifesto (1/2)<br>To: <a href="mailto:nettime-l@mx.kein.org" target="_blank">nettime-l@mx.kein.org</a><br><br><br>[This strikes me as the most advanced attempt to outline a historical<br>
perspective on an emancipatory trajectory contained within the current<br>
crisis. It's not simply a theoretical text, but a testimony to the scope<br>
of vision driving the development of the Spanish "rebel cities".<br>
<br>
The manifesto makes two key arguments. First, the two main social<br>
institutions of our time -- the state and the markets -- are are<br>
"decomposing". As a consequence, ever more economic activity is devoted<br>
to rent-seeking rather than production, leaving ever greater numbers of<br>
people as "exiles" from the still dominant society (and open to<br>
destructive communities of nationalists, racists and jihadists).<br>
<br>
Second, that technological (and organisational) advances have altered<br>
ithe scale necessary to produce many necessary products and social<br>
goods (think from atomic power-plants to solar panels). This enables<br>
many of these goods to be produced outside the market (what they call<br>
"p2p economy") and where the market remains necessary through "direct<br>
economy" meaning ways of raising the necessary capital that does<br>
not hand over control over the productive process to the owners of<br>
capital.<br>
<br>
It's a very long text, so I split it up in two mails in old nettime<br>
tradition, but it's really worth reading in its entirety. Felix]<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<a href="https://lasindias.com/the-communard-manifesto-html" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://lasindias.com/the-communard-manifesto-html</a><br>
<br>
Communard Manifesto<br>
<br>
The dilemma of our time<br>
Abundance within reach<br>
Inequality, unemployment and demoralization<br>
What is decomposing is not only the economic system, but<br>
what the human experience means<br>
Capitalism and its critics<br>
Capitalism shaped the world because, before changing the<br>
State, it was able to create a new form of human experience<br>
Revolutionaries that loved crises and large scales<br>
The history we weren’t told<br>
The new world will be born and affirmed inside the old<br>
New relationships, here and now<br>
Scale and scope<br>
From the era of economies of scale…<br>
…to the era of the inefficiencies of scale<br>
Today, capital is too big for the real productive scale…<br>
… and the optimal scale is approaching community dimensions<br>
Building abundance here and now<br>
Abundance has to do with production, not with consumption<br>
A scarce product in a decentralized network is abundant in<br>
a distributed network<br>
The “P2P mode of production” is the model for the<br>
production of abundance<br>
<br>
(PART 2/"2)<br>
The two faces of productivity<br>
Artificially creating scarcity has become a way of life for<br>
over-scaled industry<br>
Abundance is the magic that shines through the “hacker<br>
ethic”<br>
The path of abundance does not mean producing less<br>
What will we do about the overuse of natural resources?<br>
Connecting the dots<br>
Conquer work, reconquer life<br>
To be unable to access work is to be in social exile<br>
There’s no self-realization without work<br>
To conquer work is reconquer life<br>
From adding to multiplying<br>
The scene will be urban<br>
The tasks of the communards<br>
You are the protagonist<br>
Appendix: concrete things you can do with this manifesto<br>
Expand the conversation<br>
Prepare to “make community”<br>
<br>
To the friends in the Club de las Indias,<br>
because we owe them the most valuable half of this manifesto.<br>
<br>
To the communards of all times,<br>
because their mistakes left us with the right questions.<br>
<br>
To the new communards across the whole world,<br>
because their enthusiasm brings us closer to the spirit of a time to come.<br>
<br>
The dilemma of our time<br>
Abundance within reach<br>
<br>
Never before in History of humanity have technical capacities been as<br>
potent and accessible to common people as today. The massive development<br>
of the Internet through the ’90s profoundly changed ways of socializing,<br>
sharing, and working. Wealth was created in places that were socially<br>
and geographically peripheral by the hands of millions of small<br>
producers that, for the first time, could effectively access other<br>
markets and knowledge. In Asia alone, we saw hundreds of millions of<br>
people escape misery, more than in the rest of the history of humanity.<br>
<br>
As technological change became generational and social change, there<br>
appeared more and more environments of abundance, free goods, new forms<br>
of collaborative work and, above all, a new work ethic based on<br>
knowledge, the creation of goods, and “de-alienation.” The “hacker<br>
ethic,” as it was termed at the turn of the century, inspired the birth<br>
of first universal public good to be intentionally constructed by our<br>
species: free software, which, by itself, has meant a transfer of<br>
knowledge and technology greater than all developmental aid from rich<br>
countries.<br>
<br>
And, yet, not even the other great crisis of the last hundred years—the<br>
one that started with the “Crash of ’29″—created such discontent, such a<br>
dark spirit, and so much widespread pessimism. Neither admonitions nor<br>
hope work any longer to create attractive narratives. Well-being has<br>
ceased to be a credible expectation of analysts’ predictions or<br>
political parties’ options, whether old or new. All lines of contention<br>
have been shown to be futile for the common people. We’re entering a<br>
time in which no narrative can be believed if can’t demonstrate, here<br>
and now, that it successfully allows a new generation to develop and<br>
live decently through work.<br>
<br>
Inequality, unemployment and demoralization<br>
<br>
And, if anything has been really global over the last ten years, it’s<br>
been the experience of social decomposition. It’s the same whether we<br>
look in the most developed regions in the world or at emerging nations,<br>
