[P2P-F] More on the Libyan Revolution: Lessons and False Lessons

Amaia Arcos amaia.arcos at googlemail.com
Wed Aug 31 14:41:24 CEST 2011


Sorry, 40 minutes. Still, lovely documentary!

On 31 August 2011 14:38, Amaia Arcos <amaia.arcos at googlemail.com> wrote:

> Fair enough but so if you let Bahrainis die, you must also let Libyans do
> the same? (I know you are not saying that, I just mean that one thing does
> really not take from the other). I am heartbroken at what is happening with
> Bahrein, it makes my blood boil. I followed as closely.
>
> The fighters fighting in the streets are civilians, the "rebels" are mostly
> civilians, armed civilians yes but lawyers, and academics, and students, and
> bakers and unemployed, etc. Unarmed civilians have been staying home,
> shivering in fear and praying that those fighting the army and mercenaries
> will succeed. Women are there, super involved. I've seen videos of
> grandmothers cheering fighters and doing shooting celebratory rounds on
> video. Watch the video I linked to. It is 20 minutes and well done, very
> nice to watch.
>
> This is my passion and my "expertise" :)
>
>
> On 31 August 2011 13:56, Michel Bauwens <michel at p2pfoundation.net> wrote:
>
>> Dear Amaia,
>>
>> This is really crying for a storify, again, I'm amazed and floored that
>> you have been able to follow all this ...
>>
>> Also, I'm with you on the analysis. I think one's approach really depends
>> on which of two mixed feelings gets the upper hand
>>
>> 1) we care for the people and their evolution
>>
>> 2) we loathe European and U.S. imperialism and hypocrisy
>>
>> In this crisis, the two are really operating at the same time, but many on
>> the left are overwhelmed by feeling #2 and therefore forget about the
>> support for #1. No matter how much we dislike #2, there were, like in
>> Bosnia, not many alternatives for the Lybians except for asking external
>> support, and accepting where it came from.
>>
>> As you do, we can perfectly support one, be critical of two, and be happy
>> that they succeeded in these different circumstances.
>>
>> Now, what you say about the folly of Gadhafi is probably true, and
>> confirmed by recent discoveries in Tripoli, but on the other hand, the
>> repression in Bahrein has been equally atrocious, and it is occupied by a
>> foreign country, and yet, total silence; I think this shows enough the
>> duplicity of our own countries in their selective support; and we must have
>> no illusions on their motivations.
>>
>> I also believe non-violence was a very unrealistic choice in this context.
>> Nevertheless, I'm a bit surprised by the working class uprising and have
>> seen no visual evidence ... the city seemed always empty apart from a few
>> dozen fighters at any given time, and outside of Benghazi, the female
>> element seems completely absent from the public space.
>>
>> Michel
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 6:40 PM, Amaia Arcos <amaia.arcos at googlemail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Kind of good article at times, except:
>>>
>>> *It was only when the rebellion took a more violent turn, however, that
>>> the revolution's progress was dramatically reversed and Qaddafi gave his
>>> infamous February 22 speech threatening massacres in rebel strongholds,
>>> which in turn, led to the United States and its NATO allies to enter the
>>> war.
>>> *
>>> NOT true. People were being shot at in Benghazi by military and yellow
>>> hat wearing mercenaries (there is video evidence and plenty of reports,
>>> which I saw and read the very first days of, indeed, very peaceful
>>> protesting). It was only then the protestors started attacking the military
>>> base, and they succeeded almost "miraculously" after they had the "help" of
>>> a suicide bombing by a normal citizen out of desperation, after a few days
>>> of cruel fighting, and yes, military members defecting the army. Some of
>>> which got burned alive when caught by loyal forces (following orders), there
>>> is also video of that.
>>>
>>> And yes, it was after Benghazi "liberated" itself that Gaddafi went on
>>> the surreal air offensive against Benghazi and advances to other towns, who
>>> were happy to join, which is when the "rebels" started to ask for
>>> international support and a no-fly zone. The international community (thanks
>>> France? :S) took WEEKS to respond to, I remember very well crying out of
>>> desperation. It was heartbreaking seeing no response for weeks despite the
>>> videos and the evidence coming out.
