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<div style="float:left;width:80%"><h1><a href="http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/" target="_blank"></strong><strong>The B u l l e t</a></h1>
<div style="color:rgb(128,128,128)"><p>Socialist Project • E-Bulletin No. 1142<br>July 14, 2015</p></div>
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<h1>Lessons From A Defeat In Europe</h1>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<h3>Martin Hart-Landsberg</h3>
</div>
<p>The Troika are celebrating the end of negotiations
with Greece, proclaiming that thanks to their tireless efforts the
Eurozone remains whole. And why wouldn't they celebrate. They have
demonstrated their power to crush, at least for now, the Greek effort to
end austerity and its associated devastating social consequences.
Tragically, Syriza has not only surrendered, the nature of its defeat is
likely to leave the country worse off, at least both economically and
very likely politically as well.</p>
<div style="float:right;border:0px none;margin:1em;padding:0.3em;width:26.6em">
<div style="margin-left:0.5em">
<img alt="" height="500" width="400"></div><p>[<a href="http://www.mikeconstable.com/" target="_blank">Mike Constable</a>]</p>
</div>
<p>At this point, one of the most important things we can do is try to draw lessons from the Greek experience.</p>
<p>• Perhaps one of the most obvious lessons is that visions of a more
humane Europe are not real. European leaders were more than willing to
pursue the complete collapse of the Greek economy in order to break
Syriza and the movement that gave it power for fear of the demonstration
effect a successful Syriza might have had on broader European politics.
Using the lever of a European Central Bank cut off of funding for Greek
banks, the Troika pressed Syriza to the wall.</p>
<h3><a>“Extensive Mental Waterboarding”</a></h3>
<p>Here is how a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/live/2015/jul/12/greek-debt-crisis-eu-leaders-meeting-cancelled-no-deal-live" target="_blank"></cite><cite>Guardian blog post</a> described the nature of the discussions leading up to the final Greek surrender:</p>
<p>“Alexis Tsipras was given a very rough ride in his
meeting with Tusk, Merkel and Hollande, our Europe editor Ian Traynor
reports.</p>
<p>“Tsipras was told that Greece will either become an
effective ‘ward’ of the eurozone, by agreeing to immediately implement
swift reforms this week.</p>
<p>“Or, it leaves the euro area and watches its banks collapse.</p>
<p>“One official dubbed it ‘extensive mental waterboarding’, in an attempt to make the Greek PM fall into line.</p>
<p>“An unpleasant image that highlights just how far we have now fallen from those European standards of solidarity and unity.”</p>
<p>• Second, the vicious nature of the European response to the Greek
government's initial offer of moderate austerity, symbolized by the
stance of its dominant power Germany, reflects more than ignorance or
petty mindedness on the part of European leaders. It reflects the
increasingly exploitive nature of contemporary capitalism everywhere.
Capitalists, pursuing profits in an increasingly competitive and
unstable global system, demand ever greater power to intensify the
exploitation of workers everywhere and that is how dominant states
approach social policy in their respective countries and international
institutions.</p>
<p>• Third, class interests dominate so-called “economic rationality”. <a href="https://economicfront.wordpress.com/2015/07/06/victory-greece-over-the-troika/" target="_blank">A case in point</a>:
in the period before the July 5 referendum we learned that IMF staff
believed that Greece would be unable to pay its debts under the best of
conditions and that therefore any agreement with Greece had to include
debt relief while at the very same time the head of the IMF was
aggressively joining with European leaders to reject Greek government
pleas for just such relief.</p>
<p>• Fourth, since dominant powers will do everything in their power to
block meaningful social transformation, those seeking to lead it must
prepare people as best they can for the expected class struggle and
opposition. In this case Syriza can and should be faulted for not
engaging people about the difficulty of achieving both an end to
austerity and Eurozone membership under current conditions and doing its
best to develop the technical and political capacities necessary for a
break from the Euro on its own terms if and when the situation called
for it.</p>
<p>Greeks elected a progressive government, voting Syriza into power in
January 2015, on the basis of the party's commitment to both
anti-austerity and continuing Eurozone membership. The leadership of
Syriza never wavered from encouraging Greeks to believe that both were
possible and most Greeks, for many reasons, were eager to believe that
this was true. Although the results of the July 5 referendum showed that
the Greek working class has a strong fighting spirit, polling also
revealed that most of those who voted No hoped that their vote against
the European austerity plan would lead to a better deal from Europe, not
a break from the Eurozone. They no doubt felt this way because of
government pronouncements.</p>
<div style="float:right;border:0px none;margin:1em;padding:0.3em;width:30em">
<div style="margin-left:0.5em">
<img alt="" height="680" width="466"></div></div>
<p>For example, below are the <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/09/what-were-the-greeks-thinking-heres-a-poll-taken-just-before-the-referendum/" target="_blank">results of polling</a> done the day before the referendum:</p>
<p>Tragically, immediately after the vote the Greek government surprised
everyone by returning to negotiations with the Troika with an offer to
accept an austerity program much like the one that had been originally
placed before the people and rejected. The only meaningful addition was
that it included the long held Greek proposal for debt relief. This
decision was a serious mistake for two reasons – it generated serious
confusion on the part of the Greek population and perhaps even more
importantly convinced the Troika that the Greek government was not
prepared to use its new domestic support to challenge the status quo.