in the Mediterranean or in the South China Sea, in the English-speaking<br>
world or in South America: society is more and more unequal, and the<br>
differences quickly become cumulative. If you miss the train, you don’t<br>
reach the destination.<br>
<br>
In the most developed nations, the middle class has rediscovered<br>
unemployment. New generations don’t even have access to work, or if they<br>
do, it’s so precarious that it doesn’t let them experience the meaning<br>
real of what they do. Work has ceased to be considered the center of<br>
collective action, the origin of personal autonomy, and each person’s<br>
contribution to society. In today’s popular culture, work is a scarce<br>
good. There’s no lack of start-ups and NGOs that speculate with it, as<br>
if it was a precious metal. Work, the necessary link between personal<br>
effort and collective effort, is devalued to the limit, not only in the<br>
market—reducing its piece of the pie compared to capital—but also<br>
morally, in its public consideration and in its internal organization.<br>
It has gone from being universally considered the center of social<br>
organization to being perceived as facing extinction, from being<br>
experienced as the basis of personal realization to being seen as a<br>
source of anguish.<br>
<br>
In a world where being able to contribute to the common well-being, work<br>
is talked about as if it was a privilege, and the only way of building a<br>
life seems to be getting rents. Rents are not just any income, but an<br>
opportunistic and undeserved position, a extraordinary benefit produced<br>
outside of the value that one contributes. Rents are the benefits<br>
created by big businesses thanks to made-to-fit regulations or<br>
monopolies that only exist by legal imposition, like intellectual<br>
property. Rents are “incentives” that are decided on and inflated by the<br>
same directors that receive them, or the consequences in cold, hard cash<br>
of belonging to certain social spheres where certain positions and<br>
contracts, public or private, can be accessed. Rents easily become<br>
cumulative and create a spiral of inequality when access to information<br>
and education depends on personal income, or when competition to assure<br>
them is systematically restricted, as the State routinely does in key<br>
sectors like energy, telecommunications or the media.<br>
<br>
In a world of rents, everything looks like a zero-sum game, where one<br>
wins because others lose. Distrust of everything and everyone,<br>
institutions and people, is the norm. It shows an individualism of the<br>
worst kind, for which life is senseless, and mere survival.<br>
What is decomposing is not only the economic system, but what the human<br>
experience means<br>
<br>
It’s not just social cohesion that’s decomposing. The rules of the<br>
economic system are decomposing, and with them, the human experience and<br>
what it means to be human in our time. It’s the inability of the<br>
economic system to create a future for everyone the that produces<br>
loneliness and distrust of everyone; it’s the pettiness of a system in<br>
which businesses depend on the benefits they get thanks to rents more<br>
than selling their products, or on eliminating competitors more than<br>
improve themselves, that produces lives of dependency, begging, and<br>
voracity.<br>
<br>
Never has there been so much wealth or so much knowledge as now and,<br>
yet, far from feeling like both things give hope of abundance for<br>
everyone, more and more people are afraid that this is a threat to<br>
Nature, the same way they feel, day in and day out, like it’s a threat<br>
to personal survival.<br>
<br>
Capitalism and its critics<br>
<br>
There were a time when capitalism transformed the world, bringing our<br>
species closer to the abundance that, today, scares it so much. The<br>
“cancer of business” took over from the old European societies, feudal<br>
first and colonial centuries later, and smashed them from within in a<br>
long process of almost six hundred years. Capitalism, which started off<br>
as marginal—urban in a rural world, dynamic in a traditional society,<br>
equalizing in a system in which identity was based on lineage and<br>
origin—was revolutionary right from its first steps. In the city and its<br>
markets, it created new lifestyles and mentalities, new forms of<br>
knowledge, new freedoms, and new collective belongings.<br>
Capitalism shaped the world because, before changing the State, it was<br>
able to create a new form of human experience<br>
<br>
Capitalism created a new form of human experience and, by doing so,<br>
dynamited established relationships, its castes and its classes. It<br>
wasn’t the work of a generation. It could only deploy its full potential<br>
after centuries of evolution and entrenchment, of turning<br>
fairs—temporary markets—into a large, permanent urban workshop and,<br>
later, turning the guild craftsman into a factory worker under the thumb<br>
of the merchant investor, who bought the materials and carried the<br>
products to distant markets. It was only then that industrialization<br>
made a profound social transformation out of what, until then, had only<br>
been “tendencies.” It was the great revolutionary moment of the bourgeoisie.<br>
<br>
In the first place, capitalism made a commodity of land, the principle<br>
means of production of the times. In the process, the agrarian and<br>
forest commons—the oldest and most widespread form of property—came to<br>
occupy a marginal place. And, with it, the real community of the family,<br>
the clan or the village, in which everyone knows each other by face and<br>
name, because they are linked to them by interpersonal relationships and<br>
affection. The vacuum was filled throughout the nineteenth century by<br>
another innovation: the imagined community of the nation. “Imagined” not<br>
because it was unreal, but because those who are considered its members<br>
don’t know more than a tiny portion of the others, and have to imagine<br>