>>>
>>> When I saw this video http://vimeo.com/22197304 I loved it because it
>>> reported exactly like I had understood it from following closely in social
>>> media those very first few days and weeks.
>>>
>>> Nobody in Tripoli was brave enough, understandably, right until the very
>>> end because they were terrified, the article greatly exaggerates the
>>> conquests of peaceful protesting the very first weeks. Some tried and got
>>> brutally repressed. That the will was there all over the country was
>>> obvious, which is why I never bought academic commentary trying to be clever
>>> and argue that the Senussi
>>> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/senussi.htm were
>>> starting a civil war (because of the reclaiming the old flag). The people in
>>> Benghazi were clearly not thinking along tribal lines and most of the rest
>>> of the country shared their aims.
>>>
>>> The brutality of the Libyan regime and the brutality against peaceful
>>> protestors made it very obvious to anyone that the man is absolutely insane,
>>> how this article claims that it could have been dealt with differently
>>> amazes me. The only way would have been to allow to be crushed and have
>>> public executions of anyone who had even looked in the direction of anyone
>>> who must have shown any subtle disagreement with the regime. So, no:
>>>  *
>>> *
>>> *However, insisting that the Libyan opposition "tried nonviolence and it
>>> didn't work" because peaceful protesters were killed and it did not succeed
>>> in toppling the regime after a few days of public demonstrations makes
>>> little sense, particularly since the armed struggle took more than six
>>> months.*
>>>
>>> Lofty, lofty. I say if it took 6 months, and the man is still deludedly
>>> thinking he will get out of it somehow, imagine the level of insanity being
>>> dealt with here. He was using masses of mercenaries from different African
>>> countries and Serbia and even Algeria so no allegiance to the people, like
>>> the military might end up feeling if things get very crazy. Youngsters who
>>> managed to escape from Gaddafi's army spoke of being shot at when trying to
>>> escape. It would have been the biggest massacre in every sense.
>>>
>>> That France went in because of commercial reasons in the end, that NATO
>>> and any western country (or not western for that reason) only use the
>>> humanitarian excuse to pursue their interests is not a secret to anyone, not
>>> even Libyans. They were very aware they would have to do deals, fine if it
>>> means freedom. And they are not uneducated fools who will get cheated like
>>> so many presume.
>>>
>>> The article also, sadly, has completely ignored the Transitional National
>>> Council and its members. Had it monitored its formation, their press
>>> releases, the way it reached consensus with all tribal leaders that were
>>> against Gaddafi right from the beginning in order to have legitimacy, how
>>> well they have coordinated and "sold" their managing of the situation is
>>> impressive to say the least. That they have managed to sell oil during the
>>> war and secure armament and funds from several countries is impressive. Have
>>> a look at the members profiles
>>> http://www.ntclibya.org/english/council-members/, and have a look at all
>>> their pledges. I am not glorifying anyone here, they are human and we will
>>> see, either way, pretty impressive under the circumstances they have
>>> operated in my opinion. To come up with patronising, old-school
>>> fear-mongering about the propensity for dictatorship and undemocratic
>>> behaviour is a bit unreal, especially with all the evidence to the contrary
>>> having been published online all along.
>>>
>>> On 31 August 2011 12:40, Michel Bauwens <michel at p2pfoundation.net>
>>> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>> > From: Tikkun/NSP (NETWORK OF SPIRITUAL PROGRESSIVES) <
>>> info at spiritualprogressives.org>
>>> > Date: Wed, Aug 31, 2011 at 7:49 AM
>>> > Subject: More on the Libyan Revolution: Lessons and False Lessons
>>> > To: Michelsub2004 at gmail.com
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Lessons and False Lessons From Libya
>>> > Tuesday 30 August 2011
>>> > by: Stephen Zunes, Truthout | News Analysis
>>> >
>>> > Rebels celebrate outside Col. Moammar Qaddafi's Bab al-Aziziya compound
>>> in Tripoli, Libya, August 29, 2011. Residents returning to their homes have
>>> found that many have been heavily damaged by gunfire after they were used as
>>> fighting positions during the rebellion. (Photo: Tyler Hicks/The New York
>>> Times)
>>> > IF YOU PREFER TO READ THIS ON-LINE, please go to
>>> http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/stephen-zunes-on-lessons-from-the-libyan-revolution
>>> > The downfall of Muammar Qaddafi's regime is very good news,
>>> particularly for the people of Libya. However, it is critically important
>>> that the world not learn the wrong lessons from the dictator's overthrow.