This only emboldened the Troika to proclaim that the referendum had
changed everything and now that trust had been lost between the Troika
and Syriza leaders, the austerity demands had to be intensified.</p>
<p>In fact, we have learned that Syriza's leaders did not expect to win
the referendum and were prepared to and in fact perhaps hoped to be able
to resign and let more conservative forces negotiate and approve a new
austerity package. Here is part of an <a href="http://ineteconomics.org/ideas-papers/blog/the-greek-revolt-against-bad-economics-threatens-european-elites" target="_blank">interview</a> with James K. Galbraith, a strong Syriza supporter:</p>
<p>“The recent Ambrose Evans Pritchard piece is very much on the mark (‘<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11724924/Europe-is-blowing-itself-apart-over-Greece-and-nobody-can-stop-it.html" target="_blank">Europe is blowing itself apart over Greece – and nobody seems able to stop it</a>’).
The Greek government, and particularly the circle around Alexis, were
worn down by this process. They saw that the other side does, in fact,
have the power to destroy the Greek economy and the Greek society –
which it is doing – in a very brutal, very sadistic way, because the
burden falls particularly heavily on pensions. They were in some
respects expecting that the yes would prevail, and even to some degree
thinking that that was the best way to get out of this. The voters would
speak and they would acquiesce. They would leave office and there would
be a general election.”</p>
<h3>No Plan B</h3>
<p>It all went downhill from there. In short, Syriza leadership had no
plan B. The Troika knew that Syriza was unwilling to pursue its own
break from the Eurozone, which meant that its leadership would do
anything to remain in the Eurozone. The following is from an <a href="http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/07/exclusive-yanis-varoufakis-opens-about-his-five-month-battle-save-greece" target="_blank">interview</a>
with Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister, that provides
insight into the somewhat self-inflicted weakness in Syriza's
bargaining stance:</p>
<p>“The referendum of 5 July has also been rapidly
forgotten. It was preemptively dismissed by the Eurozone, and many
people saw it as a farce – a sideshow that offered a false choice and
created false hope, and was only going to ruin Tsipras when he later
signed the deal he was campaigning against. As Schäuble supposedly said,
elections cannot be allowed to change anything. But Varoufakis believes
that it could have changed everything. On the night of the referendum
he had a plan, Tsipras just never quite agreed to it.</p>
<p>“The Eurozone can dictate terms to Greece because it is
no longer fearful of a Grexit. It is convinced that its banks are now
protected if Greek banks default. But Varoufakis thought that he still
had some leverage: once the ECB forced Greece's banks to close, he could
act unilaterally.</p>
<p>“He said he spent the past month warning the Greek
cabinet that the ECB would close Greece's banks to force a deal. When
they did, he was prepared to do three things: issue euro-denominated
IOUs; apply a ‘haircut’ to the bonds Greece issued to the ECB in 2012,
reducing Greece's debt; and seize control of the Bank of Greece from the
ECB.</p>
<p>“None of the moves would constitute a Grexit but they
would have threatened it. Varoufakis was confident that Greece could not
be expelled by the Eurogroup; there is no legal provision for such a
move. But only by making Grexit possible could Greece win a better deal.