the rest through common attributes, practices, values, and memories,<br>
which are always debatable. Fraternity based on the friendship of<br>
personal relationships and shared work will give way to an abstract<br>
fraternity in search of a “common good” that the new social classes<br>
linked to wage labor make a permanent part of social discourse.<br>
<br>
Secondly, work became indistinguishable from whoever did it, because of<br>
the homogenization of the processes in the new productive space of<br>
society: the factory. The new relationship with work and, through it,<br>
with society and nature, was impersonal and anonymous, and no longer had<br>
to do with “being,” with lineage, or with geography. The vacuum created<br>
by the dilution of the servant, the communard and the guild craftsman<br>
was filled by a new abstract human type: the “individual.”<br>
<br>
Although it may sound strange today, that whole advance—which allowed<br>
humanity to grow in number, well-being, and knowledge like never<br>
before—was produced thanks to making a commodity of everything that,<br>
until then, had not been, like land, which hadn’t usually been rented or<br>
sold, only possessed.<br>
<br>
Even for the revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, it was<br>
impossible to deny the progressive nature of the great works of<br>
capitalism. They were well aware of how the industrial boom brought<br>
Humanity towards abundance, increasing knowledge and its practical<br>
consequence, technology. They were witnesses of the formidable<br>
historical spectacle of a world in revolution where distances were cut,<br>
the population multiplied, energy and water flowed in people’s houses<br>
for the first time, and the most distant and closed empires saw their<br>
walls give way before the onslaught of global commerce in manufacturing.<br>
For the first time in history, humanity as such took on a real<br>
existence: through new markets, we would all end up connected with<br>
everyone throughout the world; and in the factory, the immense majority<br>
of society would share a common experience—and therefore, would come to<br>
be the same thing—to the rhythm of the new mechanical geniuses.<br>
Capitalism, as they saw it, was preparing an egalitarian society through<br>
equality of living conditions, work, and social relationships that that<br>
it was, itself, expanding.<br>
<br>
Revolutionaries that loved crises and large scales<br>
<br>
But those revolutionaries saw something more: the growth of capitalism,<br>
in the first place, wasn’t the least bit linear. Its crises, like all<br>
prior crises, produced underconsumption (scandalous, miserable<br>
situations for those excluded from production). But, in contrast to the<br>
crises of agrarian societies, capitalist crises weren’t crises of<br>
under-production, but of “over-production”: it’s not that the factories<br>
couldn’t produce enough for the needs of all, it’s that the very dynamic<br>
of the economic system made it impossible for them to sell it to the<br>
great masses that needed it, because they didn’t have the money to buy<br>
what was produced. Additionally, the revolutionaries asserted that all<br>
this happened regularly, in cycles in which each decline necessarily led<br>
to a confrontation between an ever-more concentrated group of owners and<br>
an ever-more global and uniform class of workers. Everyone would<br>
struggle in a large global revolution for control of the States that<br>
held the social structures in place until, similar to what the<br>
bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century did in the French Revolution, the<br>
proletariat would take control of the State with one purpose: to direct<br>
a massive process of decommodification, giving way to a society of<br>
abundance where the essential purpose of production was to serve this or<br>
that need, instead of being sold as objects and services for a price.<br>
<br>
Marx and Kropotkin never proposed to to close the factories. They<br>
thought that crises of overproduction signaled a limit of capitalism,<br>
the limit at which the logic of the commodity clashed with human needs.<br>
But they saw in the technology of mass production and in the<br>
ever-greater scale of the businesses a reflection of the progress that<br>
would lead the working class to “change the world from underneath.” They<br>
thought that by eliminating the commodity nature of objects, the<br>
“productive forces would be released,” which is to say, that<br>
productivity would be developed even more, and with it knowledge,<br>
well-being, etc. The very scale of production would also develop, until<br>
it constituted a great global factory-State, so productive that it could<br>
satisfy the material needs of all humanity with nothing more than<br>
volunteer work.<br>
<br>
Nothing of the sort happened. No “global revolution” took place. Since<br>
1871, there were local and national revolutions in which communists and<br>
anarchists looked for its first signs. Most were overthrown; none was<br>
able to produce on a larger scale during the following cycle of growth<br>
and crisis; and those that triumphed never brought about the<br>
decommodification of production. On the contrary, they gave power to<br>
repressive, totalitarian regimes, with very hierarchical and inefficient<br>
nationalized economies and such low levels of well-being among workers<br>
that they belied every delusion of the “liberation of productive<br>
forces.” When the Soviet Union fell and China took its first steps<br>
towards capitalism controlled by the Communist State, communism and<br>
socialism were discredited as alternatives. In the ’90s, their place was<br>
taken by “anti-capitalism,” which fluctuated between affirming that<br>
another world was possible and denying that capitalism and the human<br>
species could survive together, but avoided explaining how the former<br>
would become real and what made the latter inevitable. To a certain<br>
degree, this was the result of the sense of profound failure of<br>
“alternative” thought that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.<br>