>>> > It is certainly true that NATO played a critical role in disrupting the
>>> heavy weapons capability of the repressive Libyan regime and blocking its
>>> fuel and ammunition supplies through massive airstrikes and providing
>>> armaments and logistical support for the rebels. However, both the
>>> militaristic triumphalism of the pro-intervention hawks and the more cynical
>>> conspiracy mongering of some on the left ignore that this was indeed a
>>> popular revolution, which may have been able to succeed without NATO,
>>> particularly if the opposition had not focused primarily on the military
>>> strategy. Engaging in an armed struggle against the heavily armed despot
>>> essentially took on Qaddafi where he was strongest rather than taking
>>> greater advantage of where he was weakest - his lack of popular support.
>>> > There has been little attention paid to the fact that the reason the
>>> anti-Qaddafi rebels were able to unexpectedly march into Tripoli last
>>> weekend with so little resistance appears to have been a result of a massive
>>> and largely unarmed, civil insurrection which had erupted in neighborhoods
>>> throughout the city. Indeed, much of the city had already been liberated by
>>> the time the rebel columns entered and began mopping up the remaining
>>> pockets of pro-regime forces.
>>> > As Juan Cole noted in an August 22 interview on Democracy Now!, "the
>>> city had already overthrown the regime" by the time the rebels arrived. The
>>> University of Michigan professor observed how, "Beginning Saturday night,
>>> working-class districts rose up, in the hundreds of thousands and just threw
>>> off the regime." Similarly, Khaled Darwish's August 24 article in The New
>>> York Times describes how unarmed Tripolitanians rushed into the streets
>>> prior to the rebels entering the capital, blocked suspected snipers from
>>> apartment rooftops and sang and chanted over loudspeakers to mobilize the
>>> population against Qaddafi's regime
>>> > Though NATO helped direct the final pincer movement of the rebels as
>>> they approached the Libyan capital and continued to bomb government targets,
>>> Qaddafi's final collapse appears to have more closely resembled that of
>>> Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali than that of Saddam Hussein.
>>> > It should also be noted that the initial uprising against Qaddafi in
>>> February was overwhelmingly nonviolent. In less than a week, this unarmed
>>> insurrection had resulted in pro-democracy forces taking over most of the
>>> cities in the eastern part of the country, a number of key cities in the
>>> west and even some neighborhoods in Tripoli. It was also during this period
>>> when most of the resignations of cabinet members and other important aides
>>> of Qaddafi, Libyan ambassadors in foreign capitals and top military officers
>>> took place. Thousands of soldiers defected or refused to fire on crowds,
>>> despite threats of execution. It was only when the rebellion took a more
>>> violent turn, however, that the revolution's progress was dramatically
>>> reversed and Qaddafi gave his infamous February 22 speech threatening
>>> massacres in rebel strongholds, which in turn, led to the United States and
>>> its NATO allies to enter the war.
>>> > Indeed, it was only a week or so before Qaddafi's collapse that the
>>> armed rebels had succeeded in recapturing most of the territory that had
>>> originally been liberated by their unarmed counterparts six months earlier.
>>> > It can certainly be argued that, once the revolutionaries shifted to
>>> armed struggle, NATO air support proved critical in severely weakening
>>> Qaddafi's ability to counterattack and that Western arms and advisers were
>>> important in enabling rebel forces to make crucial gains in the northwestern
>>> part of the country prior to the final assault on Tripoli. At the same time,
>>> there is little question that foreign intervention in a country with a
>>> history of brutal foreign conquest, domination and subversion was
>>> successfully manipulated by Qaddafi to rally far more support to his side in
>>> his final months than would have been the case had he been faced with a
>>> largely nonviolent indigenous, civil insurrection. It isn't certain that the
>>> destruction of his military capabilities by the NATO strikes was more
>>> significant than the ways in which such Western intervention in the civil
>>> war enabled the besieged dictator to shore up what had been rapidly
>>> deteriorating support in Tripoli and other areas under government control.
