<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">---------- Forwarded message ----------<br>From: <b class="gmail_sendername">James Quilligan</b> <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jbquilligan@comcast.net">jbquilligan@comcast.net</a>></span><br>
Date: Sat, Jul 2, 2011 at 12:17 AM<br>Subject: China<br><div style="word-wrap: break-word;"><div><div><div><div><p>
<span>June 30, 2011 11:04 pm</span></p>
<h1>Working out what China wants</h1><p>By Philip Stephens</p>
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<div><div><span><img alt="Pinn illustration" src="http://im.media.ft.com/content/images/a5f9db48-a343-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.img" style="width: 566px;"></span></div><p>We know what the west wants from a resurgent China. We have a pretty
good sense of what China doesn�t want from the west. What�s missing from
this story of global geopolitical upheaval is a clear idea of what
China wants from its rise to great power status.</p><p>Like many European and American commentators I spend a fair amount of
time listening to Chinese scholars, officials and diplomats. A few
years ago such figures were a rare sighting on the international
conference circuit. And visitors to Beijing were left feeling that their
interlocutors had been carefully screened to admit only one view of the
world.</p><p>Not
any more. Some months ago I listened to a Chinese vice-minister
casually acknowledge divisions at the illustrious Central Party School
about relations with Washington. Some among the keepers of the
ideological flame thought the US would only ever understand the currency
of raw power; others that China�s self-interest still lay in
co-operation as well as competition. </p><p>Chinese academics speak quite openly, albeit off-the-record, about
the conflicting currents in Beijing � between nationalists and liberals,
generals and party leaders. The implications of the coming generational
change at the top of the party are keenly debated. </p><p>One leading scholar was heard to say recently that Hu Jintao, who
steps down next year as China�s president, had been little more than a
�petty bureaucrat�. The west was in for a surprise when the generation
of president-in-waiting Xi Jinping took office. These young leaders had
been shaped and hardened by Mao�s Cultural Revolution. They would not be
shy of wielding power.</p><p>Others are not so sure. One prominent (and very rich) business leader
argues that the grinding process of getting to the top in the Chinese
system militates still against a radical break with the past. What�s
clear from most such conversations, though, is that Deng Xaoping�s
admonition that China should hide its strength is nowadays observed more
in the breach than the observance. Talk that China wants to take back
charge of its East Asian neighbourhood is no longer met with
protestations about a misreading of more benign intentions.</p><p>The west, which, absent a coherent European policy towards the rising
powers, mostly means the US and Japan, is pretty clear what it wants
from the new China. It was summed up in the worn, but still useful,
phrase coined by Robert Zoellick, World Bank president, when he called
for Beijing to behave as a �responsible stakeholder�.</p><p>This sees China taking its place in defending and developing the
rules-based global order. Beijing has a point when it protests this is a
western construction. Yet the US can argue that it has provided the
essential framework for China�s rise.</p><p>On the other side of the fence, Chinese policymakers make few bones
about what they don�t want from the west. Top of the list is any hint of
a challenge to China�s territorial integrity. Support for more autonomy
in Tibet or Xinjiang or for Taiwanese independence is a hostile act �
an effort to foment the break-up of the Chinese state.</p><p>Second on the don�t-want list is a confrontation that would disturb
the course of China�s rising prosperity. As much as it is now more
assertive than Mr Deng might have liked, Beijing is anxious to avoid any
rupture abroad that might jeopardise growth and social order at home.
China will retaliate against, say, US arms sales to Taiwan, but within
carefully-calibrated bounds.</p><p>A third taboo is western lecturing about China�s political and social
order. David Cameron was reminded of this this week when he received <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a467244-a0e0-11e0-adae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1QQe3BysY" title="FT - Wen rebukes UK human rights focus" target="_blank">Wen Jiabao</a>
in 10 Downing Street. The British prime minister got a public dressing
down from the Chinese premier. China had had enough of British
�finger-pointing� about human rights.</p><p>The snub was calculated. Accompanying officials let it be known that
Mr Wen�s subsequent stopover in Berlin was much the more important leg
of his European trip. This was partly, of course, because of the much
more valuable <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d0244274-1a71-11e0-b003-00144feab49a.html#axzz1QQe3BysY" title="FT - Li calls for deeper trade ties with Germany" target="_blank">trade and investment relationship between Germany and China</a>. But Angela Merkel, it seems, is also careful to make rather less of a public fuss about dissidents.</p>
<p>Beijing does not want to see any extension of intervention in the
affairs of sovereign states. If China joins in telling others how to
behave, others will claim legitimacy in telling it how to behave.
Liberal internationalism also makes it harder for Beijing to strike
dodgy deals with dubious regimes producing vital natural resources.</p><p>Chinese officials will agree there is sometimes a balance to be
struck. Beijing has signed up to United Nations principles on the rights
of citizens as well as states. But it will only go so far. Thus, while
it allowed UN authorisation for intervention in Libya, Mr Wen insists
the western military action was a mistake not to be repeated elsewhere.</p><p>So far, so clear. It is when you ask about China�s ambitions for its
place in the world that inscrutability sets in. Yes, China wants a role
commensurate with its history as a great and ancient civilisation. Yes,
its economic rise has greatly expanded its strategic interests. But does
it want to shape a different international order? How far will it
extend its military reach? Does it see its own political and economic
model competing more widely with western liberal capitalism? These are
questions that rarely elicit illuminating responses.</p><p>Inference provides some of the answers. The activities of the
People�s Liberation Army in the South China Sea and the present tilt of
military spending point to the desire to push back US forces. A <a href="http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/417a48c4-a34d-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1QQe3BysY" title="FT Analysis - China and Pakistan: an alliance is built" target="_blank">close alliance with Pakistan</a> underlines the strategic weight given to safeguarding China�s supply lines to and from the oil-rich Gulf. </p>
<p>A strategy of divide and rule suggests a conscious desire to
capitalise on Europe�s present weakness and undercut the Atlantic
alliance. The more China rises, the wider will be the spread of its
interests.</p><p>How wide? China is not bidding to fill the role of global hegemon
recently vacated by the US. There are too many natural constraints on
its power � think geography, India and Japan as well as the US. Beyond
that, we do not really know. But then nor, I suspect, does China.</p><p><a href="mailto:philip.stephens@ft.com" target="_blank">philip.stephens@ft.com</a>
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