But, lacking a theory of its own, it would become an invertebrate<br>
socialism, a “big no” into which anything and everything would fit. It<br>
was, in a certain way, a leftism chastened by false socialist paradises,<br>
hesitant when it came to describing any future society, and far removed<br>
from any pretense of building functional models in the present.<br>
<br>
La historia que no nos contaron<br>
<br>
Decades before the first socialist and libertarian groups of any weight<br>
were formed, an alternative trend had started down a long path with a<br>
very different focus: communitarianism.<br>
<br>
The new world will be born and affirmed inside the old<br>
<br>
The basic idea of communitarianism is that the new world will be born<br>
and grow inside the old. Profound changes in social and economic<br>
relationships—system changes—are not the product of revolutions and<br>
political changes. It happens the other way around: systemic political<br>
changes are the expression of new forms of social organizing, new<br>
values, and ways of working and living, that have reached enough<br>
maturity to be able to establish a broad social consensus. As of a<br>
certain point in development, a “competition between systems” is<br>
established. The new forms, until then valid only for a small minority,<br>
begin to seem to be the only ones capable of offering a better future<br>
for the large majority. Little by little, they expand their spectrum and<br>
their number, encompassing and transforming broader and broader social<br>
spaces, and become the center of the economy, reconfiguring the<br>
cultural, ideological, and legal basis of society from within.<br>
<br>
For communitarians, egalitarian forms should accompany capitalism in its<br>
evolution as a parallel society, not as a utopia—the promise of a<br>
society to come—except as a heterotopia: a different, alternative social<br>
place, with values and ways of its own. At first, they do it from<br>
behind, through learning, utilization and re-elaboration of existing<br>
technology and, as of a certain point, entering in competition with it.<br>
This perspective was called “constructive socialism.”<br>
<br>
The first objective was always to show the feasibility of a<br>
decommodified life, “here and now,” on any scale. Communitarianism is<br>
not centered on creating political parties, but networks of small<br>
productive egalitarian communities. The maxim of economic organization<br>
comes to be “from each according to their abilities, to each according<br>
to their needs”: communities of goods, revenue, and savings are<br>
established, production is organized by consensus, and from the<br>
beginning, the highest diversification is sought to serve the diversity<br>
of personal needs and gain autonomy for all.<br>
New relationships, here and now<br>
<br>
>From 1849 to today, egalitarian communities have always been working:<br>
Icarian communities, Russian artels, Israeli kibbutzim, US, Japanese, or<br>
German egalitarian farms… They’ve been on practically all continents,<br>
they’ve had different names and nuances in different times and places,<br>
they’ve been through all manner of crises, and their members have made<br>
enormous sacrifices. In place of the centrality of the class nature of<br>
the collectivist narrative, they wrote a story of their community and<br>
their experience, which gave substance to the central idea of<br>
constructive socialism: building—here and now, within the community and<br>
between it and its surroundings—social and economic relationships that<br>
are desired or postulated as valid alternatives to the existing<br>
socioeconomic system, without delegating power to parties or<br>
organizational structures outside of the communities themselves. Without<br>
thinking of themselves as “experimental” or having detailed “roadmaps,”<br>
they have created a heritage and a culture themselves, little by little.<br>
They are the seeds of a society of abundance.<br>
<br>
In the framework of the young and expansive capitalism of the nineteenth<br>
century, or the capitalism of technological revolution and permanent war<br>
that followed up through the present, if these “decommodified islets”<br>
want to maintain their autonomy and approach abundance, they have to<br>
enter the market: to live without needing money at all within the<br>
community, they must learn to think like merchants outside of it. It’s<br>
no contradiction: being in the market is the only way to not lose the<br>
technological pace of the system they want to overcome. But, at the same<br>
time, it’s the way to bring the first cultural and technological fruits<br>
of the new society to the old society. It is, in many senses—including<br>
the moral, since it aspires to expand the improvement in living<br>
conditions to more people—the first step towards a competition between<br>
systems.<br>
<br>
The bourgeoisie, in its medieval infancy, introduced the revolutionary<br>
principle of equality of origin and a few technological improvements<br>
that expressed their vision of the world into some small spaces in<br>
feudal society. All of them happened far from the center of the<br>
production of value at the time, the fields. The medieval commercial<br>
bourgeoisie invented important things, but eccentric for the times, like<br>
the check, the letter of exchange, and double-entry accounting. In<br>
contrast, communitarianism demonstrated from the first day the<br>
feasibility of an economic organization thought of in terms of the<br>
needs. It was the first to make a reality of equality in spite of<br>
differences in gender or social or geographical origin, and across the<br>
20th century, left a series of pioneering technologies: weatherization<br>
and sanitation in popular housing; the improvement of agricultural<br>
productivity, like drip irrigation, seed improvement, or the scientific<br>
management of dairy facilities; the development of free software for<br>
distributed networks; and the first analytical tools for public<br>
intelligence. These are innovations that continue to be significant and<br>