>>> > I could achieve an outcome I desired in an interpersonal dispute by
>>> punching someone in the nose, but that doesn't mean that it, therefore,
>>> proved that my action was the only way to accomplish my goal. It's no secret
>>> that overbearing military force can eventually wear down an autocratic
>>> militarized regime, but - as the ouster of oppressive regimes in Egypt,
>>> Tunisia, the Philippines, Poland, Chile, Serbia, and scores of other
>>> countries through mass nonviolent action in recent years has indicated -
>>> there are ways of undermining a regime's pillars of support to the extent
>>> that it collapses under its own weight. Ultimately, a despot's power comes
>>> not from the armed forces under his command, but the willingness of a people
>>> to recognize his authority and obey his orders.
>>> > This is not to say that the largely nonviolent struggle launched in
>>> February would have achieved a quick and easy victory had they not turned to
>>> armed struggle with foreign support. The weakness of Libyan civil society,
>>> combined with the movement's questionable tactical decision to engage
>>> primarily in demonstrations rather than diversifying their methods of civil
>>> resistance, made them particularly vulnerable to the brutality of Qaddafi's
>>> foreign mercenaries and other forces. In addition, unlike the
>>> well-coordinated nonviolent anti-Mubarak campaign in Egypt, the Libyan
>>> opposition's campaign was largely spontaneous. However, insisting that the
>>> Libyan opposition "tried nonviolence and it didn't work" because peaceful
>>> protesters were killed and it did not succeed in toppling the regime after a
>>> few days of public demonstrations makes little sense, particularly since the
>>> armed struggle took more than six months. And it does not mean there were no
>>> other alternatives but to launch a civil war.
>>> > The estimated 13,000 additional deaths since the launching of the armed
>>> struggle and the widespread destruction of key segments of the country's
>>> infrastructure are not the only problems related to resorting to military
>>> means to oust Qaddafi.
>>> > One problem with an armed overthrow of a dictator, as opposed to a
>>> largely nonviolent overthrow of a dictator, is that you have lots of armed
>>> individuals who are now convinced that power comes from guns. The martial
>>> values and the strict military hierarchy inherent in armed struggle can
>>> become accepted as the norm, particularly if the military leaders of the
>>> rebellion become the political leaders of the nation, as is usually the
>>> case. Indeed, history has shown that countries in which dictatorships are
>>> overthrown by force of arms are far more likely to suffer from instability
>>> and/or slide into another dictatorship. By contrast, dictatorships
>>> overthrown in largely nonviolent insurrections almost always evolve into
>>> democracies within a few years.
>>> > Despite the large-scale NATO intervention in support of the
>>> anti-Qaddafi uprising, this has been a widely supported popular revolution
>>> from a broad cross section of society. Qaddafi's brutal and arbitrary
>>> 42-year rule had alienated the overwhelming majority of the Libyan people
>>> and his overthrow is understandably a cause of celebration throughout the
>>> country. Though the breadth of the opposition makes a democratic transition
>>> more likely than in some violent overthrows of other dictatorships, the risk
>>> that an undemocratic faction may force its way into power is still a real
>>> possibility. And given that the United States, France and Britain have
>>> proved themselves quite willing to continue supporting dictatorships
>>> elsewhere in the Arab world, there is no guarantee that the NATO powers
>>> would find such a scenario objectionable as long as a new dictatorship was
>>> seen as friendly to the West.
>>> > Another problem with the way Qaddafi was overthrown is the way in which
>>> NATO so blatantly went beyond the mandate provided by the United Nations
>>> Security Council to simply protect the civilian population through the
>>> establishment of a no-fly zone. Instead, NATO became an active participant
>>> in a civil war, providing arms, intelligence, advisers and conducting over
>>> 7,500 air and missile strikes against military and government facilities.