And Varoufakis thought the referendum offered Syriza the mandate they
needed to strike with such bold moves – or at least to announce them.</p>
<p>“He hinted at this plan on the eve of the referendum,
and reports later suggested this was what cost him his job. He offered a
clearer explanation.</p>
<p>“As the crowds were celebrating on Sunday night in
Syntagma Square, Syriza's six-strong inner cabinet held a critical vote.
By four votes to two, Varoufakis failed to win support for his plan,
and couldn't convince Tsipras. He had wanted to enact his ‘triptych’ of
measures earlier in the week, when the ECB first forced Greek banks to
shut. Sunday night was his final attempt. When he lost his departure was
inevitable.</p>
<p>“'That very night the government decided that the will
of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the
energetic approach [his plan]. Instead it should lead to major
concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political
leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever
happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way
that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. ... You cease
to negotiate.'”</p>
<p>Of course, it is easy to call for a break with the Eurozone but in
reality such a break would not be a walk in the park. For example,
Varoufakis makes clear that there were no certainties for what would
happen if the government decided on a break:</p>
<p>“'He [Tsipras] wasn't clear back then what his views
were, on the drachma versus the euro, on the causes of the crises, and I
had very, well shall I say, ‘set views’ on what was going on. A
dialogue begun ... I believe that I helped shape his views of what
should be done.'</p>
<p>“And yet Tsipras diverged from him at the last. He
understands why. Varoufakis could not guarantee that a Grexit would
work. After Syriza took power in January, a small team had, ‘in theory,
on paper,’ been thinking through how it might. But he said that, ‘I'm
not sure we would manage it, because managing the collapse of a monetary
union takes a great deal of expertise, and I'm not sure we have it here
in Greece without the help of outsiders.’ More years of austerity lie
ahead, but he knows Tsipras has an obligation to ‘not let this country
become a failed state’.”</p>
<p>To be a bit more specific, a break from the Eurozone would require
nationalization of the banks – an act that would immediately draw the
country into a serious legal test with Europe since the banks are
technically under the control of the European Central Bank. It would
require the government to quickly issue new script as it prepared a new
currency, and aggressively engage in an expanded public works program.
At the same time it was unclear whether the new script would be accepted
and whether the country would have sufficient foreign exchange to
maintain minimum purchases of key import items such as food and
medicine. Moreover, many businesses, holding debts denominated in euros,
would likely be forced into bankruptcy necessitating government
takeover. And, all this would take place in a relatively hostile
international environment. No doubt some countries would offer words of
solidarity, but it appears unlikely that any would or could offer
meaningful financial or technical assistance. Still, with proper
preparation the possibilities for success could have been greatly
enhanced.</p>
<p>Strikingly, Varoufakis mentioned that Syriza had established a small
team to think about what a break would mean shortly after their January
2015 election, a team that no doubt was kept small because the
government wanted to keep the planning secret. But that was a mistake.
Planning should have happened on a large scale and in a visible way.