closer and closer to the productive core of the economic system.<br>
<br>
In what little we’ve seen of twenty-first century, that sense of a<br>
cultural and technological “membrane” between the past and the future,<br>
between capitalist society and the small, decommodified space of<br>
egalitarian communities, has become even more clear. The appearance of<br>
new ways of producing based on new forms of communal property—like free<br>
software—and distributed communication architectures—linked directly to<br>
decommodification and the creation of abundance—put forth the notion<br>
that we are on the threshold of a new phase in which we will be able to<br>
change the nature of that competition between systems.<br>
<br>
But, above all, what justifies a new time for the development of<br>
communitarianism is an irreversible economic change that has been<br>
imposed gradually: the reduction of the optimal scales of production.<br>
This decline in the optimal productive scale explains the deep trends<br>
that have produced the current economic crises, and why the political<br>
and corporate responses are often times counterproductive. And any<br>
alternative is not centered on social class or the nation, but on community.<br>
<br>
Scale and scope<br>
<br>
The optimum scale is most efficient dimension of the productive units of<br>
a society, the size as of which inefficiencies created by having to<br>
manage the excessive size of those units exceeds the benefit produced by<br>
being a little bigger. For each dimension of the market and each<br>
technological level, there exists an optimal scale of production, and it<br>
turns out to be easy to understand that, in principle, technological<br>
development reduces the optimal dimensions, because the better the<br>
technology, the fewer resources—work hours, capital and raw material—are<br>
needed to produce the same quantity of products.<br>
<br>
>From the era of economies of scale…<br>
<br>
During the height of capitalism, in the 19th century, between British<br>
imperialism’s bet on free trade, American expansion, European<br>
unifications and the revolutions in transportation—the clipper, the<br>
railroad, and steamboats—markets grew much faster than productivity. The<br>
optimum size always remained out of reach, and capital to reach it was<br>
always scarce. It was the Golden Age, and it saw the most authentic of<br>
joint-stock companies: gigantic collective efforts that brought together<br>
the savings of tens of thousands of small savers and capitalists to put<br>
whole countries into production, to charter faster and faster boats, lay<br>
telegraph cables across oceans, or cross continents from end to end with<br>
railways.<br>
<br>
For a long time, the continuous growth of scale seemed to confirm the<br>
Marxists, Kropotkinists, and social democrats. In all of their economic<br>
models, underneath the permanent expansive dynamic of capitalism, there<br>
was the need to reduce prices by increasing production per hour to<br>
survive competition and even—if the owner was the first to incorporate<br>
new machines or technologies—get extraordinary benefits while other<br>
factories adapted. Every time productive capacity increases, the benefit<br>
that each unit of product contributes is reduced, so to maintain or<br>
increase the total benefit, the owner has to produce even more quantity,<br>
which requires the incorporation of new machines and processes to reach<br>
a still-greater scale. Finally, according to these authors, when<br>
production approaches or even exceeds the potential size of the market,<br>
crises of overproduction erupt.<br>
<br>
This model, described for the first time by Marx, is known as “law of<br>
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.” For decades, Marxist<br>
economists repeated the mantra that “the decreasing tendency of the rate<br>
of profit is compensated for with the increase in the mass of product”<br>
and took for granted that each cycle of growth and crisis would begin<br>
with a greater scale and would increase it further still. Accordingly,<br>
capitalism was on the path to create big businesses, true global<br>
monopolies in each and every industrial and consumption market, which<br>
fit like a glove both with the quasi-religious Marxist vision of a<br>
great, revolutionary, global Armageddon between the proletariat and the<br>
bourgeoisie, and with the social-democratic vision that socialism would<br>
be the result of the nationalization of the great industries by the<br>
democratic state as they reached critical sizes.<br>
<br>
However, underneath both models, revolutionary and<br>
reformist-nationalizing, was a presumption that would soon be shown to<br>
be erroneous: that in each cycle, greater effective demand would appear.<br>
It’s obvious that the average scale of the businesses in the capitalist<br>
world would not increase unless owners could foresee a growing volume of<br>
demand, because with demand that was not growing globally, if they could<br>
produce the same thing with fewer resources, they weren’t going to<br>
increase scale, but reduce it.<br>
<br>
At time when Marx was writing his economic theory—in fact, for almost<br>
the entire 19th century—that extraordinary demand came largely from the<br>
incorporation of Asia and Africa into the world market. Colonialism, by<br>
subjugating backward economies and tearing down trade barriers for<br>
British and French products, continuously increased the demand for<br>
manufactured products, overcoming the tendency to reduce the size of the<br>
productive units that drove technological development.<br>
<br>
…to the era of the inefficiencies of scale<br>
<br>
We could put the date of the change at 1914. Twenty years after the<br>
colonial division of Africa among the great industrial powers at the<br>
Berlin Conference, the expectation that new, extra-capitalist markets<br>
would join those of the great powers had already dissipated. Territorial<br>
tensions in Europe reflected the rigidity of the delimitation of<br>