>>> Such abuse of the UN system will create even more skepticism regarding the
>>> implementation of the responsibility to protect should there really be an
>>> incipient genocide somewhere where foreign intervention may indeed be the
>>> only realistic option.
>>> > Furthermore, while it is certainly possible that Qaddafi would have
>>> continued to refuse to step down in any case, the NATO intervention
>>> emboldened the rebels to refuse offers by the regime for a provisional
>>> cease-fire and direct negotiations, thereby eliminating even the possibility
>>> of ending the bloodshed months earlier.
>>> > Indeed, there is good reason to question whether NATO's role in
>>> Qaddafi's removal was motivated by humanitarian concerns in the first place.
>>> For example, NATO intervention was initiated during the height of the savage
>>> repression of the nonviolent pro-democracy struggle in the Western-backed
>>> kingdom of Bahrain, yet US and British support for that autocratic Arab
>>> monarchy has continued as the hope for bringing freedom to that island
>>> nation was brutally crushed. And given the overwhelming bipartisan support
>>> in the United States for Israeli military campaigns in 2006 and 2008-09
>>> which, while only lasting a few weeks, succeeded in slaughtering more than
>>> 1,500 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, Washington's humanitarian claims
>>> for the Libyan intervention ring particularly hollow.
>>> > It's true that some of the leftist critiques of the NATO campaign were
>>> rather specious. For example, this was not simply a war for oil. Qaddafi had
>>> long ago opened his oil fields to the West, with Occidental, BP and ENI
>>> among the biggest beneficiaries. Relations between Big Oil and the Libyan
>>> regime were doing just fine and the NATO-backed war was highly disruptive to
>>> their interests.
>>> > Similarly, Libya under Qaddafi was hardly a progressive alternative to
>>> the right-wing Arab rulers favored by the West. Despite some impressive
>>> socialist initiatives early in Qaddafi's reign, which led Libya to
>>> impressive gains in health care, education, housing, and other needs, the
>>> past two decades had witnessed increased corruption, regional and tribal
>>> favoritism, capricious investment policies, an increasingly predatory
>>> bureaucracy and a degree of poverty and inadequate infrastructure
>>> inexcusable for a country of such vast potential wealth.
>>> > However, given the strong role of NATO in the uprising and the close
>>> ties developed with the military leaders of the revolution, it would be
>>> naïve to assume that the United States and other countries in the coalition
>>> won't try to assert their influence in the direction of post-Qaddafi Libya.
>>> One of the problems of armed revolutionary struggle compared to unarmed
>>> revolutionary struggle is the dependence upon foreign supporters, which can
>>> then be leveraged after victory. Given the debt and ongoing dependency some
>>> of the rebel leaders have developed with NATO countries in recent months, it
>>> would similarly be naïve to think that some of them wouldn't be willing to
>>> let this happen.
>>> > In summary, while Qaddafi's ouster is cause for celebration, it is
>>> critical that it not be interpreted as a vindication of Western military
>>> interventionism. Not only will the military side of the victory likely leave
>>> a problematic legacy, we should not deny agency to the many thousands of
>>> Libyans across regions, tribes and ideologies, who ultimately made victory
>>> possible through their refusal to continue their cooperation with an
>>> oppressive and illegitimate regime. It is ultimately a victory of the Libyan
>>> people. And they alone should determine their country's future.
>>> > Stephen Zunes is a contributing editor to Tikkun Magazine and professor
>>> of political science at University of San Francisco.
>>> >
>>> > ________________________________
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>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> “We would think and live better and be closer to our purpose as humans if
>>> we moved continuously on foot across the surface of the earth” Bruce Chatwin
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
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>
>
> --
> “We would think and live better and be closer to our purpose as humans if
> we moved continuously on foot across the surface of the earth” Bruce Chatwin
>



-- 
“We would think and live better and be closer to our purpose as humans if we
moved continuously on foot across the surface of the earth” Bruce Chatwin
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