Discussions should have been held with international legal experts as
well as with the Brics countries concerning possible use of their new
lending and investment facilities. There was no need to keep this
planning quiet, quite the opposite – Eurozone leaders should have been
made aware that Syriza was seriously studying its alternatives. And the
population should have been brought along – that the government would do
all in its power to stay in the eurozone as long as this was consistent
with an end to austerity.</p>
<p>As it was, Tsprias went back into negotiations unarmed, desperate for
a bailout. Once the ECB tightened its support for Greece's banking
system it should have been clear, if not before then, that a German-led
Europe was only interested in total surrender on the part of Greece. And
as far as I can tell total surrender is what they got.</p>
<p>Greece has agreed to austerity program that is far worse than any previously rejected. Here is the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greece-bailout-agreement-key-points-grexit" target="_blank"></cite><cite>Guardian summary</a> of what was agreed:</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Greek assets transfer</strong></p>
<p>Up to €50bn (£35bn) worth of Greek assets will be
transferred to a new fund, which will contribute to the recapitalisation
of the country's banks. The fund will be based in Athens, not
Luxembourg as Germany had originally demanded.</p>
<p>The location of the fund was a key sticking point in
the marathon overnight talks. Transferring the assets out of Greece
would have meant “liquidity asphyxiation”, Tsipras said.</p>
<p>As the statement puts it: “Valuable Greek assets will
be transferred to an independent fund that will monetise the assets
through privatisations and other means.”</p>
<p>The “valuable assets” are likely to include things such as planes, airports, infrastructure and banks, analysts say.</p>
<p>Some of the fund will be used to recapitalise banks and
decrease debt, but analysts are sceptical about how much money there
will really be to work with.</p>
<p>“Given the experience of the last few years’
privatisation programme, these targets appear overtly optimistic,
serving as a signalling mechanism of Greek government commitment to
privatisation rather than a meaningful source of financing for bank
recapitalisation, growth and debt reduction,” said George Saravelos, a
strategist at Deutsche Bank.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Pensions</strong></p>
<p>Greece has been told that it needs to pass measures to “improve long-term sustainability of the pension system” by 15 July.</p>
<p>The country's pensions system, and its perceived
generosity relative to other eurozone states, has been a key sticking
point in the past five months of negotiations with creditors.</p>
<p>The so-called troika of lenders believes that Athens
can save 0.25% to 0.5% of GDP in 2015 and 1% of GDP in 2016 by reforming
pensions.</p>
<p>Greece had wanted to draw out reform of early
retirement rules, starting in October and running until 2025, when
everyone would retire at 67. The EU wants the process to start
immediately, by imposing huge costs on those who want to retire early to
discourage them from doing so. The lenders also say Athens must bring
forward the reform programme so it completes in 2022.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>VAT and other taxes</strong></p>
<p>Another source of contention in the months of failed
negotiations that preceded Monday's tentative deal, VAT is now also on
the block for immediate reform.</p>
<p>The latest agreement demands measures, again by 15
July, for “the streamlining of the VAT system and the broadening of the
tax base to increase revenue”.</p>
<p>One of the key objections from Greece's creditors to
its VAT system is a 30% discount for the Greek islands. Athens proposed a
compromise on 10 July under which the exemptions for the big tourist
islands – where the revenue opportunities are greatest – would end
first, with the more remote islands following later.</p>
<p>The onus on Greece to “increase revenue” is likely to
mean more items will be covered by the top VAT rate of 23%, including
restaurant bills, something that had until recently been a red line for
Tsipras.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Statistics office</strong></p>
<p>Another demand for legislation by 15 July is on “the
safeguarding of the full legal independence of ELSTAT”, the Greek
statistics office.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Balancing the books</strong></p>
<p>Greece has been told it must legislate by 15 July to
introduce “quasi-automatic spending cuts” if it deviates from primary
surplus targets. In other words, if it cannot cut enough to balance the
books, it should cut some more.</p>
<p>In the past, the troika has demanded that Greece commit to a budget surplus of 1% in 2015, rising to 3.5% by 2018.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Bridging finance</strong></p>
<p>Talks will begin immediately on bridging finance to
avert the collapse of Greece's banking system and help cover its debt
repayments this summer. Greece must repay more than €7bn to the European
Central Bank (ECB) in July and August, before any bailout cash can be
handed over.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Debt restructuring</strong></p>
<p>Greece has been promised discussions on restructuring
its debts. A statement from Sunday night also ruled out any “haircuts”,
leaving the €240bn Greece owes to Brussels, the ECB and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the books.</p>
<p>Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, said the
Eurogroup was ready to consider extending the maturity on Greek loans.