colonial borders. The war that was about to break out was a “world war”<br>
precisely because it meant the end of the first stage of the<br>
configuration of a unified global market. Marxist prophecies were coming<br>
true. The crisis of ’29 would seem to corroborate them. However, from<br>
there—through another World War, the processes of decolonization in<br>
Africa and Asia, and a very long Cold War—the evidence set about<br>
dismantling the idea that capitalism was constantly evolving towards<br>
increases in the scale of businesses.<br>
<br>
In fact, big national businesses—which flourished at the beginning of<br>
the twentieth century, after the war—were only central in the socialist<br>
countries and for some nationalist regimes in backward nations. Both in<br>
them and in the developed world, where they briefly flourished as a tool<br>
of post-war reconstruction, they were not the “spontaneous” result of<br>
the evolution of markets. In every case, they were a shortcut to get<br>
production underway and reinvigorate industry after the enormous<br>
destruction left by the crisis and war. But they soon reached a ceiling,<br>
especially in the framework of the planned economies for which they had<br>
become a banner. In each new phase of technological development, Big<br>
State Businesses increased inefficiencies and their costs, which, in an<br>
authoritarian and centralized system, would spread with extraordinary<br>
speed across the economic system. The USSR, which promised to “overtake<br>
the USA” in the middle of the ’60s, entered into a crisis by the ’70s,<br>
and into open decomposition in the ’80s.<br>
<br>
In the Western bloc, not even the largest multinationals had dimensions<br>
comparable to the great State dinosaurs of the USSR, and yet the weight<br>
of the inefficiencies of scale started to be obvious by the mid ’50s.<br>
That was when economist Kenneth Boulding called attention to problems of<br>
communication, management, and control in large, pyramidal<br>
organizations. Boulding also warned that, given the size and weight of<br>
certain companies in the economic system and their effect on employment,<br>
inefficiencies threatened to spread to the whole economy through the<br>
state, since over-scaled businesses competed to “capture it” and to make<br>
up for the costs of inefficiencies due to over-scaling with rents<br>
resulting from tailor-made regulations.<br>
<br>
Following Boulding’s warnings, technological research then became<br>
centered on information science and data management, on communications,<br>
and on forms of work. The “information revolution” that started at that<br>
time was the first line of defense against the effects of of<br>
over-scaling. It wasn’t enough, however. In the middle of the ’70s, it<br>
became obvious in Europe—and not only there—that the State of the<br>
postwar period, captured by big businesses and sectoral interests, was<br>
effectively unviable.<br>
<br>
This was when the set of policies called “neoliberalism” was designed.<br>
It was basically an attempt to confront the results of over-scaling in<br>
the other possible way: by expanding markets. What’s original about<br>
neoliberalism is that not only does it extend markets in space—through<br>
reduction of tariff barriers and creation of free-trade zones—but also<br>
over time, with the use of new tools such as “financialization.”<br>
Today, capital is too big for the real productive scale…<br>
<br>
It’s well known how financial innovations and deregulation came together<br>
to lay the foundations for the global crisis of 2008. What’s less<br>
discussed is that in the same “exuberance of capital” that preceded the<br>
crash, a problem of excessive scale was manifested. Investment<br>
exuberance is a mass mirage produced by the hopelessness of investors<br>
who can’t find a place for their capital.<br>
<br>
Also, this problem, already endemic, was multiplied by the capture of<br>
the State and of the market itself by banks. The State had deregulated<br>
financial activity for the benefit of the big banks beyond a reasonable<br>
point. State agencies were powerless, and often conditioned or seduced<br>
by pressure from institutions that were considered “systemic,” and had<br>
turned “too big to fail” into a pirate flag. And not even the market<br>
could act as a counterweight. With ratings agencies captured by their<br>
own customers—and distributing hyper-optimistic descriptions—the mass of<br>
small investors could only follow the great tendencies of capital as an<br>
independent indicator. The trouble is that that movement wasn’t<br>
independent at all, since the same financial groups were channeling it.<br>
The result is a system that, even in midst of the crash, they contained<br>
their damage by abusing asymmetries of information and their power to<br>
set prices at the expense of their own customers. Today, eight years<br>
after the fall of Lehman Brothers, that system remains basically intact.<br>
<br>
The root of the problem was that the financial system was also suffering<br>
form the inefficiencies of over-scaling: the amounts of capital were too<br>
large in relation to real, productive businesses for anyone to pay<br>
attention to the reality of the investments; and even to find interest<br>
in investing in a scale that was known to be really productive. The<br>
problem to solve was—and is— “placing” big piles of capital that<br>
couldn’t, and can’t, find enough projects of their size.<br>
<br>
Over the last two decades, it’s become common to hear complaints in the<br>
economic press that fewer new large industries that justify grandiose<br>
investments are appearing than in prior periods.<br>
<br>
The attempt to solve this that arrived with neoliberalism was to<br>
“financialize” whole markets: to “package” risks—to “dissolve” some from<br>
over here with some from over there—and create abstractions of value to<br>
bet, more than invest, those huge amounts of capital. Enron, the<br>
business that made financialization its flagship product, made it<br>
possible to invest in things like “Megabit of bandwidth installed” or<br>
