I agree with this perspective of Alex Foti, i.e. that progressive popular movements should be pro-European, but against the EU elites,
factors to consider is that many people, despite their frustrations and the rise of right-wing anti-european populism, are still attached to the structures, fearing adventurism, which is why a party like Syriza is so circumspect in its policies,
Michel
is the european question the analog of the habsburg question or the ottomanquestion in the 19th century? i don't think so, but there's certainly roomfor the belief that the 'sick man of europe' is europe itselft, or ratherthe EU.One could counter that the stagnation that Merkel and the eurocracy arecasting upon Europe is actually limited to the eurozone. EU countries thatare issuing their own currency have escaped the Greek fate. And the UK istimidly recovering (wages are still way depressed everywhere, though) whileItaly and Spain accumulate record after record in youth unemployment.So the euro is the problem, and especially the deflationary bias intrinsicto the Maastricht Treat, that monetarist cadeau poisonn?? wrapped up bymarket theologists in good times when the neoliberal economy seemed todeliver the goods (growth and low inflation). The much-praised Draghi isactually not doing enough against the sound money balanced budget dogma ofOrdoliberismus. He hasn't gone fully QE and unlike the Fed he doesn't haveto care about escalating unemployment in Southern Europe, save for theperiodic staid sermons about 'structural reform' of public finances andlabor markets. In macroeconomic terms, monetary policy is not expansionaryenough (and the extra liquidity to shore up reckless banks doesn'ttranslate in extra loans) while fiscal policy stays viciously restrictiveto the point that it's hurting Germany itself, a country that can nowfinance itself at negative real interest rates (imagine: you pay back tothe bank less than what you owe, perhaps for that student loan you wereforced to take for your studies).But of course the point is that in political terms the European citizenryhas sent a huge 'fuck europe!' to Council and Commission at the lastEuropean Parliametary elections, where less than 50% cares to vote andright-wing, xenophobic, nationalist or populist parties clearly and sadlywon the election (just think of FN and Marine Le Pen in France). Theeurocracy responded the usual way, by castling against any pressure fromeither right or (red and/or green) left and covering the EU credibilitygash with a used band-aid like Juncker (in the pocket of banks andcorporations since day one, Luxembourg being synonymous with corporate taxevazione) in a Commission still committed to austerity and backed the threemajor EU parties: Merkel's european popular party, Hollande's europeansocialist party, and Verhofstadt's european liberal party, i.e. thepolitical forces that are the self-proclaimed founders of Europe in 1957.I have long argued that a Great Recession would come and its politicalconsequences would be similar to the Great Depression, namely a shift tothe right in Europe, which is happening everywhere except Spain (podemos)and Greece (syriza). Even in Italy, where Renzi won the elections for thePD, the League is rearing its ugly head with a no euro campaign and futurealliance with the elected faction of Italian neofascism (the aim being thatof equaling the FN's meteoric rise at the polls). The only antidote to theracist drift in the peninsula has been the #socialstrike organized bycentri sociali, anti-precarity activists and radical unions (sindacati dibase) in 45 Italian cities (especially Rome, Milan, Naples, Genoa, Padua,Turin, Pisa, Rimini) last November 14. It brought the country to a grindinghalt, its success totally unexpected. Let's hope the practice extends toBrussels, Frankfurt, and the rest of Europe, cos we desperately need to gobeyond the nation-state to defeat precarity and solve mass youthunemployment.Europe is not a good sell. Not in Western Europe, not in Eastern Europe,and most particularly on the left, where accusations of eurocentrism anddenunciations of the arbitrary political notion of "Europe" (where does itend? when did it start?) abound. The position, best argued by Streeck, thatonly by returning to the nation-state what's left of the left can hope toshelter citizens from the inequalities of global financial capitalism,seems to me nostalgic of the fordist age of (patriarchal and paternalist)social democracy. In fact, the very notion of the left seems to be a trapwhich the political movements born out of the revolutions of 2011 often tryto avoid (although podemos sits with the red left in strasbourg, it hassmashed the competition of izquierda unida at home and is posed to threatenthe pp-psoe power duopoly in the next political elections). What we needmore of in europe and elsewhere is progressive populism from below, whichis nevertheless structured in organizations that are able to wieldsignificant counterpower against increasingly repressive governments. InItaly and France, sinistra and gauche are increasingly associated in thepopular imagination with ideological conservatism and political inaction,while social fear and misery spread unchecked in the banlieues of Europe.Populism is in fact the bane of the eurocratic consensus above described.Because it would bridge the democratic deficit in the only possible way: bygetting rid of failed ??lites. On the other hand, liberals agitate thethreat of the extreme right to present themselves as the defenders of lastresort of political Europe. Of course, the very antisocial policies theypursue (bailing out banks and restoring capital gains at the expense ofeverybody else) make the growth of the radical right ever more likely. Ithink there is no alternative to opposing this Europe other than in thename of Europe itself, the Europe of individual and social rights. Knowingfull well that the remnants of the left in Europe will provide littleassistance in the task of building a left-oriented (but notleft-proclaimed) populist front, we cannot refrain from the task offighting nationalism at home and overthrowing the EU government in Brusselsin the name of the people. Only then, in this act of self-assertion againstthe European oligarchy, will a truly European people constitute itself asthe sovereign subject from which all power descends. Next December 19 inBrussels (where a particularly rowdy anti-austerity general strike ended upin major clashes with the police on November 6 #manif6nov; a flashmoblaunched my young labor activists of mixed descent had weeks earlier raidedthe European Parliament to protest against LePen's press conf) could be thefirst stage of such a process of euroradical self-awareness. Last year theystormed the European Commission and Business Europe against the TTIP. TheD1920 is an assorted transnational coalition of activists, unionists,farmers, public employees, students and young precarious workers. We mustbring toghether various social interests around the common priorities ofjobs and welfare, and the establishment of real democracy in europe againstappropriation by oligarchic interests. We need social advocacies andstructured political movements for this. In their absence, rabidnationalism will only grow, until France and Germany part ways and thewhole European architecture collapses. In that scenario (which some on theleft welcome as it would entail the end of the euro and the return ofnational economic sovereignty) war could return to Europe. It's already atits doorsteps in Ukraine and Kurdistan, not to mention Syria and Libya.# distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission# <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism,# collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets# more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l# archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org
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