She argues that a delay in loan repayments and a lower interest rate act
in the same way as a write-off, which is why many analysts point out
that the Greek debt mountain is worth the equivalent of 90% of GDP in
real terms and not the 180% commonly quoted. Merkel said that for this
reason there was no need for a Plan B.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Radical reforms</strong></p>
<p>Tsipras pledged to implement radical reforms<strong> </strong>to
ensure the Greek oligarchy finally makes a fair contribution. The
agreement thrashed out overnight would allow Greece to stand on its feet
again, he said.</p>
<p>Implementation of the reforms would be tough, he said,
but “we fought hard abroad, we must now fight at home against vested
interests”.</p>
<p>He added: “The measures are recessionary, but we hope
that putting Grexit to bed means inward investment can begin to flow,
negating them.”</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Liberalising the economy</strong></p>
<p>The new deal also calls for “more ambitious product
market reforms” that will include liberalising the economy with measures
ranging from bringing in Sunday trading hours to opening up closed
professions.</p>
<p>Greece's labour markets must also be liberalised, the
other eurozone leaders say. Notably, they are demanding Athens
“undertake rigourous reviews and modernisation” of collective bargaining
and industrial action.</p>
<p>Pharmacy ownership, the designation of bakeries and the
marketing of milk are also up for reform, all as recommended in a
“toolkit” from the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>IMF support</strong></p>
<p>The statement from the euro summit stipulates that
Greece will request continued IMF support from March 2016. This is
another loss for Tsipras, who had reportedly resisted further IMF
involvement in Greece's rescue.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Energy market</strong></p>
<p>Greece has been told to get on with privatising its energy transmission network operator (ADMIE).</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Financial sector</strong></p>
<p>Greece has been told to strengthen its financial
sector, including taking “decisive action on non-performing loans” and
eliminating political interference.</p>
<p style="padding-left:30px"><strong>Shrinking the state</strong></p>
<p>Athens has been told to depoliticise the Greek administration and to continue cutting the costs of public administration.</p>
<p>The <cite>Guardian</cite> highlights one of the hidden landmines in the agreement:</p>
<p>“Our economics editor Larry Elliott has been going through the details of <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greece-bailout-agreement-key-points-grexit" target="_blank">this morning's deal</a>
and concludes it will deepen the country's recession, make its debt
position less sustainable and that it ‘virtually guarantees that its
problems come bubbling back to the surface before too long’.”</p>
<p>He <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/13/europe-greece-pushed-into-further-peril" target="_blank">continues</a>:</p>
<p>“One line in the seven-page euro summit statement sums
up the thinking behind this act of folly, the one that talks about
‘quasi-automatic spending cuts in case of deviations from ambitious
primary surplus targets’.</p>
<p>“Translated into everyday English, what this means is
that leaving to one side the interest payments on its debt, Greece will
have to raise more in revenues than the government spends each and every
year. If the performance of the economy is not strong enough to meet
these targets, the ‘quasi-automatic’ spending cuts will kick in. If
Greece is in a hole, the rest of the euro zone will hand it a spade and
tell it to keep digging.</p>
<p>“This approach to the public finances went out of
fashion during the 1930s but is now back. Most modern governments
operate what are known as ‘automatic stabilisers’, under which they run
bigger deficits (or smaller surpluses) in bad times because it is
accepted that raising taxes or cutting spending during a recession
reduces demand and so makes the recession worse.”</p>
<p>At least according to press reports, Tsprias put up his greatest
fight over inclusion of the IMF in monitoring the agreement and
privatization. The IMF is definitely in. As for privatization or what
the <cite>Guardian</cite> calls “Asset Transfer,” gains were minimal.
One can question in fact whether at least the latter area is one where
Tsprias should have tried to draw lines. At least on the face of it, it
would seem that it would have made more sense to fight the demand to
“liberalize” labour markets. A victory here would have given the state
freedom to encourage the development of a strong labour movement,
regardless of ownership.</p>
<p>Moreover, as noted in the summary, Greece is still not guaranteed new
loans or debt relief. Its parliament has to pass all of the above and
then the government gets to start negotiations again.</p>
<p>As the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/13/greek-bailout-what-happens-next" target="_blank"></cite><cite>Guardian reports</a>:</p>
<p>“European leaders lined up to say Grexit has been
averted, but this snappy soundbite glides over the fact the eurozone has
simply agreed to open negotiations on an €86bn (£62bn) bailout.