“Megawatt consumed,” showing that not even telcoms and energy companies<br>
were capable of meeting the need to place large masses of capital on<br>
their own. And the famous mortgage derivatives, which were at the center<br>
of the crisis in 2008, showed that the construction sector had also<br>
become too small for the scale of capital that wanted to cast its lot<br>
with it.<br>
<br>
The crisis of 2008 made clear the origin of the “decomposition” with<br>
which we begin this manifesto: the simultaneous destruction of the two<br>
main social institutions, the State and the market, by the hunger for<br>
rents of over-scaled companies—and financial companies are just the tip<br>
of the iceberg—which see in them the only way to make up for their own<br>
inefficiencies of scale. What everyone saw in the financial sector in<br>
the years that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, was later<br>
seen with equal clarity in the dominant businesses in sectors as<br>
apparently different as energy or agroindustry.<br>
<br>
… and the optimal scale is approaching community dimensions<br>
<br>
But if the result of neoliberal financial policies was object of a<br>
profound public scrutiny, what does not usually receive so much<br>
attention is how the information revolution joined the globalization of<br>
commerce in goods with the reduction of optimal scales to create a whole<br>
series of new productive forms. Surely the reason is that the first to<br>
take advantage of it were thousands of Asian small businesspeople, the<br>
true engines of the drastic reduction in global poverty. Only more than<br>
a decade later, in the middle of a crisis, have the new models started<br>
to reach Europe and America, driving a wave of sustained, small-scale,<br>
entrepreneurial projects on a new technological base and often oriented<br>
towards niche demands in the global market.<br>
<br>
We can group these new forms around two broad trends: the “P2P mode of<br>
production” and the “direct economy.” The P2P mode of production<br>
replicates the free software model in all kinds of industries where<br>
knowledge condensed into design, software, creativity, blueprints, etc.,<br>
is central to the creation of value; and can accumulate in a “immaterial<br>
universal commons” that can be improved, reformed, and used in<br>
alternative ways for many kinds of different projects.<br>
<br>
This multifunctionality of tools and value chains—which is what<br>
economists call “scope”— is the key to the direct conomy, a way of<br>
creating products created by small groups and launching them on global<br>
markets by using, on the one hand, low-cost, adaptable, external<br>
industrial chains and free software and, on the other, advance sales<br>
systems or collaborative financing.<br>
<br>
That is, before our eyes, before and after the large financial crisis, a<br>
new kind of small-scale industry has developed, which is characterized<br>
by being global and by getting capital and credit outside the financial<br>
system, some in collaborative financing platforms, others announcing<br>
their own pre-sales and getting donations in exchange for merchandising.<br>
In fact, it’s an industry of “free” capital, which doesn’t have to give<br>
up ownership of the business to the owners of capital because, on the<br>
one hand, it reduces its needs by using publicly available technological<br>
tools, like free software, and on the other, obtaining the little<br>
capital it needs in the form of advance sales and donations.<br>
<br>
Taken together, P2P production and the direct economy, two ways of<br>
substituting scale with scope, are the leading edge of a productive<br>
economy moving more and more quickly towards the reduction of scale.<br>
That makes them essential to understanding why communitarianism has a<br>
unique opportunity in the new century.<br>
<br>
Building abundance here and now<br>
Abundance has to do with production, not with consumption<br>
<br>
Abundance is an economic concept in the setting of production, not<br>
consumption. Abundance exists when an extra unit can be produced without<br>
that meaning a perceptible increase in costs. For economists, it can be<br>
reduced to a formula: “zero marginal cost.” In an ideal competitive<br>
market, when the marginal cost is zero, that means that the prices that<br>
would maximize the benefit to producers would also be zero.<br>
<br>
Common sense would say then that the business would have no incentive to<br>
continue producing. But really, just the opposite would happen. Although<br>
the price of the product is zero, the interest of the producer is to<br>
produce the maximum possible to dilute fixed costs as much as it can<br>
among all units produced. It is at that theoretical moment, with zero<br>
price, when a business stops thinking about the market and starts to<br>
seek the maximization of meeting the human needs its products match.<br>
<br>
That is, if the marginal cost approached zero, the products would be<br>
“decommodified,” would stop being commodities that have to be sold,<br>
because if they aren’t, that would create a new loss. As a consequence,<br>
as of a certain level, anyone could enjoy as much as they need without<br>
giving up anything, and the same rationality that orients the behavior<br>
of the businesses towards the maximization of benefit would lead to an<br>
economy centered on satisfying human needs: anyone could enjoy as much<br>
as they need without giving up anything.<br>
<br>
This does not mean that capitalism tends to be “decommodified” by the<br>
mere effect of competition. But this extreme solution of a basic model<br>
of economic analysis is, in any case, very illuminating.<br>
<br>
In practice, abundance exists when the cost of producing one more unit<br>
is negligible and, given a sensible calculation of potential demand, we<br>
can do it indefinitely. For example: the cost of serving a web page or<br>
an electronic book to one more user from our own server is, for all<br>
practical purposes, zero.<br>
A scarce product in a decentralized network is abundant in a distributed<br>
network<br>
<br>
We should say that this example would only be true within a definable<br>
range of requests, but that if the number of people who want read our<br>
book were to pass a certain critical point, we would have to increase<br>
our bandwidth and the number of servers as well. So, if we look at it<br>
over the long term, these cost increases should be attributed to the<br>
units served. The marginal cost, the cost associated with the last copy<br>
distributed, wouldn’t be zero. Abundance, in that case, would have been<br>
just an illusion, a mirage, sort of like the cost of taking more person<br>
to work in our car: it’s practically zero… until the seats run out. Once<br>
the places are full, we need other car, or at least a bus ticket, for<br>
each additional person we’d like to transport. The marginal cost, the<br>
increase in costs for one more person, would be positive and easily<br>
perceptible.<br>
<br>
But in our example, an information good, this criticism would only be<br>
true if the copies were distributed from a single server. If we share it<br>
on a distributed network with other users who, by downloading it, make<br>
it available to others in turn, each new download, each new user, will<br>
mean a possible place for others to download more. The more people<br>
download it, the less possibility there will be that, no matter how fast<br>
or large increases in demand may be, that any member of the network<br>
would have to increase their costs so that someone could download a new<br>
copy.<br>
<br>
This is doubtlessly the most important thing the Internet has taught us:<br>
the same product that is abundant in a distributed network certainly<br>
would not be in a centralized or decentralized network. And, conversely,<br>
what is scarce in a centralized or decentralized network, can be<br>
abundant in a distributed network.<br>
<br>
This finding may seem limited, since with current technologies, it would<br>
only affect intangible goods. But some of those intangibles—like<br>
industrial design, hardware, or processes—are the motors of the increase<br>
in productivity in physical goods and, since the world wars, the<br>
percentage they represent of total value produced has only increased.<br>
Their conversion into free goods can’t help but have a profound effect<br>
on the whole productive system.<br>
<br>
That’s how, for example, the creation of free software works, as does<br>
the whole growing economy in general, the immense majority of it<br>
decommodified, that we include under the label “the P2P mode of<br>
production.” At the same time, the direct economy uses the results of<br>
innovation outside the productive apparatus controlled by over-scaled<br>
industries and the very over-scaled financial system, increasing<br>
productivity in the manufacture of tangible goods and pushing scale even<br>
farther downward.<br>
<br>
The “P2P mode of production” is the model for the production of abundance<br>
<br>
Although we are still far from general abundance, we have a model of the<br>
production of abundance for intangible goods and innovation—the “P2P<br>
mode of production.” This, in turn, feeds a sector, the direct economy,<br>
that demonstrates enough productivity in the market to compete and beat<br>
the industry “from the outside,” without the help of over-scaled<br>
finance. That is, this new productive ecosystem is capable of competing<br>
and gaining ground against a giant that enjoys the advantage of<br>
extra-market rents, like customized regulations, grants, or patents.<br>
We’re talking about the same extra-market rents that multiplied with<br>
neoliberalism and which have produced the simultaneous erosion of state<br>
and market, which is to say, social decomposition. So, just to<br>
demonstrate that a productive alternative exists is already big news.<br>
<br>
This social and productive space around the “new digital commons” or<br>
simply, the “commons,” is today’s equivalent of the first cities and<br>
markets of the medieval bourgeoisie, a space where new non-commercial<br>
social relationships appeared, and the new logic, together with signs of<br>
autonomy, begin to show a limited but direct impact on productivity.<br>
Throughout the lower Middle Ages, the bourgeoisie was able to drive<br>
those cities to turn them, first, into a big “urban workshop,” and<br>
later, into “municipal democracies.” A similar historical task, now with<br>
a society of abundance as the goal, is what lies ahead for communitarianism.<br>
<br>
This is because this whole reduction of scales brings the optimum size<br>
of productive units ever closer to the community dimension, and<br>
therefore, points to community as the protagonist of a society of<br>
abundance. And it is in community that we can understand why the<br>
struggle to overcome a socioeconomic system cannot be proposed as an<br>
electoral platform, revolutionary as it may be, but rather, happens in<br>
the setting of more profound competition: productivity.<br>
<br>
[End part 1/2]<br>
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</div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div>Check out the Commons Transition Plan here at: <a href="http://commonstransition.org" target="_blank">http://commonstransition.org</a> </div><div><br></div>P2P Foundation: <a href="http://p2pfoundation.net" target="_blank">http://p2pfoundation.net</a> - <a href="http://blog.p2pfoundation.net" target="_blank">http://blog.p2pfoundation.net</a> <br><br><a href="http://lists.ourproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/p2p-foundation" target="_blank"></a>Updates: <a href="http://twitter.com/mbauwens" target="_blank">http://twitter.com/mbauwens</a>; <a href="http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens" target="_blank">http://www.facebook.com/mbauwens</a><br><br>#82 on the (En)Rich list: <a href="http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/" target="_blank">http://enrichlist.org/the-complete-list/</a> <br></div></div></div></div>
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