Although this is a step to shoring-up confidence in the euro, it is only
a promise to have more talks with no guarantee of success.</p>
<p>“Talks on the bailout plan are forecast to last around
four weeks. ‘We know time is critical for Greece, but there are no
shortcuts,‘ said Klaus Regling, the official in charge of the the
European Stability Mechanism, the eurozone's permanent bailout fund that
Greece hopes to tap.</p>
<p>“But these formal talks can only begin, if eurozone
leaders avoid several political and financial tripwires. The Greek
government has until the end of Wednesday to ensure that sweeping
reforms to its pension system and VAT rates are written into law. If
Greek lawmakers meet this eurozone-imposed deadline, the baton will pass
to the creditors. At least five countries, including Germany, the
Netherlands and Finland, will have to put the idea of opening
negotiations on a bailout to a parliamentary vote.</p>
<p>“Politics could be overtaken by financial deadlines.
Athens faces demands to repay €7bn of debts in July, including €3.5bn
due to the European Central Bank on Monday (20 July).</p>
<p>“Eurozone officials are working round the clock to come
up with emergency funds that will help Greece bridge the gap before a
permanent bailout kicks in. ‘It's not going to be easy,’ said Jeroen
Dijsselbloem, the hawkish Dutch politician, who was re-elected chair of
the eurozone group of finance ministers on Monday. Several options were
being discussed on bridge finance, but no one had found ‘the golden key
to solve the problem’, he said, although he hopes to see progress by
Wednesday.”</p>
<p>The ECB will also continue to maintain a choke hold on the Greek
economy perhaps for months, tightening if any deviations take place.</p>
<p>“They told clients tonight that the European Central
Bank is unlikely to cut Greece much slack until the third bailout is
agreed.</p>
<p>“We suspect the ECB will stall an ELA decision until Greece begins to legislate the new deal later this week.</p>
<p>“Greece would still face a tight ELA cap, however. We
expect the ELA cap will remain carefully calibrated and controlled at
least until the new ESM loan is fully in place. Access to banks could be
fully normalised only in the fall.”</p>
<p>It is hard to see this agreement as anything but failure. Clearly the
main responsibility for this disaster rests with the leaders of Germany
and the European Union. They showed that they had no interest in
meaningful, honest negotiations, fearing that they would likely lead to a
real challenge to their power. But unfortunately Syriza's leadership
did not make the best of the bad hand they were dealt. They needed to
talk more truthfully to the population about the political/class nature
of and reasons for the difficult challenges they faced and do the
maximum possible to strengthen their negotiating position and prepare
the population for the failure that they thought likely.</p>
<p>Hopefully, the Greek people will find the time and space necessary to
digest and learn the lessons from this struggle and successfully
regroup. We all must. •</p>
<p>Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics at Lewis
and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; Adjunct Researcher at the
Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South
Korea; and Adjunct Professor in the Labour Studies Program at Simon
Fraser University, Canada. He blogs at <a href="https://economicfront.wordpress.com/" target="_blank">economicfront.wordpress.com</a> where this article first appeared.</p>
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<div><div><h3><span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,213);padding:0px 0.4em">Comments</span></h3>
<div style="margin-left:4%;margin-right:4%">#1 <strong>Anonymous</strong> <span style="font-size:75%">2015-07-14 19:15 EDT</span><br><strong>Where does "power" reside in a bourgeois democracy?</strong><br>"Greeks elected a progressive government, voting Syriza into power in January 2015,..."<br>
Well no actually as we have clearly seen Syriza was not "voted into power" in January 2015.<br>
Power at that time still resided with "Capital" as it always will in a capitalist (bourgeois) democracy.<br><br><hr style="background-color:rgb(85,85,85);color:rgb(85,85,85);min-height:0.5em;border:medium none;width:90%"><br style="clear:right"><span style="background-color:rgb(255,255,213);padding:0.5em"><strong>Post New Comment: </strong></span><br><br><BR><MailScannerForm24483 form action="http:///bullet/1142.php" method="post" style="width:96%" target="_blank" onsubmit="return window.confirm("You are submitting information to an external page.\nAre you sure?");"><fieldset><label>Display Name:</label>
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